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        ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
This dissertation relates to the dismissal of Admiral Jellicoe, First Sea Lord 
from November 1916 to December 1917, by Sir Eric Geddes, First Lord of the 
Admiralty, at the behest of the Prime Minister, David Lloyd George.  The dismissal 
was peremptory and effected without rational explanation, despite Jellicoe having 
largely fulfilled his primary mission of combating the German U-boat threat to British 
merchant shipping.  The outcome of the war may well have been affected if the level 
of shipping losses sustained through U-boat attack in April 1917 had continued 
unabated.  
The central argument of the dissertation is that the dismissal was unjustified.  
As an adjunct, it argues that the received view of certain historians that Jellicoe was 
not successful as First Sea Lord is unwarranted and originates from severe post war 
critism of Jellicoe by those with a vested interest in justifying the dismissal, notably 
Lloyd George.  
Supporting these arguments, the following assertions are made.  Firstly, given 
the legacy Jellicoe inherited when joining the Admiralty, through the strategies 
adopted, organisational changes made and initiatives undertaken in anti-submarine 
weapons development, the progress made in countering the U-boat threat was notable.  
Secondly, the universal criticism directed at the Admiralty over the perceived delay in 
introducing a general convoy system for merchant shipping is not sustainable having 
regard to primary source documentation.  Thirdly, incidents that occurred during the 
latter part of 1917, and suggested as being factors which contributed to the dismissal, 
can be discounted.  Fourthly, Lloyd George conspired to involve General Haig, 
Commander of the British Forces in France, and the press baron, Lord Northcliffe, in 
 7 
his efforts to mitigate any potential controversy that might result from Jellicoe’s 
removal from office.  Finally, the arguments made by a number of commentators that 
the Admiralty performed better under Jellicoe’s successor, Admiral Wemyss, is 
misconceived.        
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Chapter I  
 
 
          Introduction 
 
 
Background 
 
It has been said of Admiral Sir John Jellicoe that ‘he was the only man on 
either side who could lose the war in an afternoon.’1  That remark proffers no 
exaggeration.  When Britain declared war on Germany on 4 August 1914, its standing 
army was about one tenth of the size of Germany’s army.  It has been described by 
one historian as an ‘antique fire engine: spotless, shining and in perfect working 
order, but not good at putting out big fires’.2  In economic terms Germany’s industrial 
output had outstripped Britain’s since before the turn of the century.  More 
significantly, in the context of this dissertation, Britain imported almost two thirds of 
its food and, usually, did not maintain a stock of more than four to six weeks supply 
of raw materials for its manufacturing industries.
3
  Maintenance of Britain’s naval 
supremacy was therefore imperative to its survival.  Not only had the Royal Navy to 
protect Britain’s vital ocean trade routes, it had to deter any attempted invasion, 
blockade Germany’s sea trade, and, as the British Government had decided to provide 
military support to France and Belgium, prevent enemy interference with the 
                                                 
1
 Winston Churchill, The World Crisis, (London, 1927), III, 112. 
2
 Gerard de Groot, Blighty, British Society in the Great War, (London, 1996), 14.  
3
 Arthur Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, (London, 1961), 1, 358. (References to this 
work in footnotes are hereafter abbreviated to FDSF). 
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movement of troops and supplies across the English Channel.  Moreover, if the raison 
d’etre of the Royal Navy’s Grand Fleet was to be wholly fulfilled, it would have to 
seek out and annihilate the powerful German High Seas Fleet.  
After two years of war, Jellicoe, as Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet, 
had, with one exception, met those objectives.  Germany had not invaded Britain;    
the blockade of German sea trade was beginning to have an adverse impact on its 
economy and its population; and the cross Channel traffic was secure.  The exception 
was that the Navy had not annihilated the High Seas Fleet.  That Fleet had barely 
ventured from its home port during those two years.  The only time that the main 
body of capital ships of both fleets fought was at the Battle of Jutland in May 1916 
and, whilst it is arguable that the High Seas Fleet scored a tactical victory in the battle 
in as much as more British than German ships were sunk, strategically, the victory 
was clearly British.  Under the onslaught of the British guns, the High Seas Fleet 
under Admiral Scheer turned away from the Grand Fleet and returned to harbour.  It 
would rarely venture forth again during the course of the war and never with the 
intention of confronting the entire Grand Fleet.       
 Ultimately, Germany’s submarine fleet represented a greater threat to 
Britain’s maritime superiority.  Although during the first two years of the war the    
U-boat had affected the strategic and tactical criteria under which the Grand Fleet 
operated and caused some damage to Britain’s merchant shipping, it had not had a 
major impact on Britain’s war effort.  However, as explained further in Chapters II 
and III below, in February 1917 that situation was to change significantly when 
Germany embarked on a full, unrestricted submarine campaign of attacking British, 
Allied and neutral merchant shipping sailing in the waters around Britain.  The effect 
was dramatic.  For a short period Britain’s ocean trade was seriously threatened and, 
 11 
had the submarine campaign continued unabated through the course of 1917, it could 
well have affected the outcome of the war.  Thus, whilst Britain retained control of 
the surface of the oceans, complete control of the sea was threatened by Germany’s 
ability to attack at will from below the surface. 
 In October 1916, Jellicoe had persuaded Herbert Asquith, then Prime 
Minister, and Arthur Balfour, then First Lord of the Admiralty, that strategically,      
the U-boat represented the greatest threat to Britain’s naval supremacy.  He also 
recognised that the Admiralty had been ambivalent to the U-boat threat and that over 
the preceding two years of the war, had done little towards countering it.  As a 
consequence, Jellicoe, acknowledged as being the senior naval commander most 
capable of dealing with this threat, relinquished command of the Grand Fleet and 
moved to the Admiralty as First Sea Lord.   
However, his tenure was short lived.  After just twelve months in office, and 
despite the U-boat threat having been contained, Jellicoe was peremptorily dismissed.  
On Christmas Eve 1917, at about 6 pm, he returned to his office at the Admiralty to 
find a letter from Sir Eric Geddes, then First Lord of the Admiralty, which stated: 
After very careful consideration I have come to the conclusion that a change is 
desirable in the post of First Sea Lord … I have consulted the Prime Minister 
and with his concurrence I am asking to see the King to make this 
recommendation to him … I have thought that you would prefer me to convey 
this decision to you in writing, but should you wish to see me, I shall of course 
be at your disposal at any time.  My regret at having to convey this decision to 
you is the greater in view of the very cordial personal relations which have 
existed between us throughout.
4
  
                                                 
4
 Letter Geddes to Jellicoe, 24 December 1917, BL, Add. MSS 49039.      
 12 
The ‘change’ came without prior notice, discussion, or explanation as to why it was 
being made.  Jellicoe’s response to Geddes’ letter was also terse: 
I have received your letter.  You do not assign a reason for your action, but  
I assume that it is due to a want of confidence in me.  Under these conditions 
you will realise that it is difficult for me to continue my work, as action taken 
by me may commit my successor and may be contrary to your own views.  
I shall therefore be glad to be relieved as soon as possible.
5
  
Thus it was, in the words of one of Jellicoe’s biographers: 
Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, who had served in the Royal Navy, man and boy for 
forty five years, was acknowledged as one of the foremost naval experts of his 
day and who commanded the respect, admiration and affection of all ranks and 
ratings in the Navy, was dismissed from his office on Christmas Eve by an ex- 
railway manager who had been in the Admiralty since the previous summer - 
barely half a dog watch, as the Service saying had it.
6
  
The dismissal caused a furore within the Navy.  A number of politicians were also 
aghast.  The naval members of the Board of the Admiralty were on the verge of 
mutiny.  If they had resigned en masse as threatened, it would, in all probability, have 
brought down the coalition government formed in December 1916 under David Lloyd 
George’s premiership, at a critical point in the war.  
In these circumstances, logic dictates that Jellicoe’s political masters would 
have had grounds for the dismissal that were substantial and publicly justifiable. 
Jellicoe never was ‘assigned a reason’ for his dismissal, either privately or publicly.   
Neither Lloyd George nor Geddes provided justifiable reasons at the time, in 
subsequent Parliamentary debates, or later in correspondence or biographies.  The fact 
                                                 
5
 Letter, Jellicoe to Geddes, 24 December 1917, NA, ADM 116/1807. 
6
 John Winton, Jellicoe, (London, 1981), 261. 
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that they did not do so does in itself suggest that the dismissal was unwarranted.   
Whilst a number of hypotheses have been put forward since, including by Jellicoe 
himself, no real explanation has yet emerged.  It is the question as to whether or not 
Jellicoe’s dismissal was justified that forms the central theme of this dissertation.   
 
 
Jellicoe: the Person  
 
From his birth in Southampton on 5 December 1859, John Rushworth Jellicoe 
was destined to be a sailor.  By his own admission, from his earliest days he had never 
‘thought of any other career than that of the sea’.7  Given his heritage, that is not 
surprising.  His father, John Henry Jellicoe, a sailor all his working life, ended his 
career as Commodore of the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company.  Jellicoe’s three 
maternal uncles all served in the Royal Navy.  His mother, Lucy Keele, was a direct 
descendent of Admiral Phillip Patton, who served with distinction under Boscawen, 
Hawke and Rodney and was Second Sea Lord at the time of the Battle of Trafalgar.
8
  
Following that destiny, in 1872, Jellicoe joined the Royal Naval College, HMS 
Britannia, as a cadet. 
From the beginning of his career, Jellicoe showed ambition.  On receiving the 
news that he had gained admission to Britannia, he was moved to write on the cover 
of one of his books, ‘This book is the property of Admiral Sir John Jellicoe.’9  Later, 
when serving as a Midshipman on HMS Agincourt, his response to a query by his 
mother about his ‘feeling nervous’ about a particular incident was, ‘I am surprised at 
                                                 
7
 Jellicoe, Autobiographical Notes, BL, Add. MSS 49038, 99.  Page references in Jellicoe’s 
Autobiographical Notes are to the folio references in the typed copy, not the holograph version, 
contained in this volume of his papers. 
8
 A. Temple Patterson, Jellicoe, A Biography, (London, 1969), 15.  
9
 Quoted, Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon, The Life of John Rushworth, Earl Jellicoe, (London, 1936), 8.  
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you asking such a question of Sir John Jellicoe KCB.’10  Prima facie, that ambition 
was largely realised.  By his death in 1935, Jellicoe had attained the rank of Admiral 
of the Fleet, had been appointed a Grand Commander of the Order of the Bath and of 
the Royal Victorian Order, received the Order of Merit, held war time commands as 
Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet and as First Sea Lord, served as Governor 
General of New Zealand, and had been elevated to the peerage, ultimately with the 
rank of earl.  Moreover, on this death, he was awarded perhaps his greatest accolade 
by being buried in St Paul’s Cathedral, just a few yards away from the tomb of 
Britain’s greatest naval hero, Admiral Nelson. 
 Early in his career Jellicoe had been identified by the naval reformer, Admiral 
Sir John Fisher, as a sailor of exceptional ability and was one of an elite group of 
Fisher protégés known as the ‘fish pond’.  He had served under Fisher in several 
senior posts at the Admiralty, notably as Controller of the Navy from 1908 to 1910 
and, having been involved in the expansion of the British fleet and development of the 
revolutionary Dreadnought class of battleships through the first decade of the 
twentieth century, he had a thorough knowledge of the capability and strengths and 
weaknesses of the British ships.  Jellicoe had also held numerous senior seagoing 
posts.  He commanded the Atlantic Fleet in 1911 and in 1912 was second in command 
of the larger Home Fleet.  His success in carrying out a simulated invasion on the 
Humber Estuary in the fleet manoeuvres of 1913 was such that the manoeuvres were 
curtailed by the Admiralty ‘for fear of giving useful information to the Germans’.11   
On a personal level, Jellicoe has also been lauded.  He was clever, perhaps 
exceptionally so, relative to the average intelligence of naval officers of the time.  He 
passed out of Britannia first in his term.  The commander there, after meeting 
                                                 
10
 Letter, Jellicoe to his Mother, 10 March 1878, BL, Add. MSS 71544. 
11
 Jellicoe, Autobiographical Notes, BL, Add. MSS 49038, 249. 
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Jellicoe’s mother, remarked to a friend, ‘I wonder if Mrs Jellicoe realizes that her son 
John is one of the cleverest cadets we have ever had.’12  That remark is supported by 
his having achieved firsts in his seamanship examinations, in his studies for lieutenant 
at the Greenwich Naval College and in gunnery.
13
  In the seagoing posts which he 
held, he was extremely effective, his Service Record being peppered with the words 
‘excellent’ and ‘exceptional’.14  Moreover, Jellicoe was personally courageous.  More 
than once he had put his own life at risk in attempting rescues at sea.
15
  He was 
mentioned in despatches for his conduct under fire whilst serving in China during the 
Boxer rebellion of 1900.
16
   
Further, by most accounts, in his rise to the pinnacle of the Service, there is 
little evidence that his character exhibited the traits of authoritarianism, vanity or 
indeed arrogance that often marks those who reach high command.  To quote 
Jellicoe’s first biographer, Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon:  
Heredity had equipped Lord Jellicoe with a charming disposition and firmness 
of character; and between those two somewhat opposing tendencies, he 
developed a wonderfully balanced judgement … The straightness of the 
course he steered was due to the fact that he never allowed personal 
inclination or advantage to weigh against right, nor cause him to neglect doing 
a kind act to others … He had the gift of capturing affection and regard of all 
who serve under him.
17
   
                                                 
12
 Quoted, Winton, Jellicoe, 12. 
13
 Jellicoe, Service Record, NA, ADM 196/38. 
14
 Ibid. 
15
 In 1886, Jellicoe was awarded the Board of Trade medal for gallantry for rescuing the crew of a 
stricken ship off Gibraltar. Ibid.    
16
 Jellicoe was also seriously wounded in the chest leading a charge against the Boxer occupied village 
of Peitsang on the bank of the Pei Ho River.    
17
 Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon, From 1900 Onward, (London, 1940), 334.  
 16 
This is strong praise indeed, even if the source of the remarks cannot be considered to 
be entirely objective.
18
  
  Yet, for all this perceived success and the gift of the ability to command, 
Jellicoe’s reputation, particularly as it relates to his war time commands, is not 
unblemished and was, and remains, the subject of much criticism, both from his 
contemporaries and later commentators.  Indeed, one historian has gone as far as to 
suggest that ‘there is almost an element of Greek Tragedy in the career of Admiral of 
the Fleet Lord Jellicoe.’19  Certainly, one element of the Aristotelian concept of 
tragedy exists in that Jellicoe, being one who was in a position of high power, 
suffered a severe reversal of fortune by being dismissed.  Whether the other essential 
feature of that concept, i.e., that the cause of the misfortune resulted from the hero’s 
own action or inaction rather than some external factor, is debatable.  It will be argued 
in this dissertation that the misfortune was not of Jellicoe’s making.  
The criticism of Jellicoe relates principally to three aspects of his war time 
commands; his defensive approach to strategy whilst in command of the Grand Fleet; 
the tactics adopted during the Battle of Jutland; and his performance as First Sea Lord 
during 1917.  Whilst the first two of these aspects may have coloured the views of 
certain sections of the press and Jellicoe’s political masters as to his competence, it is 
his time at the Admiralty in 1917 that is primarily of relevance in the context of his 
dismissal.  The received view amongst historians is that Jellicoe was not successful as 
First Sea Lord.  Richard Hough, in The Great War at Sea, states, ‘The choice of 
Jellicoe was not a successful one and before long the Prime Minister recognized he 
                                                 
18
 Bacon was a life long friend and associate of Jellicoe and as discussed further in the Literature 
Review that follows, his biography and other writings on Jellicoe are biased in Jellicoe’s favour.       
19
 A Temple Patterson (ed.), The Jellicoe Papers (London 1966), 1, 1. 
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had made a mistake.’20  N. A. M. Roger, in his book entitled The Admiralty, 
concludes that ‘Jellicoe’s prestige made the choice [as First Sea Lord] inevitable, but 
it must be doubted if it was wise.’21  Arthur Marder thought that Jellicoe had been 
‘less successful as First Sea Lord than as C.-in-C. Grand Fleet'.22  
However, these historians appear to have taken the criticism of a number of 
political commentators such as Lloyd George and Winston Churchill at face value 
and, in coming to their conclusion, they have neglected to analyse the positive 
features of the work of the Admiralty under Jellicoe in the context of whether or not 
such criticism or the dismissal was justified.  To ascertain whether the dismissal was 
justified, this dissertation seeks to undertake this analysis. 
 
 
Basis of Argument and Structure  
 
The arguments here focus on six separate premises.  The first is that Jellicoe’s 
effectiveness as First Sea Lord should be measured, not in isolation, but in the context 
of the state of affairs and problems that were prevalent at the Admiralty at the time of 
his appointment.  Therefore, Chapter II firstly discusses this legacy, particularly in 
terms of organisation and weaponry then available to counter the German U-boat 
threat.  Secondly, it considers the organisational, strategic and technological 
initiatives undertaken by Jellicoe.  Thirdly, Chapter II seeks to put the foregoing in 
perspective by considering briefly the change in German naval strategy in its 
                                                 
20
 Richard Hough, The Great War at Sea (Oxford, 1983), 305.  Strictly, Hough’s comment is inaccurate 
in that Jellicoe had been appointed by Asquith as Prime Minister before Lloyd George assumed that 
office.    
21
 N A M Rodger, The Admiralty, (Lavenham, 1979), 133.  
22
 Marder, FDSF, 4, 346. 
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reversion in February 1917 to a wholly unrestricted submarine campaign against 
British, Allied and neutral merchant shipping. 
 However, it is the perceived delay in introducing a general system of 
convoying merchant ships as a counter to the U-boat threat that has generated the 
most severe criticism of the Admiralty under Jellicoe’s command.  Lloyd George, 
referring to this delay, wrote, ‘they [the High Admirals] acted as men who … proceed 
with excessive caution and with an ill-concealed expectation that their forebodings 
will be justified by the experience.’23  Marder was also of the view that ‘he [Jellicoe] 
had been dangerously slow to appreciate the value of a general convoy system.’24  
Even the historian Nicholas Black, who holds a more positive view on the work of the 
Admiralty under Jellicoe than do most commentators, remarked in his recent book, 
The British Naval Staff in the First World War, ‘the one major blot was the tardiness 
with which he [Jellicoe] and his staff eventually grasped the potential of the 
convoy.’25  The second premise is that such severe criticism was unwarranted.  
Chapter III therefore considers the Admiralty’s initial policy towards the convoy 
system and analyses the circumstances surrounding its introduction.  This chapter also 
challenges the controversial claim that the introduction of the convoy system was 
forced on Jellicoe by his political masters rather than as a result of the Admiralty’s 
own initiative.  
 As will be seen, one hypothesis is that the perceived delay in introducing the 
convoy system was a contributory cause of Jellicoe’s departure from the Admiralty.  
However, it is notable that a period of more than six months elapsed between the 
introduction of the general convoy system and his dismissal.  Moreover, Lloyd 
George claimed in his War Memoirs that he had decided in June 1917 to replace 
                                                 
23
 David Lloyd George, War Memoirs, (London, 1934), III, 1164. 
24
 Marder, FDSF, 4, 346. 
25
 Nicholas Black, The British Naval Staff in the First World War, (Woodbridge, 2009), 213.  
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Jellicoe as First Sea Lord.
26
  This begs the question as to why Jellicoe was not 
dismissed until 24 December 1917, particularly as by that time the German submarine 
threat had been contained, if not eliminated entirely.  There were, however, a number 
of incidents that occurred through the latter part of 1917 which Jellicoe himself 
referred to in his biographical notes and which had resulted in some difference of 
opinion between himself and Geddes.  Thus, the third premise on which the central 
argument is based is that none of these incidents, either in isolation or together, 
provided sufficient grounds to relieve Jellicoe of his position.  Chapter IV discusses 
and analyses these incidents in detail.    
   The fourth premise is that Lloyd George, in his efforts to remove Jellicoe 
from office without being seen to be responsible for such unwarranted action, sought 
firstly, to involve General Sir Douglas Haig, Commander-in-Chief of the British 
Expeditionary Force in France, in the matter and then conspired with the press baron, 
Lord Northcliffe, in conducting a vitriolic press campaign against both the Admiralty 
and Jellicoe personally.  With regard to the former, Chapter V considers the events 
surrounding the appointment of Geddes, firstly as Controller of the Navy and then 
First Lord of the Admiralty.  It also considers the relationships between the three 
personalities principally involved, namely Lloyd George, Geddes and Haig and seeks 
to establish the rationale for Haig’s involvement.  As to the latter, Chapter V 
examines the relationship between Lloyd George and Northcliffe and the nature and 
content of the press campaign itself.  The extent to which these ‘conspirators’ may 
have been personally motivated as distinct from acting in the public interest is also 
discussed in this chapter.          
                                                 
26
 Lloyd George, War Memoirs, III, 1176. 
 20 
 The fifth premise is that the manner of the dismissal itself and the somewhat 
bizarre events surrounding it necessarily gives rise to the supposition that neither 
Lloyd George nor Geddes could offer rational grounds to the War Cabinet or to the 
Board of the Admiralty for replacing Jellicoe.  Chapter VI of the dissertation therefore 
considers the actual dismissal and the events surrounding it.  The starting point for 
this chapter is an article by the naval historian, Stephen Roskill, which sets out at 
length the correspondence concerning the dismissal that passed, inter alia, between 
Geddes and Jellicoe, between Geddes and the naval members of the Admiralty Board 
and between Geddes and Sir Edward Carson, Geddes’ immediate predecessor as First 
Lord.
27
  However, this article is primarily a narrative account and does not analyse the 
correspondence in the context of certain extraneous events, notably Geddes’ desire to 
leave the Admiralty and the failure of Lloyd George or Geddes to consult the War 
Cabinet over the dismissal.  Further, Roskill leaves the reader of his article to make 
his own judgement on the manner of the dismissal and on the extent to which Geddes 
relied on false representations made to the Board of the Admiralty.  Thus, Chapter VI 
also amplifies Roskill’s account and gives opinions on the matters on which readers 
are left to make their own judgement.   
Jellicoe’s dismissal might have been justified if matters had improved 
significantly under the tenure of Jellicoe’s immediate successor as First Sea Lord, 
Admiral Sir Rosslyn Wemyss.  That matters did improve is certainly the view held by 
a number of historians.  Again, however, in coming to this conclusion, those who hold 
this view appear to have relied on the testimony of those directly involved in the 
matter, notably Lloyd George, Geddes and Wemyss.  The sixth premise is that this 
opinion is not correct.  In support of this, Chapter VII considers firstly, Wemyss’ 
                                                 
27
 Stephen Roskill, ‘The Dismissal of Admiral Jellicoe’, Journal of Contemporary History, 1, 4, 
(1966). 
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credentials for undertaking the role of First Sea Lord, secondly whether or not under 
Wemyss there was any change to a more aggressive strategy that would have 
appeased the Admiralty’s political masters and thirdly, whether or not operational 
blunders or missed opportunities reduced under Wemyss’ command.  This chapter 
also considers certain aspects of the attempt to blockade the German occupied 
harbours of Ostend and Zeebrugge in April 1918 on the basis that this raid was the 
one naval operation in the war that received wide public and press acclamation, thus 
giving the perception that the Admiralty under Wemyss was more offensively minded 
than under Jellicoe.   
 Chapter VIII offers final thoughts on the dismissal in the context of Jellicoe’s 
health, his career after his dismissal and draws conclusions from the arguments made. 
 
 
Literature Review   
 
There is an abundance of literature on the naval history of the First World 
War.  Within that, much has been written about Admiral Jellicoe.  Most of that 
literature relates to Jellicoe’s role as Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet and 
much of that comprises analyses of different facets of the Battle of Jutland.  As one 
historian has said, ‘Had another fleet encounter taken place … it is unlikely that 
anyone would care much who won Jutland.’28  
Less has been written about the year on which this dissertation is centred, 
namely 1917, and much of that has been focused on the controversy surrounding the 
introduction of the convoy system.  Moreover, as mentioned, most naval historians 
                                                 
28
 Andrew Gordon, The Rules of the Game, Jutland and the Naval Command, (London, 2005), 562.    
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writing on this have concluded that Jellicoe’s tenure as First Sea Lord was not 
successful.   
It is convenient for the purposes of this review to divide the principal literature  
sources considered into three categories; firstly, literature published by naval 
historians; secondly, biographies of those involved in the events pertaining to 
Jellicoe’s dismissal; and thirdly, the memoirs, again of politicians or naval personnel 
with knowledge of the events pertaining to the dismissal.   
In the first category, the starting point must be The Official History of the 
Great War, Naval Operations, published in five volumes between 1920 and 1931.
29
 
The first three volumes were written by the naval strategist and historian, Sir Julian 
Corbett.  The last two were completed after Corbett’s death by the poet and author, 
Sir Henry Newbolt.  The historian, Arthur Marder, described this work as being 
‘detailed and authentic’ and with ‘restrained judgments’ and it is certainly a valuable 
source for the narrative of events, statistics and charts.
30
   However, for two reasons, 
the commentary has to be treated with some caution.  Firstly, when the monograph 
was written, some information was withheld on grounds of secrecy.  Secondly, in the 
words of one reviewer, ‘Perhaps the weakest characteristic of The Official History is 
the evident effort on the part of its authors to refrain from all criticism of British 
leaders.’31  In this context it is evident from Jellicoe’s papers that Newbolt’s original 
draft of the chapter relating to the introduction of the convoy system, following the 
start of the German unrestricted submarine campaign, underwent a number of changes 
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at the behest of Jellicoe before it was finally published.
32
  Thus, Marder’s comment 
that the Official History is ‘restrained’ is an understatement.  
Less caution need be exercised with regard to Marder’s own major work, 
entitled From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow.
33
  Published in five volumes between 
1961 and 1970, it is thoroughly researched, with Marder having access to many of the 
documents not available when the Official History was written.  Despite the fact that 
the last volume was published over forty years ago, it remains the seminal work on 
British naval history for the period 1914-1919.  It covers in detail all aspects of the 
war at sea from a British perspective, and of particular relevance here, contains a 
detailed analysis of the German unrestricted submarine campaign of 1917 and the 
Admiralty’s efforts to counter it.  In the words of the war historian, John Keegan, 
‘Marder had achieved standards of archival research and organisation of material 
which defy betterment.’34     
Nevertheless, although Marder’s opinions are generally well balanced, they 
are not incontestable.  As pointed out by the naval historian Andrew Lambert, aspects 
of Marder’s work have recently been challenged, notably, in the context of this 
dissertation, by Nicholas Black in his recent work, The British Naval Staff in the First 
World War.
35
  Black argues that Marder was inclined to adopt the opinions of several 
reform-minded officers, particularly Herbert Richmond and Kenneth Dewar, both of 
whom served in the Admiralty during the war, in reaching a number of conclusions 
regarding the competence of naval staff at the Admiralty, particularly in the Jellicoe 
era.  Certainly in this context Marder has undoubtedly been swayed by Richmond on 
account of having written his biography, Portrait of an Admiral, before writing From 
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the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow.
36
  Moreover, Marder’s occasional trait of relying on 
third party opinions without supporting analysis is exemplified in Chapter VII below 
by his support for the view expressed by Lloyd George and Wemyss that the 
Admiralty was more efficient under Wemyss than it was under Jellicoe.  However, 
Lambert’s implication that Marder’s work contained ‘damaging assumptions and 
intentions of previous generations’ which could only be freed through ‘analysis, based 
on large-scale, sustained research’ is unduly harsh.37  Much of the narrative within 
From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow is the result of sustained and detailed research. 
Marder’s work remains a most valuable source for any scholar of the naval history of 
the war and has been a principal source of statistics used in this dissertation. 
Two other useful sources for statistics are The German Submarine War, 1914 -
1918, by R H Gibson and Maurice Prendergast, first published in 1931, and Seaborne 
Trade, History of the Great War based on Official Documents by Ernest Fayle,  
published in three volumes from 1920 to 1924.
38
  The former is a narrative account of 
the German submarine war and, inter alia, provides detailed accounts of individual 
submarine actions.  The language used is occasionally flamboyant and, although not 
expressing any opinion on Jellicoe’s dismissal, the book is favourably biased towards 
him and the work undertaken by the Admiralty in ultimately defeating the U-boat.  
The book is also useful in that Gibson and Prendergast have made extensive use of 
German source material in their research.  The latter work is in essence the official 
account of Merchant Navy operations during the war and the same qualifications 
regarding secrecy apply to that work as they do to the Official History.       
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 Of the other monographs on naval aspects of the war that have been 
considered, Castles of Steel, written by Robert Massie and published in 2005 is 
stylishly written (as befits a Pulitzer Prize winner) and well researched, although 
Massie relies primarily on secondary source material and consequently the work does 
not have the same value to the researcher in pointing to the primary sources as the 
other monographs mentioned here.
39
  Massie’s chapter dealing with the German 
submarine campaign is relatively short and focuses mainly on the activities of the ‘Q’ 
Boats and on the relationship between the Navy and the US Navy operating around 
Britain after the US entered the war.  He does relate Lloyd George’s criticism of the 
Admiralty in relation to the introduction of the convoy, but expresses no firm view as 
to whether it was warranted.  Nor does he comment on whether Jellicoe’s dismissal 
was justified.  Where this book is perceptive, however, is in the way in which Massie 
interweaves the personalities of the politicians primarily associated with the conduct 
the war with his narrative account of naval operations.   
Two other monographs on the naval war that have been referred to extensively 
are Paul Halpern’s A Naval History of World War I, first published in 1994, and John 
Terraine’s Business in Great Waters, first published in 1989.40  Both of these are 
conventional narratives, Terraine’s being specifically directed to the German 
submarine campaigns of both world wars.  Again, neither of these books offers any 
firm view of the reasons for Jellicoe’s dismissal or whether or not it was justified, 
although Halpern does suggest that the surface attack on two Scandinavian convoys in 
the latter part of 1917, discussed further in Chapter IV below, may have been a 
contributory factor.  Halpern also presents Jellicoe’s dismissal as Geddes having 
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‘asked for and received Jellicoe’s resignation as First Sea Lord’ which, in light of the 
correspondence quoted at the beginning of this chapter, seems to be a particularly 
benign interpretation of the event.
41
  Moreover, both these authors adopt the received 
view that the Admiralty procrastinated in adopting the convoy system.   
 The most recent secondary source that warrants some comment here is The 
British Naval Staff in the First World War by Nicholas Black.
42
  First published in 
2009, the book provides a detailed analytical history of the work of the Admiralty 
throughout the war, based on extensive research and analysis of relevant Admiralty 
papers.  His assessment challenges the view of the earlier writers that the Admiralty 
under Jellicoe was ineffective, commenting in some depth on the reorganisation and 
growth of the naval staff under Jellicoe and the weapons development and intelligence 
work undertaken in the efforts to defeat the U-boat.  Black concludes that the ultimate 
defeat of the U-boat in 1918 was a direct result of the building blocks put in place by 
Jellicoe and his staff in 1917.  However, as is discussed further in Chapter III below, 
his statement to the effect that Jellicoe’s only failure was in delaying the introduction 
of the convoy system seems inconsistent with his detailed analysis of the 
circumstances surrounding this issue.  
 Turning to the second category of literature that falls for discussion here, 
namely biographies of people involved in or with close knowledge of the work of the 
Admiralty during 1917 and the controversy surrounding the dismissal, the obvious 
starting point is the existing biographies of Jellicoe.  Perhaps surprisingly given the 
importance of his role in the war, just three full biographies of Jellicoe have been 
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written and only one of these by an academic historian.
43
  This is in contrast to the 
numerous biographies that have been written about Jellicoe’s military counterpart, 
General Haig, but perhaps this imbalance is a reflection of the fact that over 700,000 
British soldiers’ lives were lost, whereas the total number of Royal Navy personnel 
killed amounted to some 34,000.  
The first full biography of Jellicoe was written by Admiral Sir Reginald   
Bacon.
44
  Published in 1936, it is unequivocally biased in Jellicoe’s favour.  As noted, 
Bacon was a lifelong friend of Jellicoe.  He was recognised by his peers as being 
highly intelligent and, like Jellicoe, swam in the ‘fishpond’.  For most of the war, he 
was in command of the Dover Patrol, responsible for securing the English Channel 
and protecting the shipping traffic supporting the British Expeditionary Force on the 
Western Front.  According to Marder, it was Jellicoe’s sense of loyalty in not 
relieving Bacon of his command at the end of 1917 that was the catalyst that 
prompted Jellicoe’s dismissal.  This biography was written shortly after the 
publication of Lloyd George’s War Memoirs and is generally defensive of Jellicoe.   
In the words of one of Jellicoe’s later biographers, Bacon ‘was too close to him 
[Jellicoe] and in the major case too warmly partisan and too deeply immersed in the 
controversies to which his war time activities give rise for an objective presentation to 
be possible’.45  Yet despite that, Bacon’s biography is of considerable value, not only 
because he was close to and involved in many events as they occurred, but also 
because he was personally close to Jellicoe.  Consequently his biography gives more 
insight to Jellicoe’s persona than the other biographies discussed here.   
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However, Bacon is highly critical of Lloyd George’s decision to remove 
Jellicoe from the Admiralty.  He concludes his chapter on ‘Leaving the Admiralty’ by 
remarking that ‘then, having achieved this task [of countering the U-boat threat], one 
which Sir John himself, at first, deemed to be almost impossible, he was thrown, 
without ceremony, courtesy or excuse, on to the scrap-heap’.46  With such strongly 
held views, Bacon’s opinion of the dismissal must be considered with some 
circumspection. 
  Far less circumspection is required with regard to the second full biography of 
Jellicoe’s life.  First published in 1969 and written by A Temple Patterson, at the time 
Professor of History at Southampton University, it is much more of an academic and 
reliable source, if for no other reason than it followed his publication, through the 
Naval Records Society, of an edited selection of Jellicoe’s private and official 
papers.
47
  Again, with specific regard to the dismissal, Patterson’s account of the 
events is primarily narrative and he does not attempt to analyse the question of 
whether or not it was justified.  He does, however, support the view that originated in 
the Official History that the strain of office was proving too much for Jellicoe and 
‘could not be further prolonged with justice to him or advantage to the Service’.48  
Similarly, Patterson’s account of the Admiralty’s efforts to counter the U-boat 
campaign through the course of 1917 is primarily narrative.  However, it is notable 
that Patterson attributes one of the causes of the Admiralty’s reluctance to introduce 
the convoy system to the Admiralty’s reliance on misleading merchant ship 
movement statistics, a view that is challenged in Chapter III below.
49
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 The latest biography of Jellicoe was written by John Winton in 1981.
50
  
Winton is more renowned as a novelist than an historian and, although his work 
appears to be well researched, it again tends to be more descriptive than analytical.
51
  
Further, Winton makes a number of controversial statements which do not withstand 
analysis.  For example, whilst extolling Jellicoe’s success in the large scale fleet 
exercises of 1913, he states that Jellicoe was ‘at the peak of his mental, professional 
and physical fitness and had never been so sharp, so quick and accurate of decision’ 
and from this premise draws the conclusion that ‘if the Battle of Jutland had been 
fought in July 1913, it might have been the comprehensive victory that the nation had 
yearned for.’52  Given the difference in circumstances between an amphibious 
exercise and meeting the whole of the High Seas Fleet in battle, the fact that Jellicoe 
had acquired two years of wartime command in the meantime and the fact that there is 
no evidence at all to suggest any decline in Jellicoe’s mental or physical powers at the 
time of the Battle of Jutland, Winton’s conclusion can best be described as 
speculative.  Winton, like Patterson, also argues that ‘the Admiralty had made an ass 
of itself’ over the matter of the merchant shipping movement statistics.53  Moreover, 
his view on Jellicoe’s dismissal that ‘probably no single person, neither Geddes, nor 
Lloyd George, nor the continued press campaign of Lord Northcliffe, was responsible 
for what was to happen’, is an opinion which is at odds with the evidence contained in 
the following chapters.
54
  Thus, for different reasons, Winton’s opinions should be 
treated with as much circumspection as are Bacon’s.  
 As will be noted from the attached bibliography, biographies of a number of 
people referred to in this dissertation other than Jellicoe have been considered, but 
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there is space here only to comment on these that pertain to four people central to the 
arguments presented here, namely Sir Eric Geddes, Sir Rosslyn Wemyss, Sir Edward 
Carson and Lord Northcliffe.  The Forging of a Family, written by Geddes’ brother, 
Sir Auckland Geddes, is in essence a biography of the Geddes family with a 
substantial part of it devoted to the life and work of Sir Eric.
55
  It undoubtedly reveals 
an element of ‘brotherly bias’ in its praise of Sir Eric’s character and achievements.  
Furthermore, as noted in Chapter VI below, it also contains factual inaccuracies 
regarding events which occurred immediately before Jellicoe’s dismissal.  Despite 
this, however, the chapter describing Geddes’ time at the Admiralty does provide an 
interesting perspective as to his state of mind at the time of his appointment and his 
time in office.  It also gives Geddes’ perspective on the dismissal itself and on the 
debacle with the other Sea Lords and Carson that occurred after the event.  Notably, 
the biography confirms that Geddes was cognisant of the fact that Lloyd George was 
seeking to use Geddes as the mechanism for dispensing with Jellicoe’s services, 
without responsibility attaching to him.
56
  This supports the argument that Lloyd 
George engineered the dismissal, despite his protestations to the contrary. 
 Similarly, The Life and Letters of Lord Wester Wemyss provides an interesting 
perspective on Wemyss’ time at the Admiralty and has also proved to be a useful 
source for some of his correspondence which could not be accessed directly.
57
  
However, this biography was written by his wife and in a similar vein to Sir Auckland 
Geddes’ biography of his brother, Lady Wemyss was undoubtedly intent on 
commending her husband’s achievements, remarking that on his appointment as First 
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Sea Lord, Wemyss ‘was to succeed where others had failed’.58  Consequently, some 
caution has to be exercised in accepting her comments at face value.  It is, however, a 
caution that does not appear to have been exercised by a number of historians who, 
contrary to the arguments contained in Chapter VII below, have adopted the view that 
the Admiralty was more effective under Wemyss than it was under Jellicoe.  
Written independently of familial association, the biography of Sir Edward 
Carson by Montgomery Hyde is more objective.
59
  Again, because Carson was First 
Lord for just six months and his political achievements are more associated with the 
affairs of Ireland than with the Navy, the parts of the biography that deal with his time 
at the Admiralty are relatively short.  Nevertheless, the biography is illuminating in 
two respects.  Firstly, it confirms that from the beginning of 1917, Carson was under 
considerable pressure from Lloyd George to make changes at the Admiralty, despite 
the fact that Jellicoe had only just been appointed First Sea Lord and had just set 
about its reorganisation.  According to Carson, ‘Sack the lot!’ and ‘why do you not 
get fresh men with sea experience?’ were expressions frequently used by Lloyd 
George, despite the fact that Carson presented lists of service personnel proving to 
Lloyd George that many of the personnel Jellicoe brought to the Admiralty had recent 
service afloat.
60
  Secondly, it confirms that Carson, despite his disapproval of 
Jellicoe’s dismissal, acted in the interests of the country in mollifying the Sea Lords 
who had threatened to resign over the matter, thus avoiding a constitutional crisis. 
 As is argued in Chapter V below, the press baron, Lord Northcliffe, also had a 
role in the dismissal of Jellicoe.  Two biographical works, both by J. Lee Thompson, 
have been the principal secondary sources considered in this respect, namely 
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Northcliffe, Press Baron in Politics 1865-1922, published in 2000 and Politics, the 
Press and Propaganda, Northcliffe and the Great War, published in 1999.
61
  The 
former is a general account of Northcliffe’s life and work, whilst the latter is primarily 
concerned with his wartime activities.  Both are objectively written and provide a 
useful insight to the power Northcliffe wielded, particularly through his ownership of 
The Times and the Daily Mail, and to his personal relationship with Lloyd George.  
There is, however, surprisingly little discussion in either of the biographies about the 
press campaign against the Admiralty.  Nor is any clear motivation ascribed to 
Northcliffe for the concerted press attacks on Jellicoe other than a brief comment 
about Northcliffe’s concern for ‘the unrelenting losses to the submarines and the 
resulting food crisis’  which ‘finally moved him to unleash his newspapers on the 
Admiralty’.62  Also, no specific mention is made of the conspiracy to remove Jellicoe 
from office that is discussed in Chapter V.  However, Thompson does claim that in 
October 1917, Northcliffe ‘complained personally to Lloyd George and Carson that 
the Sea Lord [Jellicoe] should be removed’, which supports Jellicoe’s contention that 
Nothcliffe was involved in the matter.
63
   
 As to the third category of literature considered here, that is memoirs or other 
work written by those involved in or with close knowledge of the relevant events, the 
starting point is again Jellicoe himself.  He did not publish an autobiography, but 
authored three books about his war time activities.
64
  The first, entitled The Grand 
Fleet, 1914-1916 and published in January 1919, was clearly written in the time he 
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had immediately after his dismissal.
65
  Whilst in the words of one commentator, ‘It is 
no literary masterpiece,’ it fulfils Jellicoe’s stated intent of ‘giving an account of the 
organisation and the development of the Grand Fleet and its bases … after the 
hoisting of my flag on the outbreak of hostilities, and the manner in which the 
changing conditions of naval warfare were met’.66  As such, the work provides useful 
background and insight into Jellicoe’s approach to command.  The second and third 
books written by Jellicoe are more directly relevant in this context.  The first, 
published in 1920, is entitled The Crisis of the Naval War, and in Jellicoe’s own 
words ‘is largely concerned with the successive steps taken at the Admiralty to deal 
with a situation [the U-boat threat], which was always serious and at times assumed a 
very grave aspect’.67  Again some element of caution has to be exercised in relying on 
this as a source, as Jellicoe later acknowledged in his third book, The Submarine 
Peril, published in 1934, his earlier work was deficient in that ‘it was not then 
desirable to give full details of our methods.’68  However, it is probably not just this 
that initiated the second work on the same subject.  Rather, although Lloyd George’s 
name is only fleetingly mentioned, there is little doubt that from the timing of the 
book’s publication and the reference in its Introduction to ‘many misstatements on the 
subject’ having been published, it is written in response to the numerous criticisms in 
Lloyd George’s War Memoirs, particularly on the perceived delay in introducing the 
convoy system.
69
  Given the extent of the criticism directed at the Admiralty both 
during the war by the Northcliffe press and subsequently, it is not surprising that 
Jellicoe, on occasion, is defensive of his position.  Nevertheless, irrespective of the 
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foregoing reservations, both works must be considered to be authoritative sources on 
the Admiralty’s efforts to defeat the U-boat campaign. 
 Lloyd George’s War Memoirs is a further work which warrants comment 
here.
70
  The political theorist, Harold Laski, observed that political memoirs generally 
‘focused on the personalities and roles of the elite, whose principal interest in writing 
is to vindicate their political behaviour’.71  Lloyd George’s War Memoirs certainly 
exemplifies that observation.  Published in six volumes between 1931 and 1936, it is 
an epic account of the war that is as enigmatic as its author.  On the one hand, it was 
written on the basis of painstaking research of Cabinet and other relevant papers and 
diaries and with the support of the Cabinet Secretary, Sir Maurice Hankey.  On the 
other hand, in parts it is written with a belligerence that goes beyond all reason.  It has 
been said that Lloyd George’s version of the war, particularly the chapters on the 
Passchendaele Battle, did as much as any single source to ‘stigmatize indelibly in 
popular memory the role of the military elite in the war’.72  The same may be said of 
the effect of his criticism of the naval elite, and in particular those, including Jellicoe, 
who served at the Admiralty during 1917.  Hankey’s own work, The Supreme 
Command, provides a more objective assessment of the events surrounding the 
controversy over the introduction of the convoy system, although it is notable that he 
also claims that it was his memorandum on the benefits of the convoy system, written 
in February 1917, that was the catalyst for the Admiralty’s conversion to this 
approach to countering the submarine threat.
73
  Finally in this category, two other 
works are worthy of note.  Bacon’s The Dover Patrol 1915-1917, published in two 
volumes in 1919, provides an interesting perspective on two matters discussed in 
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Chapters VI and VII below, namely the controversy that arose in December 1917 over 
the mine barrages across the English Channel and the attempt to block the Zeebrugge 
and Ostend harbours in April 1918.
74
  Bacon is critical both of the work of the 
Barrage Committee, which was established at the Admiralty to review the barrage’s 
effectiveness, and of certain aspects of the plans to attack the Zeebrugge and Ostend 
harbours.  Clearly, as it was his resistance to the Barrage Committee’s proposals 
which resulted in his being relieved of command of the Dover Patrol, his opinion is 
likely to be biased.  Nevertheless, his explanation of the technical and operational 
issues involved on both matters is illuminating.  The other side of the picture is 
provided in The Naval Memoirs of Admiral of the Fleet, Sir Roger Keyes.
75
  Keyes 
chaired the Barrage Committee, succeeded Bacon in command of the Dover Patrol 
and commanded the attack on Zeebrugge and Ostend.  It is, therefore, not surprising 
that he offers a more positive perspective on these events than Bacon.  If nothing else, 
whilst works in this category are valuable sources, such opposing views highlight the 
degree of caution that the historian should adopt in their use.  
 
 
Summary 
 
Jellicoe at the peak of his career, arguably holding the most important service 
role in the war, was peremptorily dismissed without rational explanation, despite 
having largely fulfilled his mission of countering the German submarine threat.  If 
that threat had been sustained, it would have seriously threatened Britain’s ability to 
continue the war. 
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 However, the accepted view is that Jellicoe was not was not a success as First 
Sea Lord.  The central argument in this dissertation is that this view is misconceived 
and that Jellicoe’s dismissal was unjustified.  It will establish this firstly by exploring 
the strategies and weaponry developed on the Admiralty’s initiatives during the 
course of 1917 in the context of the legacy Jellicoe inherited.  Secondly, it will be 
argued that the universal criticism made over the perceived delay in introducing the 
convoy system as a means of defeating the U-boat was unwarranted.  Thirdly, it will 
be argued that although there were differences of opinion between Geddes and 
Jellicoe, particularly during the later months of 1917, these differences were 
insufficient to warrant the dismissal.  Fourthly, the dissertation will explore the way in 
which Lloyd George, with his capacity for intrigue, conspired with General Haig and 
then Lord Northcliffe in his efforts to remove Jellicoe from office, thus suggesting 
that that he had no reasonable cause for so doing.  Fifthly, it will be argued that the 
bizarre circumstances of the dismissal and its aftermath give credence to the argument 
that the dismissal was unwarranted.  Finally, it will be argued that the Admiralty’s 
performance under Jellicoe’s successor was no better than it had been under Jellicoe, 
thereby countering the statements to the contrary of Lloyd George, Geddes and 
Wemyss that matters were much improved. 
 In other words therefore, the arguments in this dissertation seek to remove the 
‘stigmatisation’ that attached to the naval elite as a consequence of Lloyd George’s 
version of the Admiralty’s activities through 1917.                
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    Chapter II
 
 A Difficult Inheritance 
 
 
 Introduction  
 
Admiral Sir John Jellicoe’s transfer to the Admiralty at the beginning of December 
1916, after two and a quarter years in command of the Grand Fleet, was undertaken 
with reluctance.  Jellicoe accepted the offer from Arthur Balfour, then First Lord of 
the Admiralty, on the basis that he was ‘prepared to do what was considered best for 
the Service’.1  However, his appointment as First Sea Lord was largely of his own 
making.  On 29 October 1916, a month prior to his appointment, he had written to 
Balfour and Sir Henry Jackson, Jellicoe’s predecessor, stating: 
The very serious and ever-increasing menace of the enemy’s submarine attack 
on trade is by far the most pressing question at the present time. 
2. There appears to be a serious danger that our losses in merchant ships, 
combined with the losses in neutral ships may, by the early summer of 1917, 
have such a serious effect upon the import of food and other necessaries into 
the allied countries as to force us into accepting peace terms, which the 
military position on the Continent would not justify and which would fall 
short of our desires. 
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3. The methods which have been used in the past for attacking submarines are 
not now meeting with the success which has hitherto attended them.
2
 
 As Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet, Jellicoe had no direct 
responsibility for the development of anti-submarine measures, but in writing to his 
superiors in such terms his consternation about the potential impact of the German 
submarine threat on the outcome of the war and the lack of development of effective 
anti-submarine weaponry is evident.   
 Such was his concern that on the following day, he again wrote to Jackson 
suggesting that to achieve the ‘very rapid action on any idea that seems to give 
promise of success’ an ‘all-powerful committee’ be established to ‘work with the 
idea,’ the committee to include ‘younger officers who were prolific in ideas’.3  
Balfour did not follow this recommendation.  Instead, he asked Jackson to resign and 
appointed Jellicoe as First Sea Lord in his place.    
It was virtually Balfour’s last act as First Lord and arguably his most 
successful during his time at the Admiralty.  Within three weeks of Jellicoe’s 
appointment, the Prime Minister, Herbert Asquith, had resigned and a new Coalition 
Government formed under David Lloyd George.  Balfour had been replaced by Sir 
Edward Carson, the Ulster Unionist MP who, by his own admission, knew little of 
naval matters.  On his first day at the Admiralty, Carson announced, ‘I am here, 
gentlemen, because I know nothing at all about the job.  My only great qualification 
for being put at the head of the Navy is that I am very much at sea.’4  As it transpired, 
Carson and Jellicoe worked well together for the brief period that Carson remained at 
the Admiralty.  However, as will become evident later in this dissertation, the same 
cannot be said for Jellicoe’s relationship with Lloyd George.   
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 Nevertheless, initially the change of political masters was the least of 
Jellicoe’s difficulties in dealing with the U-boat threat.  In the context of whether his 
dismissal was justified or indeed of the subsequent criticism to which he was 
subjected, it is appropriate to consider the state of affairs that existed at the time he 
assumed the role of First Sea Lord and the steps he initiated to address the problems 
encountered.  Thus, this chapter will consider firstly, the Admiralty organisation in 
place at the beginning of 1917 and the steps Jellicoe took to change this.  Secondly, to 
put the problems Jellicoe faced in context, it will consider the status and effectiveness 
of the U-boat campaign against merchant shipping up to that date and the changes 
made by the German naval hierarchy to its naval strategy.  Thirdly, it will consider the 
strategic options open to Jellicoe and, in that context, the weaponry at his disposal.   
 
 
The Legacy  
 
 Historians have not regarded kindly the Admiralty regime of Arthur Balfour as 
First Lord and Sir Henry Jackson as First Sea Lord (which ran from May 1915 to 
November 1916).  The sometimes acerbic Andrew Gordon described Jackson as 
‘lacklustre’ and the regime as ‘comatose’.5  Lloyd George did not think that Balfour 
was the person ‘to stimulate and activate the Navy in a time of crisis’.6  Marder was of 
the view that Jackson lacked leadership capabilities, imagination and energy and that 
the job proved ‘too much for his talents and his temperament’.7  These views are 
harsh given the problems that the Admiralty faced during that period, notably the 
aftermath of the disaster of the Gallipoli campaign that brought about Winston 
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Churchill’s departure as First Lord, the resignation of Admiral Fisher as First Sea 
Lord and the aftermath of the Battle of Jutland.  As Nicholas Black has stated, 
‘Jackson was not the buffoon that later accounts have made him out to be.’8    
However, what is certainly clear is that under the auspices of Balfour, Jackson 
and their immediate predecessors, the Admiralty did little towards combating the 
looming U-boat threat.  As Jellicoe wrote to his successor in command of the Grand 
Fleet, Admiral Sir David Beatty, shortly after his appointment, ‘Everything has been 
left on the wait and see principle.  The late Government is much to blame.’9   
In mitigation of this failure, merchant shipping losses from U-boat attack had 
not seriously threatened the Allied war effort until the latter part of 1916.  Such losses 
(to British Empire shipping) had remained fairly constant at an average of 
approximately 300,000 gross tons per quarter from the beginning of the war.  It was 
not until the final quarter of 1916 that these losses began to escalate seriously.
10
  On 
the other hand, the U-boat had played a major part in determining Britain’s overall 
naval strategy throughout the first two years of the war.  It had dictated that the sea 
blockade against German merchant trade be carried out at a distance rather than close 
to shore.  It had dictated the policy that other than in exceptional circumstances, the 
Grand Fleet curtail its operations in the North Sea to an area above latitude 55 degrees 
30 minutes north.  It had also dictated the Grand Fleet’s battle tactics.  Early in the 
war, Jellicoe, as Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet, had written to the 
Admiralty stating that: 
If … the enemy battlefleet were to turn away from an advancing Fleet, I 
should assume that the intention was to lead us over mines and submarines, 
and should decline to be so drawn. 
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I desire particularly to draw the attention … to this point, since it may be 
deemed a refusal to do battle, and, indeed, might possibly result in a failure to 
bring the enemy to action as soon as is expected and hoped.
 11
  
Indeed, the view has been expressed by a number of commentators on the Battle of 
Jutland in May 1916 that, in adopting this policy of ‘turning away’, Jellicoe lost an 
opportunity to inflict much greater damage on the German High Seas Fleet during that 
battle because he ordered his ships to turn away under threat of torpedo attack. 
  Moreover, and perhaps most significantly in the context of the U-boat threat to 
merchant shipping, the perceived necessity of screening capital ships with destroyers, 
the ideal vessels for hunting U-boats and protecting convoys, seriously limited the 
availability of such vessels for trade protection purposes.  It is remarkable then, 
despite the fact that the loss of merchant shipping to submarine attack did not 
seriously affect the war effort until the end of 1916, that Carson’s and Jellicoe’ 
predecessors had done little to develop anti-submarine measures.  
One further point should be made with regard to the legacy Jellicoe inherited.  
Not surprisingly on account of the lack of attention given to the problem, although 
several inventions had shown potential, no technical solutions had been fully 
developed for detecting a submerged submarine or sinking it once it had been 
detected.  From the start of the war until the end of December 1916, just 46 German 
submarines had been sunk, the majority by gunfire or mine.  
Thus, whilst Balfour’s statement to the War Committee on 14 October 1916 
that ‘we must for the present be content with palliation … to diminish an evil which 
unfortunately we cannot wholly cure’ reflected an attitude of resignation, it also 
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contained an element of realism.
12
  The combination of advances in the development 
of diesel and electric motors, pumping technology and the torpedo had created what 
was to become the most formidable weapon of naval warfare.  At the beginning of the 
war, Germany had just 28 U-boats in service.
13
  By the time Jellicoe had been 
appointed First Sea Lord that number had grown to 138.
14
  Further, the capability of 
the U-boat had improved significantly.  By 1917, the larger U-boats in service 
operating out of the German occupied North Sea ports generally had an endurance of 
more than 5,000 miles, a surface speed of over 16 knots and a submerged speed of 
over 8 knots.  They were armed with one or two guns of 10.5cm calibre or greater and 
a minimum of four torpedo tubes.
15
  Even the smaller U-boats (classified UB), which 
generally sailed out of the German controlled Flanders seaports, although slower, had 
a range of more than 4,000 miles and armament that almost matched that of the larger 
boats.
16
  With the capability of attacking on the surface and then escaping underwater 
or simply attacking from underwater, the U-boat was a threat in respect of which the 
Navy had no answer.  As Marder said, ‘The submarine, which had been a fragile thing 
at the beginning of the war, had developed into a desperately dangerous instrument of 
destruction.’17 
It was Jellicoe’s initiative that had forced the Admiralty and his political 
masters to acknowledge the potential seriousness of the threat to Britain’s food and 
raw material supplies from this ‘instrument of destruction’ and prompted his reluctant 
move to the Admiralty.  His predecessors there had at best been ambivalent to the 
threat and had not taken positive steps to develop effective countermeasures.  It is 
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thus reflective of Jellicoe’s dedication to the service of his country that he was 
prepared to forsake the command of the Grand Fleet and assume responsibility for a 
poisonous legacy for which there was no known antidote.  It is also reflective of 
Jellicoe’s appreciation of the wider strategic priorities that could influence the 
outcome of the war.    
 
 
Unrestricted Submarine Warfare  
 
 As stated, when Jellicoe was appointed First Sea Lord, the threat to Allied 
shipping could be described as serious but not critical.  The received view is that at 
the beginning of the war, the German navy had neither the capability nor the intention 
of launching a submarine offensive against merchant shipping.
18
  Rather, in the view 
of Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, Secretary of the German Imperial Naval Office, the 
submarine was seen as a fleet reconnaissance and torpedo unit ‘potentially capable of 
providing an equalization factor between opposing grand fleets’.19 
This view was to change.  It has been suggested that it was an article by Sir 
Arthur Conan Doyle that appeared in the Strand Magazine in the summer of 1914 
entitled ‘Danger! Story of England’s Peril’, which related how a small nation with a 
force of sixteen submarines destroyed British commerce and forced Britain to 
conclude peace terms, that was the inspiration for the change of strategy.
20
  However, 
it was more likely that the British imposition of the trade blockade against Germany 
immediately after war started, and which Germany considered illegal, precipitated the 
                                                 
18
 Philip Lundenberg, ‘The German Naval Critique of the U-boat Campaign, 1915-1918’, Military 
Affairs, 27, 3, (Autumn, 1963), 105.   
19
 Quoted, ibid, 106.  
20
 Halpern, Naval History, 291. 
 44 
reassessment.  The German head of state, Kaiser Wilhelm II, declared on 4 February 
1915 that from 28 February the waters around Great Britain, including the English 
Channel, would be considered a war zone in which every merchant ship encountered 
would be destroyed without the safety of crew and passengers necessarily being 
reassured.  In other words, the cruiser rules whereby merchant ships would first be 
stopped and the crew given the opportunity to take to the ship’s boats were 
abandoned.   
However, this declaration engendered serious diplomatic opposition and was 
almost immediately modified.  The US government issued a diplomatic note stating 
that if the life of any US citizen was lost as a consequence of implementing this 
strategy, the German government would be held to a ‘strict accountability’. 21  
Bethman-Hollweg, the German Chancellor, responded to the effect that German 
submarine commanders would be ordered to spare neutral shipping, provided that it 
could be recognised as such.  In turn, this angered the German naval leaders as it 
compromised the effectiveness of the campaign.
22
   
There is not space here to provide a detailed analysis of the internal politics 
that influenced the development of the German U-boat campaign thereafter, but three 
general points emerge from the foregoing that have relevance to the current 
arguments.
23
  Firstly, the conflict of views between the German politicians and naval 
hierarchy stemmed primarily from the premise that the submarine does not lend itself 
to the complex and legalistic rules and customs that governed guerre de course.     
The submarine’s crew was relatively small and therefore could not spare men to act as 
prize crews.  It did not have the space to take on board crew from the target vessel.   
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Most significantly, by having to surface to examine ships it intercepted, the submarine 
seriously jeopardised its own safety, particularly after the Allies introduced              
‘Q’ ships.24   
Secondly, this conflict between the German political and naval hierarchies, 
with the political hierarchy fearing the adverse reaction of neutral countries 
(particularly the US and Holland) to the sinking of their ships, lasted until February 
1917.  During this period, the rules of engagement for U-boat commanders vacillated 
constantly, depending essentially on the level of protest from neutral countries after 
any of their ships had been sunk and whether politicians or the naval hierarchy had 
the upper hand in influencing the Kaiser.  This proved extremely frustrating to the   
U-boat commanders.  In the words of one captain: 
So many [restrictions] were issued that it was impossible for a submarine 
commander to learn them all, and many times it was necessary for the 
helmsman or some other trusty support to bring the orders to the conning 
tower and hastily run through the mass to find out whether or not a certain 
vessel could be torpedoed.  Even then, it frequently turned out that ‘whatever 
you do is wrong’.25  
This uncertainty undoubtedly had an impact on U-boat effectiveness and it is 
noteworthy that during the period January 1915 to August 1916 only in three separate 
months did the monthly total of British merchant shipping losses rise above 100,000 
tons.
26
  Moreover, although in the last three months of 1916 the total of British 
merchant tonnage lost increased to an average of approximately 175,000 tons per 
month, primarily as the result of the greater number of submarines Germany then had 
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available, by the end of 1916 the British merchant marine capacity had reduced by 
just six per cent from the capacity pertaining at the beginning of the war.
27
  Further, 
during the period October to December 1916, approximately 75 per cent of the British 
shipping lost had been sunk by gunfire under the prize rules.  Thus, whilst Jellicoe’s 
October 1916 memorandum to Balfour had anticipated the threat to Britain’s trade, 
and although at the time he transferred to the Admiralty the situation had become 
more serious, as stated previously, it was by no means critical.   
However, this was to change dramatically.  By the end of 1916, the balance   
of power in the debate within Germany over whether or not to engage in unrestricted 
submarine warfare had moved inexorably towards those who favoured its resumption.  
Three factors helped to bring this change about.  Firstly, the outright rejection by the 
allies of the German peace proposals made in December 1916 strengthened German 
resolve.  Secondly, the successful conclusion of Germany’s land campaign against 
Romania had freed troops which could be deployed against Holland and Denmark    
in the event that the unrestricted submarine campaign, extended to neutral shipping, 
brought them into the war.  The possibility of having to fight Holland on a third front 
had been as much a deterrent to the adoption of an unrestricted submarine campaign 
as was the threat of the US becoming involved. 
The third reason resulted from the appointment of two new German supreme 
army commanders in the Western Front, Generals Ludendorff and Hindenburg, who 
made a fundamental change to Germany’s military strategy.  Recognising that their 
land armies could not sustain the continuing carnage, they adopted a defensive 
strategy by retreating from the existing front lines and constructing a formidable 
defensive line (known generally as the Hindenburg Line).  This, they recognised, had 
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its limitations in that adoption of this strategy could postpone matters but would 
inhibit any offensive operations that would lead to victory.  It would also form the 
foundation from which peace negotiations could be initiated and, more significantly   
in the current context, form a background to the adoption of an unrestricted submarine 
campaign.  In other words, for the first time in the war, the concept of unrestricted 
submarine warfare was seen as integral to the whole German war strategy, and not 
merely a piecemeal part of a naval strategy centred on the activities of the High Seas 
Fleet.  
This time the argument for introducing an unrestricted U-boat campaign was 
led by the German Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Henning von Holtzendorff.  In a 
memorandum of 22 December 1916, he concluded that: 
A decision must be reached in the war before the autumn of 1917, if it is not to 
end in the exhaustion of all parties, and consequently disastrous to us.  Of our 
enemies, Italy and France are economically so hard hit that they are only 
upheld by England’s energy and activity.  If we can break England’s back the 
war will at once be decided in our favour.  Now England’s mainstay is her 
shipping, which brings to the British Isles the necessary supplies of food and 
materials for war industries, and ensures their solvency abroad.
28
   
These remarks were supported by an economic assessment as to Britain’s available 
shipping capacity.  Holzendorff had calculated that if Germany could sink 600,000 
tons per month, with the additional expectation that at ‘at least two-fifths of neutral 
sea traffic will at once be terrorised into ceasing their journeys’, within five months, 
shipping to and from England would be reduced by about 39 per cent.
29
  ‘England’, 
                                                 
28
 Memorandum, Admiral Henning von Holzendorff , 22 December 1916, quoted, Admiral Reinhard 
Scheer, Germany’s High Seas Fleet, (Nashville, 2002), 248.   
29
 Quoted, ibid, 249. 
 48 
Holzendorff went on to claim, ‘would not be able to stand that, neither in view of the 
post-war conditions, nor with regard to the possibility of carrying on the war’.30   
  Holzendorff’s arguments were convincing.  They were supported by 
Hindenburg and Ludendorff.  Even Bethmann-Hollweg changed his view and 
accepted the situation, despite the acknowledged risk that an all out unrestricted 
campaign was likely to bring the US into the war on the Allied side.  On this 
particular aspect, Holzendorff’s memorandum concluded that ‘I am most emphatically 
of the opinion that war with the United States of America is such a serious matter that 
everything ought to be done to avoid it.  But, in my opinion, fear of a break must not 
hinder us from using this weapon which promises success.’31 
 The Kaiser considered that the matter was ‘irrelevant’, a remark which was destined 
to be proved most inept.
32
  
 Moreover, this decision to embark on the unrestricted campaign not only 
removed the prize rule fetters from the U-boat commanders, it also changed 
Germany’s ship building policy.  Previously, this had been based on the creation of 
what has been termed ‘a balanced fleet’, i.e., with shipbuilding priorities spread 
between a variety of types of surface vessels and submarines.  Now priority was given 
to the construction of submarines.  Germany had started the unrestricted campaign 
with 142 boats in service.
33
  In February 1917, a further 51 U-boats were ordered.  
This was followed in June 1917 by a further order for 95 boats, and yet another order 
for 120 boats in December1917.
34
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Thus to quote Gibson and Prendergast, ‘Put in a nutshell, the whole effort was 
to be a gigantic “smash and grab” raid; the brittle glass of the world’s shipping was to 
be shattered, so that the U-boats could grab the gems of victory and decamp before 
Policeman America could lay a hand on them.’35  For a short time, it appeared that 
‘the raid’ would be successful.  As is discussed more fully in the following chapter, 
removal of the prize rule constraints proved highly effective.  In February 1917, the 
total of British, Allied and neutral merchant shipping lost through enemy action rose 
to just over 540,000 tons, in March to over 593,000 tons and in April to a staggering 
881,000 tons.
36
  Put in another way, during the course of April 1917 one in four 
merchant ships entering British waters was being sunk.  
Thus, placing this discussion in the context of the problems Jellicoe 
encountered on his move to the Admiralty, not only did he inherit the legacy of an 
Admiralty ill-equipped to deal with the existing submarine threat and a Navy with 
very limited means of detecting or sinking the submerged submarine, within a month 
of his arrival he was faced with a reversal of German naval strategy.  Instead of an 
enemy whose strategy was to use his U-boats as an adjunct to its surface fleet in 
making the occasional sortie into the North Sea or in relatively constrained attacks 
against merchant shipping, he was faced with an enemy which unleashed the full 
force of its U-boat flotillas against Allied and neutral merchant shipping.  
Furthermore, it was an enemy that was prepared to bear the wrath of the US and 
discount the risk of its joining forces with the Allies with all its war production and 
manpower capability.  It cannot have been a task that Jellicoe relished.  Nevertheless, 
it was one that he set about with considerable skill and energy.     
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The New Organisation 
 
Until Jellicoe’s arrival at the Admiralty in December 1916, no one person or 
department had responsibility for dealing with the submarine threat.  The Operations 
Division, the Trade Division and the Intelligence Division were all involved to a 
greater or lesser extent.  Moreover, only four Admiralty staff were engaged in 
experimental work associated with finding a means of detecting and sinking U-
boats.
37
  Thus, it is not surprising that little progress had been made in finding a 
technical solution to the problem.       
   However, Jellicoe took immediate steps to rectify this.  In his memorandum 
to Balfour of 29 October 1916, he stated: 
Our present methods of offence against submarines are to a considerable 
extent due to suggestions put forward by some of the younger officers and the 
most promising method of evolving new methods appears to lie in the 
formation of a small committee of such officers who have shown in the past 
special inventive aptitude or originality.  They should work under some senior 
officer, who will not only have the energy to carry through with great rapidity 
any promising suggestions that may be put forward, but will also have the 
power to influence those in authority as to overcome all difficulties that may 
be encountered.
38
  
This reference to employing younger officers at the Admiralty assuages the criticism 
made of Jellicoe that he was reluctant to give credence to views of junior officers.  
Also, the reference to a ‘senior officer’ with ‘energy’ suggests an element of 
perception about the bureaucratic processes in place at the Admiralty and the need to 
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put in place a forceful senior officer that would have the authority to cut through these 
processes.   
 In essence, it was the proposals outlined in that memorandum which formed 
the basis of his initial reorganisation.  Jellicoe separated the Operations Division and 
established a separate anti-submarine division, initially under Rear Admiral Duff, 
with two captains, four commanders, three lieutenant commanders and two 
engineering officers, all of whom he brought from the Grand Fleet.
39
  Again this fact 
counters the criticism that Jellicoe was reluctant to introduce fresh blood to the 
Admiralty.  This new division assumed control of all vessels and aircraft which were 
engaged in anti-submarine work, whether offensive or defensive.  The division was 
also charged with ‘the duty of examining and perfecting all experimental devices for 
combating the submarine menace and of producing fresh schemes for the destruction 
of enemy submarines’.40 
 Not surprisingly, for the first month in the new division, things were ‘quite 
chaotic’ with ‘nothing organised, no principles, everyone scratching his head and 
wondering what to do’.41  However, within a month matters had settled down and 
Marder offers no faint praise when he states that by the time Germany announced 
their unrestricted U-boat campaign on 1 February 1917, ‘There was, thanks to 
Jellicoe’s foresight, initiative and prodding an organization at the Admiralty staffed 
by experts, whose entire efforts were devoted to defeating the U-boats.’42   
Moreover, this was only the first of several reorganisations that Jellicoe 
initiated.  The staff organisation, as introduced by Winston Churchill as First Lord of 
the Admiralty in 1911, acted in an advisory capacity only and, although it had grown 
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in numbers during the war, its function had not changed materially by the time 
Jellicoe assumed the role of First Sea Lord.  It had no executive power and as a 
consequence all orders affecting the movement of ships required approval of the First 
Sea Lord before issue.  In other words, the organisation was over-centralised and 
created additional and unnecessary demands upon the First Sea Lord.  By April 1917, 
Jellicoe had concluded that this lack of executive function was ‘illogical’.43  He 
maintained that as a consequence, following discussion with Carson, the decision was 
taken to give the war staff executive responsibility, with the First Sea Lord assuming 
the title and the role of Chief of Naval Staff.  Admiral Sir Henry Oliver, who had been 
Chief of War Staff, assumed the role of Deputy Chief of Naval Staff, with 
responsibility for the Operations Division, which was primarily concerned with 
surface ship activities, the Mobilization Division, Intelligence and Signals.  Duff was 
appointed Assistant Chief of Naval Staff, with his responsibilities extending to 
Minesweeping and the Trade and Convoys sections, as well as the newly formed 
Anti-Submarine division.
44
 
Historians have argued that much of the pressure for these organisational 
changes came from outside the Admiralty, in particular from Lloyd George.  That 
may have been the case with regard to the appointment of Geddes as Controller at the 
end of May 1917 and to the establishment of a separate Plans Division.  However, as 
Black points out, these changes started to take place ‘before either Lloyd George or 
Geddes could have been the reason for them’, and consequently Black’s conclusion 
that the changes represented an example of ‘bureaucratic evolution’ rather than a ‘big 
bang’ forced on him by his political masters is well made.45  
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Further, these organisational changes counter the view that Jellicoe was an 
arch-centraliser and incapable of delegation.  They show quite clearly that Jellicoe 
was prepared to off-load responsibility. Even Marder was prepared to concede that 
‘the A.S.D. [Anti-Submarine Division] … was the first important wartime instance of 
decentralization at the Admiralty.’46  
Thus, from the foregoing, it is evident that in terms of reshaping the Admiralty 
in order to deal with the U-boat threat, little if any criticism can be levied against 
Jellicoe.  In less than three months after his appointment as First Sea Lord, he had 
shaken the Admiralty from its apparent apathy and put in place an organisation with a 
combination of experienced sea officers and ‘younger blood’, with the sole remit of 
finding and implementing a solution to the U-boat threat.  Moreover, he had reshaped 
the War Staff and given it executive functions.  The key issue was whether or not that 
new organisation could meet the threat.   
 
 
Strategies, Tactics and Weapons Development 
  
Jellicoe summarised his strategic dilemma by stating that ‘there were only 
three ways of dealing with the submarine menace.  The first, naturally, was to prevent 
the vessels from putting to sea; the second was to sink them after they were at sea; 
and the third was to protect the merchant ships from their attack.’47  The first option 
was not open to him.  That would have necessitated either a close blockade of the 
ports from which the submarines operated or physically blocking those ports.  As to 
the former, whilst the close blockade had been used with considerable success in the 
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days of sail, notably in the Napoleonic wars, it had succumbed to progress.  Before 
the war, the Admiralty had recognised that with the need for steam driven warships to 
refuel, combined with the advent of the mine, the torpedo and long range coastal 
ordinance, maintaining a close blockade was not feasible.  As to the latter, blocking 
harbours, for example by sinking old ships in the harbour mouths, was not considered 
a practicable solution.  Such a solution was only attempted once during the course of 
the war when, in the spring of 1918, an attempt was made to block the Ostend and 
Zeebrugge harbours.  As discussed in Chapter VII below, that attempt proved 
unsuccessful.  
  Thus, it is in Jellicoe’s adoption of the second of the above options, despite the 
lack of effective anti-submarine weapons that is at the root of the controversy which 
surrounded the introduction of the convoy system.  However, as is subsequently 
argued at greater length, Jellicoe’s initial focus on offensive, as distinct from 
defensive measures, did contribute significantly to the defeat of the U-boat.  In The 
Submarine Peril, Jellicoe outlined no less than eleven separate initiatives started by 
the Anti-Submarine Division.
48
  These initiatives included increasing the use of 
aircraft for anti-submarine work, the development and installation of hydrophones, 
significantly increasing the number of guns fitted to merchant ships and the use of ‘Q’ 
ships, the development and arming of warships with depth charges and depth charge 
throwers, the development of improved shells for use against submarines and the 
development and mass production of an efficient mine.  Space here does not permit 
detailed discussion on the full extent of the work undertaken by the Admiralty in 
relation to each of these.  However, in the context of the argument that Jellicoe 
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brought drive and energy to the Admiralty over this period, it is pertinent to consider, 
by way of example, just four of the most important of these initiatives. 
 The first that falls for discussion is the arming of merchant ships.  This was the 
earliest of Jellicoe’s major initiatives, ‘being taken up with the Cabinet immediately 
on the formation of the Board of the Admiralty presided over by Sir Edward Carson’   
and considerable Admiralty resources were deployed in this direction.
49
  Supplies of 
guns destined for the army were obtained from the War Office, from France and from 
Japan.  According to Jellicoe, by May 1917, over 10,000 guns and howitzers destined 
for British merchant ships were in the process of manufacture.
50
  As of 1 January 
1917, just 1,420 merchant ships were armed; by 1 April 1917 that number had risen to 
2,181 and by 1 July 1917 over 3000 ships had been so armed.
51
  ‘Q’ ships were also 
used as decoys whereby the ship would wait until it was attacked by a U-boat before 
revealing its armament.  Some of the accounts of the fights involving these ‘Q’ ships 
can only leave a reader full of admiration for the courage and discipline of their 
crews, which Jellicoe maintained had ‘never been surpassed afloat or ashore’.52  
Nevertheless, the issue in the current context is whether committing such a 
large resource to arming merchant ships was an appropriate strategy.  Again, taking 
some statistics, it appears that between January 1916 and January 1917 some 310 
armed merchant ships were attacked by U-boats.
53
  Of these, 236 escaped, 62 were 
sunk by torpedo without warning and only 12 were sunk by gunfire.
54
  On the other 
hand, during the same period, of the 302 unarmed British merchant ships which were 
attacked by U-boat, only 67 escaped, 30 were sunk by torpedo without warning and 
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205 were sunk by gunfire.
55
  Thus, it is evident that as long as the majority of U-boat 
attacks were made on the surface under the cruiser rules, which was the case when 
Jellicoe became First Sea Lord, the arming of merchant ships was a logical and 
effective counter to the U-boat threat. 
Moreover, the use of ‘Q’ ships had become increasingly effective.  The 
number in operation had risen from approximately a dozen craft used as decoys in 
1915, to 180 in 1917 and the number of ‘duels’ between ‘Q’ ships and U-boats had 
risen from eight in 1915 to 63 in 1917.
56
  Although only 13 U-boats were sunk by ‘Q’ 
boats throughout the war, many others were severely mauled and it was probably only 
the capacity of the double strength hull of the U-boat to absorb punishment that 
prevented the losses from being considerably greater.
57
   
Perversely, it can be argued that this strategy added to Jellicoe’s difficulties.  
Whilst Holzendorff, in his memorandum of 22 December 1916, appears to have relied 
on economic arguments to persuade the Kaiser and his political advisers to adopt an 
unrestricted submarine campaign and did not specifically refer to the tactical 
difficulties caused by adherence to the cruiser rules, there can be little doubt that this 
had an influence on the decision.  Prior to the introduction of the unrestricted 
campaign, orders issued to U-boat commanders persistently emphasised the 
importance of giving priority to the safety and security of the boat and its crew in 
formulating attack plans.  The increase in the number of defensively armed merchant 
ships and the success of the ‘Q’ boat tactics increased the vulnerability of the U-boat 
attacking on the surface.  Attacking from under water without warning in most 
circumstances significantly reduced this vulnerability.  In other words, the very 
success of the strategy of arming merchant ships and deploying ‘Q’ ships contributed 
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to the shift in U-boat tactics.  This shift to under water attack clearly reduced the 
effectiveness of the ‘Q’ ship and by the autumn of 1917, the Admiralty had virtually 
abandoned their use.  Nevertheless, in the context of the tactics prevalent at the time 
Jellicoe moved to the Admiralty and the success that the arming of merchant ships 
had achieved, he was fully justified in his decision to give priority and impetus to the 
project and in convincing the War Cabinet to divert manufacturing resources from the 
army’s requirements.  
However effective the arming of merchant ships may have been against        
U-boats attacking on the surface, it did not resolve the issue of attacking the 
submarine under water.  Often in the field of weapon’s technology, the introduction of 
a new weapon leads quickly to the development of an effective countermeasure.  It 
has been argued that the reason why this did not happen in response to the 
development of the U-boat was that ‘in 1914, the Admirals of the Royal Navy 
remained contemptuous of the potential of the submarine.’58  Whilst that statement 
may have had some substance in that there were some within the Admiralty who 
morally abhorred the concept of attack without warning, it has no real merit if for no 
other reason than the fact that the U-boat largely dictated both the strategic use and 
the battle tactics of the Grand Fleet. 
Furthermore, it was not as if the need for development of an effective 
offensive weapon against a submerged submarine had gone unrecognised.  In March 
1910, a committee known as the Admiralty Submarine Attack Committee (SAC) had 
been formed following a series of unsuccessful trials of various methods of attacking 
submarines, most of which involved attempting to damage or ensnare the periscope.
59
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This committee proposed a number of other unlikely solutions, such as spreading 
chemicals in the sea that would stick to the periscope and blind the submarine, or 
trailing nets behind the attacking surface vessel to catch the submarine.  None of the 
possible solutions proposed by the SAC proved to be effective except one, namely 
‘the dropping bomb’; a device that was launched over the stern of the attacking vessel 
and exploded at a predetermined depth.  In July 1914 Sir George Callaghan, Jellicoe’s 
predecessor in command of the Grand Fleet, requested that a number of these depth-
charges be manufactured.  However, it was not until June 1916 that an effective 
depth-charge (the type D), with a hydrostatic valve that triggered the explosion at 
preset depths, was available for production.  A thousand were ordered in August 1916 
but the rate of production was slow and when Jellicoe arrived at the Admiralty each 
anti-submarine vessel was equipped with just four of these devices.
60
 
  Jellicoe attributes the difficulty in acquiring adequate stocks of depth-charges 
to ‘shortage of labour and the many demands on our industries made by the war’.61  
However, there is little doubt that the attitude imbued through Balfour’s ‘palliative’ 
approach to the U-boat, if not the ‘contemptuous’ attitude of the Admirals, 
contributed to the delays.  
 What is certain, however, is that it was recognised by Jellicoe and the Anti- 
Submarine Division that the depth-charge was the only available effective offensive 
means of attacking a submerged U-boat.  By July 1917, the Admiralty had increased 
production of depth-charges to 140 per week, by October to 500 per week and by the 
end of the year production had increased to 800 per week, so that by the end of 1917, 
each anti-submarine vessel was equipped with 30 to 40 depth-charges.
62
  Furthermore, 
the Admiralty had solved problems associated with launching depth-charges too close 
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to the attacking vessel with the development and fitment of ‘throwers’, which 
launched the charges some 60 yards from the side or stern of the ship. 
  The result of the development of and arming anti-submarine vessels with 
depth-charges was impressive.  From the 2 U-boats sunk by depth-charge in 1916, the 
number increased to 12 in 1917 and in the period January to November 1918, a total 
of 24 U-boats (i.e., more than one third of the total number of U-boats sunk in that 
period) were sunk by depth-charge.
63
     
  Thus again, Jellicoe’s impact at the Admiralty can be seen.  He recognised 
that the depth-charge was the one effective offensive weapon that could combat the 
U-boat.  Jellicoe remarked that ‘the great value of the depth charge as a weapon 
against the submarines, and the large number that were required for successful attack 
became apparent early in 1917.’ 64  It was evident that through his predecessors’ 
ambivalence, the anti-submarine vessels at his disposal were inadequately equipped 
with this weapon.  He complained about the difficulty in procuring sufficient numbers 
of the weapon for reasons outside of the Admiralty’s control.  Yet, by the end 1917, 
each of the Navy’s anti-submarine vessels had been equipped with 10 times more 
depth-charges than had been the case at the beginning of the year.   
The depth-charge may have given the Navy the means of sinking a submerged 
submarine but was obviously only effective once the submarine had been detected.  In 
the words of Gibson and Prendergast, ‘Invisibility had cloaked in mystery the 
movements of the submarine, and had afforded an impenetrable screen to its retreat 
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beneath the waves.’65  However, as Terraine remarked, ‘necessity produced, as it so 
frequently did between 1914-18, a burst of inventive originality’.66  In this case it 
resulted in the invention of the hydrophone which, in the simplest of terms, utilised an 
underwater microphone to detect the noise of a submarine’s engine.  The hydrophone 
had evolved in 1915 but, by the beginning of 1917, was still very much in the 
experimental stage and the devices for use afloat, as distinct from shore based 
devices, suffered from two problems.  Firstly, it was not possible for the vessel fitted 
with the hydrophone to use it whilst it was moving.  The noise of the vessel’s own 
machinery and of water passing along its side prevented detection of the submarine’s 
engine.  If the searching vessel remained stationary it became much more vulnerable 
to torpedo attack by the submarine being sought.  Secondly, early versions of the 
hydrophone were not directional, so they could only establish the presence of a 
submarine somewhere in the vicinity.  Again however, under the direction of the 
newly formed Anti-Submarine Division, development work was expedited, with the 
result that by March 1917 two forms of directional hydrophones had been developed.  
Moreover, the pace of production and installation was improved.  By July 1917, 2,750 
non directional and 500 directional hydrophones had been supplied and by the end of 
the year these figures had risen to 3,680 non directional and over 2,700 directional 
hydrophones.
67
  
It must be said, however, that the hydrophone’s effectiveness has been 
questioned.  Gibson and Prendergast take the view that ‘the introduction of the 
hydrophone marked the beginning of a new era in anti-submarine warfare’.68  Marder, 
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on the other hand, denounces that argument, claiming ‘it did nothing of the kind’.69  
Marder also calls Gibson and Prendergast’s stress on the moral and psychological 
effect of the hydrophone on U-boat crews ‘nonsense’.70  Certainly, accepting the 
accuracy of personal correspondence that Marder received on the effectiveness of the 
hydrophone from an expert on the German navy, which claimed that ‘until relatively 
late in the war, U-boat captains did not have to worry too much about being chased’, 
Marder’s view on the moral and psychological impact of the hydrophone appears 
correct, if expressed somewhat harshly.
71
    
However, the issue is not so clear cut on the question as to whether the 
hydrophone introduced a new era in submarine warfare.  Statistics show that through 
October 1918 only three U-boats were known to have been sunk following detection 
by hydrophone, with one other probably sunk and a further 22 damaged.
72
  That being 
the case, on a narrow interpretation of Gibson and Prendergast’s statement, Marder’s 
comment appears justified.  On the other hand, the hydrophone, using sound, was the 
first invention that was able to detect a submerged submarine and, whilst that device 
had its limitations, it led (too late for operational use in the war) to the much more 
effective echo reflecting system know as ASDIC.  Thus on a wider interpretation, it 
can be argued that Gibson and Prendergast’s claim that the hydrophone introduced a 
‘new era’ was no exaggeration.  
Irrespective of those opposing views, the introduction of the hydrophone again 
illustrates the drive and energy that the Admiralty, under Jellicoe, brought to trying to 
find the solution to the U-boat threat.  It took on board the one means that had 
potential for detecting the submerged U-boat, developed it, brought it into production 
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and equipped large numbers of anti-submarine vessels with the device within a short 
period of time.   
A fourth example of where the Admiralty’s initiatives under Jellicoe had an 
impact on the U-boat threat was in the introduction of a cohesive mining strategy.  
Although it had been recognised that effective mines laid in sufficient numbers in 
appropriate locations would prove to be a useful counter measure, in Jellicoe’s   
baleful words, ‘Unfortunately, in January 1917, we did not possess a mine that was 
satisfactory against submarines’.73  Trials initiated by Jellicoe revealed that when a 
submarine brushed against the current design of British mine (with a small explosive 
charge), only a third of the mines detonated.  Further, whilst in April 1917 the Navy 
had approximately 20,000 mines in stock, because of defects to the mooring system, 
only 1,500 of these mines were fit for use.
74
  
A new and more effective type of mine, based on a German design, had been 
developed during the course of 1916, but little progress had been made in putting it 
into production.  Again in Jellicoe’s words, ‘as soon as drawings could be prepared, 
orders for upwards of 100,000 were placed in anticipation of its success’, although it 
was not until November 1917 that these mines were delivered in sufficiently large 
numbers for an effective mining strategy to be deployed. 
75
  
The effect of this mining strategy is discussed in greater detail in the      
Chapter VII below.  Suffice to say for the present that the full exposure of the 
inadequacy of the existing British mine and the production and development of an 
effective replacement represented yet another example of the initiatives taken by the 
Admiralty under Jellicoe’s auspices.  
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Conclusions 
 
There is little doubt that when Jellicoe assumed the role of First Sea Lord in 
December 1916 he was left with a difficult legacy.  Despite the extent to which the 
Navy’s tactics had been dictated by the German submarine threat, Jellicoe’s 
predecessors at the Admiralty had shown little urgency in finding the means of 
countering that threat.  That this lack of urgency pertained through the regime of 
Balfour and Jackson is not surprising given their ambivalent attitude.   
Consequently, after over two years of war, no means of detecting or sinking a 
submerged U-boat had been fully developed.  Jellicoe changed that.  From his arrival 
at the Admiralty, his principal focus was directed at defeating the U-boat threat; a 
threat that had escalated exponentially when, after he had been in office for a month, 
Germany changed its naval strategy and resorted to an unrestricted submarine 
campaign.  Jellicoe reorganised the Admiralty to cope with that threat and brought in 
both senior and younger staff, many of whom had recently served afloat with the 
Grand Fleet.    
The anti-submarine campaign conducted by the newly created division has 
been described by one officer as being based on ‘the thousands scheme - thousands of 
patrol craft, thousands of mines, thousands of nets, etc’.76  On the one hand it can be 
argued that this is a reflection of the efforts made.  On the other it could be argued 
that the extent of the activities unnecessarily diluted available resources.  Indeed, 
considering the bizarre nature of some of the projects contemplated, such as training 
sea lions to attack U-boats or training seagulls to perch on their periscopes, the latter 
                                                 
76
 Quoted, Marder, FDSF, 4, 71. 
 64 
argument would seem to have some merit.
77
  Nevertheless, in the development and 
volume production of the hydrophone, the depth-charge and an effective mine, the 
Admiralty under Jellicoe found effective methods of attacking the U-boat. 
  One further point should be made here in the context of whether Jellicoe’s 
dismissal was ultimately justified.  In his War Memoirs, Lloyd George was highly 
critical of the Admiralty under Jellicoe, particularly as regards the introduction of the 
convoy system, but whether deliberately or otherwise, he fails to give any credit for 
the work undertaken by the Admiralty in its attempt find a solution to detecting and 
attacking the U-boat.  He certainly cannot claim ignorance of the efforts made by the 
Admiralty, if for no other than that in a paper to the War Cabinet in February 1917, 
Jellicoe out-lined no less than twelve new initiatives that had been taken by the Anti-
Submarine Division.  Jellicoe’s expressed concern then was that shipping losses for 
that month would be 425,000 tons and ‘may be substantially exceeded in the 
following months’.78  Moreover, he advised:  
The Admiralty can hold out little hope that there will be any reduction in the 
rate of loss … unless new methods which have been and are in the process of 
being adopted … result in the destruction of enemy submarines at a greater 
rate than that at which they are being constructed … On this latter point it 
would not be safe to anticipate benefit during the next two or three months.
79
 
Despite Jellicoe’s efforts, these predictions unfortunately proved to be only too 
accurate.    
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Chapter III  
 
 
The Convoy Controversy 
 
 
Introduction 
  
In the previous chapter, reference was made to the fact that Admiral Jellicoe, 
on joining the Admiralty in December 1916, elected for the second of three possible 
strategic options for countering the German submarine threat, namely attempting to 
sink U-boats while at sea.  Consequently, the immediate initiatives undertaken by the 
Admiralty with regard to detecting and sinking submarines were primarily directed to 
that end.  As he advised the War Cabinet in his paper of 21 February 1917, the 
development of new anti-submarine measures would take time. 
However, time was something the Admiralty did not have.  After Germany 
commenced the unrestricted campaign at the beginning of February 1917, the losses 
to Allied merchant shipping increased dramatically.  In February losses through 
submarine attack rose to 464,599 tons; in March to 507,001 tons and in April a total 
of 354 Allied and neutral ships with an aggregate weight of 834,549 tons were lost.
1
  
Moreover, to compound the problem, at that time the British and Allied ship 
construction industry was incapable of building new ships to replace such losses.
2
  
Thus, whilst there was no immediate threat of the British population suffering 
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starvation, it was clear that such losses could not be sustained indefinitely.  The Prime 
Minister, Lloyd George, later concluded, ‘It is a horrifying thought that it [the 
unrestricted submarine campaign] very nearly achieved the destruction of Britain’s 
sea power, with all that such a disaster would have meant to the fortunes of the 
Alliance and humanity.’3  This may have been a dramatic assessment of the situation, 
but there is no doubt that for a time it seemed that Admiral Holzendorff’s strategy 
might actually have succeeded unless an effective counter measure could be 
implemented quickly.  As it transpired, the solution was found in the introduction of 
the system of convoying merchant ships.  It is the perceived obstinacy over the 
introduction of this system that the Admiralty under Jellicoe has been universally and 
most heavily criticised.   The first section of this chapter will therefore consider the 
extent to which this criticism is warranted and, if there was delay in introducing the 
convoy system, whether it was justifiable.   
There is, however, a second controversy concerning the introduction of the 
convoy.  That relates to the question of who was responsible for its introduction.  Did 
the Admiralty introduce it on its own initiative, or did Lloyd George, as he claims, 
compel the Admiralty to adopt it?  This is a debate that did not surface, at least 
publicly, until after the war and to that extent it may be considered of questionable 
relevance to the issue of whether Jellicoe’s approach justified the perceived lack of 
confidence in his abilities.  However, depending on the way the argument falls, it does 
demonstrate the extent of the Admiralty’s flexibility.  Additionally, as Sir Edward 
Carson believed Lloyd George’s claim to be an outright lie, there is an inference that 
Lloyd George was seeking to justify an inappropriate course of action, namely the 
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dismissal of Jellicoe.  For these reasons, this issue is considered in the second section 
of this chapter. 
   
 
Justified or Unjustified Criticism    
  
It is not surprising that Jellicoe adopted the second of the strategic options 
referred to previously.  The majority of U-boat attacks at the time were made from the 
surface and taking steps to arm large numbers of merchant ships appeared a logical 
and effective step.  Also, and more generically, the Navy was imbued with what has 
been described as ‘a culture of the offensive’.  A century of uncontested sea power, 
without major conflict and the freedom to patrol the seas at will, had instilled the 
naval hierarchy with the view that attack was the best method of defence.  In other 
words, the submarine threat could be better met by introducing hunting patrols of 
destroyers, rather than by wasting their time defensively escorting merchantmen.  In 
the words of Winston Churchill: 
The first security for British merchant ships must be the superiority of the 
British Navy, which should enable us to cover in peace, and hunt down and 
bring to battle in war, every enemy’s warship which attempts to keep to the 
seas.  A policy of vigorous offence against the enemy’s warships, wherever 
stationed, will immediately give far better protection to British traders than 
large numbers of vessels scattered sparsely about in an attitude of weak and 
defensive expectancy.
 4
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Consequently, when Jellicoe became First Sea Lord, the convoy system had few 
supporters at the Admiralty and indeed, as is discussed further in Chapter VII below, 
it was a view that prevailed in some quarters through 1918.  
The convoy system had also been rejected on practical grounds.  Admiral 
Arthur Wilson, First Sea Lord in 1905, had rejected it because mercantile trade was 
‘too gigantic’.  A War Staff study in 1913 had rejected it on similar grounds.  Again 
Churchill who, not for the first time, was later to effect a volte-face, envisaged the use 
of convoys only in ‘exceptional cases’, but hoped that ‘this cumbrous and 
inconvenient measure will not be required’.5  Further, later in the war, a proposal by 
the Vice Admiral commanding the 10
th
 Cruiser Squadron that ‘the present enemy 
submarine campaign would be considerably reduced if merchantmen were convoyed’ 
was robustly rejected by the Chief of Staff, Admiral Oliver, on the grounds that ‘ideas 
are of no use if they entail the employment of vessels which cannot be obtained.’6  
Similarly, a proposal from Admiral Tupper, commanding the Western Approaches, 
‘that these vessels should be despatched in some close formation, attended by a 
convoying squadron consisting of fast and powerful trawlers … accompanied by a 
few destroyers’ was rejected out of hand by Captain Jackson, Director of Operations, 
on the grounds that resources were just not available to contemplate such a proposal.
7
    
This attitude to the convoy was reflected in an Admiralty staff paper issued in 
January 1917, which read:   
Whenever possible, vessels should sail singly, escorted as considered 
necessary. The system of several ships sailing together in convoy is not 
recommended in any area where submarine attack is a possibility.  It is evident 
                                                 
5
 Quoted, Ibid, 361. 
6
 Memorandum, Admiral Commanding 10
th
 Cruiser Squadron to Admiralty, 21 October 1916, NA, 
ADM 137/1922; Docket Note, Oliver, 6 November 1916, ibid.   
7
 Memorandum, Tupper to Secretary of the Admiralty, 21 October 1916, NA, ADM, 137/1322; Docket 
Note, Jackson, 6 November 1916, ibid.  
 69 
that the larger the number of ships forming the convoy, the greater is the 
chance of a submarine being enabled to attack successfully, the greater the 
difficulty of the escort in preventing such attack.
8
  
 Newbolt is kind in assessing Jellicoe’s approach to this policy, suggesting that in his 
early days at the Admiralty, Jellicoe ‘was bound to give great weight and 
consideration to Admiralty opinion as he found it’.9  Jellicoe defended the paper on 
the grounds, firstly, that he did not think he had personally seen it and, secondly, on 
the basis that it had been issued prior to the start of the unrestricted submarine 
campaign.
10
  Just as pertinently, he could have argued that the pamphlet was outdated 
as, at the time it was written, the question of introducing the convoy system, albeit to 
a limited degree, was under consideration.  
 However, historians other than Newbolt have been more critical.  Winton 
holds the opinion that ‘a more criminally stupid point of view, a more incredibly 
erroneous interpretation of naval history would be hard to imagine’.11  Hough is 
equally damning: 
The first difficulty to overcome was that of recognizing the nature of the 
threat.  In its characteristics and its method of attack, the submarine was 
something entirely novel in commerce warfare and in the struggle for survival 
at sea, the fact that the U-boat was only a raider in another guise was lost in 
the smoke screen of new weaponry.  A glance back in history and a cold hard 
look by an intelligent Staff Committee would have led to the simplest solution 
much earlier than it was reached.
12
  
                                                 
8
 Quoted, Newbolt, Official History, V, 5. 
9
 Ibid.  
10
 Jellicoe, Submarine Peril, 103. 
11
 Winton, Jellicoe, 238. 
12
 Hough, Great War at Sea, 305. 
 70 
This remark seems to miss the point in that the submarines’ ability to attack from 
underwater completely unseen was not just ‘novel’, but made it wholly unique from 
anything that had gone before.  Aside from that, these remarks imply criticism on two 
counts.  Firstly, Jellicoe was wrong to elect for an offensive strategy in the first place. 
Secondly, the Admiralty’s rejection of the convoy system was misplaced.  This 
criticism does not take account of a number of relevant factors.  As to Jellicoe’s 
election for the offensive approach, the counter arguments are relatively simple.  
Irrespective of whether or not the convoy system ought to have been adopted earlier 
than it was, it was still essential to develop new weaponry to combat the submarine as 
a counter to the threat to the Navy’s capital ships.  Destroyers without the ability to 
detect and sink a submarine could screen capital ships against surface torpedo attack, 
but they were much more effective against underwater attack if they had anti-
submarine countermeasures at their disposal.  A system of convoying merchant ships 
could only be effective if its naval escorts could sink Hough’s ‘raider’, in whatever 
guise.  Escort vessels without teeth would have made the U-boat commanders’ work 
easy indeed.   Moreover, to reiterate the point made by Jellicoe in the context of this 
particular argument, the pamphlet had been written before unrestricted submarine 
warfare was declared and the conclusions reached in the pamphlet were largely 
applicable to protection against surface attack.  Thus, the statement that merchant 
ships should sail singly should be seen in the context of these circumstances.    
        The counter argument to the criticism that the Admiralty’s rejection of the 
convoy system was misplaced is more generic.  Hough is correct in his inference that 
history would have shown that the system of escorting merchant ships was as old as 
naval warfare itself and that it had been used with considerable success by the 
protagonists in the Napoleonic wars.  However, things had changed significantly since 
 71 
the days of sail.  Heavily influenced by the theories of the US naval strategist Alfred 
Mahan, British naval thinking followed the principle that the primary unit of strength 
was the battleship; the group unit was the line of battleships.  Every other vessel was 
considered to be auxiliary and the primary objective was to seek out and destroy the 
enemy fleet.
13
  As Marder stated, ‘In the pre war years there was much talk about “the 
Nelson touch”.  The practical consequence was to think that the essence of the naval 
war was the battle - that the Navy’s principal raison d’être was to meet and annihilate 
the High Seas Fleet in a Second Trafalgar.’14  Thus, all other operations, including 
commerce raiding, were considered to be indecisive and secondary in nature.  
Consequently, the convoy was considered a defensive tool and in the development of 
the so called ‘blue water’ policy, the principle of the convoy had been discarded.  
        Further, there is an argument that convoying was simply impractical under 
modern conditions.  The consensus of view within the Admiralty was that in pre-
steam days, merchant ships travelled slowly and were often detained in dangerous 
waters by adverse winds.  It was acknowledged that the convoy was the most 
effective method of protection in such circumstances.  On the other hand, steam ships 
could pass relatively quickly through these dangerous waters at a time and on a route 
of the masters’ own choosing and consequently, in theory at least, were at far less risk 
than sailing ships.  
Given these factors, Winton’s remarks regarding the ‘criminality’ of 
Admiralty policy are not justified.  Obviously, it can be argued in hindsight that as 
soon as it had become apparent that the offensive measures against the U-boat were 
inadequate, Jellicoe ought immediately to have overturned existing policy and 
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introduced the convoy system sooner.  This is where Lloyd George has been most 
critical, writing that: 
Looking back, it seems amazing that the system of escorting our ships in 
convoys was not adopted earlier.  Yet in the teeth of the fact that other 
methods were proving futile and disastrous, and our sinkings were increasing 
at an alarming rate, the Admiralty stubbornly refused to consider adopting the 
convoy system and thus extending to the mercantile marine the same 
guardianship as that upon which they relied for their own safety in the Grand 
Fleet.
15
 
This criticism raises two questions about Jellicoe’s approach.  Firstly, did he really 
resist adoption of the convoy system or was it, as Winton contends, a question of not 
ruling it out and withholding judgement on its introduction for the time being?
16
  
Secondly, in either case, were there rational grounds for his approach?   
As to the first issue, despite the vigour of Lloyd George’s condemnation, and 
indeed, the existence of the Admiralty Staff paper advocating that ‘vessels should sail 
singly’, it is evident that his remarks are far from justified.  In the first place, at the 
end of December 1916, Jellicoe had requested that the feasibility of munitions ships 
sailing in convoy be considered, and although Captain Webb, in charge of the 
Admiralty Trade division, considered that a system of general convoy would not be 
practicable, it could be implemented in the case of munitions ships.
17
  Secondly, 
before the introduction of a general system of convoy at the end of April 1917, it had 
been decided to introduce convoys on two critical North Sea trade routes, namely the 
coal trade with France and trade with the Scandinavian countries.  As to the former, 
France had lost a number of its coal fields in the wake of the German occupation.  To 
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continue prosecuting the war it needed to import a minimum of 1.5 million tons per 
month.
18
  Heavy losses in the last quarter of 1916 meant that by the end of the year 
the situation had become critical, with French factories shutting through lack of coal.  
This situation resulted in the Board of Trade requesting that ships carrying coal to 
France should be convoyed.
19
  Although Webb was initially reluctant, expressing the 
view that convoying would in essence cause ‘delays and congestion at ports of 
departure and arrival’, the French authorities convinced the Admiralty that delays in 
sailing caused by U-boat sightings outweighed delays caused by any port 
congestion.
20
  Accordingly Jellicoe approved the introduction of ‘controlled sailings’ 
for the French coal trade on 16 January 1917.
21
 
A similar situation pertained in relation to trade between the British North Sea 
ports and Scandinavia.  Again, as a consequence of heavy losses during the last 
quarter of 1916, ship owners began to lose confidence in the Navy’s ability to provide 
adequate protection and had threatened to delay sailings.  Some limited form of 
protection for this trade had been put in place at the end of January 1917, but the 
system used then was not particularly effective.  By April the loss rate was running at 
about 25 per cent for the round trip.
22
  This resulted in the ‘Longhope’ conference 
where the representatives of the Admiralty, Grand Fleet and Orkneys and Shetland 
Command unanimously concluded that ‘the convoy system be used in preference to 
the scheme of continuous stream of traffic’.23  Although they had reservations, both 
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Oliver and Duff concurred with this recommendation and Jellicoe finally approved it 
on 21 April 1917.
24
     
 Two other pieces of evidence are relevant here.  The first is that in a 
memorandum concerning the protection of Atlantic trade against the German 
commerce raider, Moewe, which had managed to escape into the Atlantic, Jellicoe 
noted on a paper from Duff emphasising the difficulties of introducing the convoy 
system, that the ‘whole question must be borne in mind and brought up again later if 
needs be’.25  Secondly and perhaps most conclusively, the War Cabinet minutes of 19 
February 1917 included a statement that ‘the First Sea Lord stated that the Admiralty 
were looking into the question of convoys and that he himself had arranged to see a 
number of Naval Officers and Captains of Naval Vessels who had experience on this 
subject.’26  Thus, not only was the convoy system under consideration at the 
Admiralty during the early part of 1917, by April it had initiated on two routes.  
Moreover, given Lloyd George’s presence at the War Cabinet, he had knowledge of 
the fact that the matter was under consideration, which belies his statement that the 
Admiralty ‘stubbornly refused to adopt the convoy system’.  
  The French coal and Scandinavian convoys proved to be successful.  As to the 
former, some 2,600 ships were convoyed during the course of April 1917.  Just five 
were sunk by U-boat, representing a loss rate of 0.19 per cent.
27
  As to the latter, in 
May 1917, the first month of operation, the loss rate was cut 120 fold to a rate of 0.24 
per cent.
28
  It has been argued that the success of these convoys ought to have 
influenced the Admiralty and encouraged a change of policy sooner.
29
  This is a valid 
                                                 
24
 Docket Note, Jellicoe, 21 April 1917, ibid. 
25
 Newbolt, Official History, V, 6. 
26
 Minute, War Cabinet Meeting, 19 February 1917, NA, CAB/23/1/73.  
27
 Marder, FDSF, 4, 139. 
28
 Ibid, 144. 
29
 Halpern, Naval History, 354. 
 75 
point and indeed, in the words of Terraine, it ‘threw light on the question of 
vulnerability’, i.e., on the belief that the convoy presented a larger target to the U-boat 
than a single ship and consequently its use would lead to greater loss.
30
    
This issue of timing of the introduction of the convoy leads to the second 
question raised by Lloyd George’s comments, namely, if Jellicoe was not opposed in 
principle to the convoy system, did he have rational grounds for his caution?  Not 
surprisingly, in The Submarine Peril, Jellicoe defends his position at some length, 
claiming that the introduction of a general convoy system ‘was receiving constant 
consideration at the Admiralty in the early part of 1917, but the objections to it were, 
until a later date, far too strong to admit of its adoption’.31  In seeking to justify this, 
he lists the ‘Mercantile Disadvantages’ as including delays incurred in assembling 
ships ready for convoy; delays occurring through the convoy having to sail at the 
speed of the slowest ship; congestion at the port of destination caused by a large 
number of ships arriving at the same time; lack of means of darkening ships at night; 
and the inability of ships in convoy to keep close station, either through lack of 
devices such as revolution indicators or telephones between the bridge and engine 
room, or through not having sufficient skilled officers, many of those having 
transferred to the Royal Navy.
32
   
There is no doubt these were legitimate concerns and it was not just the 
Admiralty that had reservations about introducing a general convoy system.  In 
accordance with his commitment to the War Cabinet on 19 February, four days later 
Jellicoe met with ten masters of merchant ships to ascertain ‘their opinion on the 
question of convoys against submarine attack’.33  Their view was conclusive, the 
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minute of the meeting recording that ‘the masters … were firmly of the opinion that 
they would prefer to sail alone rather than in company and under convoy.’34  
Seeking the opinion of merchant ship masters was an eminently sensible 
course of action.  However, the event has been the subject of some criticism.  Lloyd 
George was again vitriolic, contending that ‘it was highly probable that the form in 
which Admiral Jellicoe put the questions might make the seamen fear that they could 
never carry out proper station-keeping and joint manoeuvring that membership of a 
convoy demanded.’35  This accusation has been vigorously opposed, no more so than 
by Captain Bertram Smith, who attended the meeting with Jellicoe.  His view was that 
‘the First Sea Lord dispassionately and impartially stated the object of the meeting, 
namely to get an unbiased view of the Merchant Service.’ 36  There would seem to be 
little reason not to accept Smith’s view.  Jellicoe was as concerned as any person to 
find a solution to the U-boat problem and he had little to gain by biasing the questions 
to give a preconceived answer.   
  The extent to which the outcome of this meeting delayed the introduction of 
a general convoy system is questionable.  Marder was of the view that ‘the objections 
of the merchant skippers were undoubtedly a powerful factor in the Admiralty’s 
reluctance to adopt convoy’.37  However, in addition to the ‘mercantile’ disadvantages 
Jellicoe described, Jellicoe was faced with a number of ‘naval difficulties’, which 
were more problematic and had a greater influence on the timing of the introduction 
of the convoy than the ‘mercantile disadvantages’.  Foremost of these was the 
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shortage of necessary escort vessels, both to protect convoys from the port of 
assembly up to the U-boat danger zone and then through the U-boat zone.
38
  
Secondly, Jellicoe argued that until the US entered the war, American ports could not 
be used as ports of assembly, nor could they land the staff necessary to effect the 
required organisation.  Thirdly, there was a concern that the losses would be heavy if 
the convoy inadvertently happened to enter an enemy minefield.
39
  These were 
undoubtedly valid reasons, although with regard to the unavailability of US ports, it 
must be questionable as to why ports on the eastern seaboard of Canada, such as 
Halifax, could not have been used as assembly points.   
However, the most compelling argument for the Admiralty’s stance was the 
shortage of escort vessels.  It was a point frequently made by Jellicoe in War Cabinet 
meetings and it is a matter Jellicoe dealt with at some length in The Submarine 
Peril.
40
  There he concluded that ‘we could not possibly produce the necessary 
escorts; and, that until this difficulty was overcome we should have to postpone the 
introduction of a convoy system.’41  According to Admiralty calculations, forty 
destroyers or sloops were available for escort duty in early February.
42
  However, 
again by their calculations, the number of escort vessels required for inbound Atlantic 
convoys would be 81 destroyers or sloops, with an additional 44 required for 
outbound convoys.
43
  Thus, there was a clear shortfall.  Further, according to Jellicoe, 
introducing a policy of convoy for only a portion of the Atlantic trade would have 
been ‘useless and dangerous on the grounds that providing escorts for the portion 
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would have deprived all other vessel sailing of any protection at all’.44  Moreover, 
Jellicoe was equally dogmatic on the question of transferring escorts from other 
duties.  As this issue goes to the root of the convoy controversy and the defence of 
Jellicoe’s rationale, it is appropriate to quote him at length: 
It was out of the question to reduce the Harwich or Dover flotillas materially, 
as we were already running the gravest risks from the inadequacy of these 
forces to deal with enemy destroyers and submarines operating in southern 
waters from Zeebrugge or from German ports, and in addition the Harwich 
force furnished the sole protection for the weekly convoy running between the 
Thames and the Dutch ports … The destroyers on the East Coast and in the 
Portsmouth Command were already inadequate to afford proper protection to 
the trade and the Cross-channel communications, as evidenced by our losses. 
Here again, however, in order to meet the very serious situation, some 
destroyers were eventually transferred to Devonport from Portsmouth, but at 
the expense of still less protection and fewer opportunities for offensive action 
against submarines.  There remained only the Grand Fleet Destroyers on 
which we could draw yet further.  It had always been held that the Grand Fleet 
required a total force of one hundred destroyers and ten flotilla leaders for the 
double purpose of screening ships from submarine attack when at sea and of 
countering the enemy’s destroyers and attacking his heavy ships with torpedo 
fire in a fleet action … At our average moment … we could not expect that 
more than seventy destroyers and eight leaders would be with the Fleet.’45  
The crux of the issue here is that Jellicoe was not prepared at this time to withdraw 
significant numbers of destroyers from protection of the Grand Fleet.   
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Nevertheless, a number of commentators have challenged Jellicoe’s 
assessment of the situation.  Admiral Sir Kenneth Dewar, appointed Assistant 
Director of Plans in 1918, wrote that the problem was ‘not so much a lack of escorts 
as the more efficient use of those we had’.46  Dewar, however, does not specify how 
more efficient use could be made of the escorts.  Marder also takes the view that 
better use could have been made of escort vessels.  From a detailed analysis of the 
number available, he believed that the necessary ships could have been found early in 
1917 without giving up or jeopardising other operations.
47
  This argument is based on 
two factors.  The first is that Duff, in a note of 19 April 1917, recommended that two 
escort vessels would be required by every merchant ship in the convoy; an 
extraordinarily high ratio.
48
  Jellicoe, in post war correspondence with Newbolt on the 
accuracy of the draft of certain sections of the Official History, defends this point by 
maintaining that this comment was made only with specific reference to Scandinavian 
convoys where ships had to pass and re-pass over the same dangerous area and it was 
certainly not Admiralty policy as regards general convoy systems.  Moreover, that 
view was not universally held within the Admiralty.  Oliver, for example, expressed 
the opinion that in a general convoy a ratio of 1 escort to 20 merchant ships would be 
adequate.
49
 
The second factor Marder relies upon is the contention that the Admiralty 
remained wedded to the concept of the offensive; particularly in that they continued to 
send destroyers out on ineffective anti-submarine patrols.  This can be countered to 
some extent by reference to the above quotation in that, with reluctance, Jellicoe was 
prepared to countenance the transfer of destroyers from Portsmouth to Devonport at 
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the expense of offensive operations.  Further, although it has not proved possible to 
investigate the underlying basis of the figures used in Marder’s analysis, he does not 
appear to take account of the fact that in northern waters, it was primarily Grand Fleet 
destroyers that were used for offensive patrols.  These patrols were generally of short 
duration and therefore the Grand Fleet was ‘denuded’ of its screen for considerably 
less time than if the same destroyers had been used for convoy escort duties.  Even so, 
Admiral Beatty, had, on 7 May 1917, cause to write:   
The trouble is T.B.D.’s [Torpedo Boat Destroyers].  We are so very short of 
them, and if we have to go to sea, could not screen efficiently the squadrons.  
What would happen if the enemy came out with the intention of engaging us 
in mortal combat I can’t think as he certainly would have 100 submarines so 
disposed as to render him the utmost assistance and today we have 37 
destroyers here and 14 at Rosyth!!!  Apparently we are gambling heavily on 
that contingency never arising.
50
   
Whilst Beatty exaggerates the number of submarines at Germany’s disposal, the letter 
highlights Jellicoe’s dilemma and the tension between the need to provide escorts and 
the underlying broader strategy of maintaining the Grand Fleet’s capability.51  It also 
indicates the level of support Jellicoe had in this regard from Beatty.  
Finally, in this context, it must also be said that it is possible with hindsight to 
analyse the question of availability of vessels for convoy escort duty.  In the midst of 
a world war, Jellicoe, under resourced, was seeking to meet the demands of 
commanders in every theatre of operations clamouring for additional ships.  
Moreover, this dilemma must be considered in the context of the necessity of 
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maintaining the Grand Fleet’s capability both to keep the High Seas Fleet in its base 
and to be able to defeat it should Admiral Scheer have adopted a more offensive 
strategy.  Churchill, with his usual flamboyance, describes the potential impact of a 
decisive defeat of the Grand Fleet thus: 
The trade and food-supply of the British islands would have been paralysed.  
Our armies on the continent would have been cut from their base by superior 
naval force.  All the transportation of the Allies would have been jeopardised 
and hampered.  The United States could not have intervened in the war.  
Starvation and invasion would have descended on the British people.  Ruin, 
utter and final would have overwhelmed the Allied cause.
52
 
Jellicoe, having commanded the Grand Fleet and served at the Admiralty in more 
junior positions, was well aware of the limitations of the British fleet.  Its ships had 
numerical and firepower superiority but lacked the armour, speed and gunnery 
accuracy of the German ships and the armour piercing capability of the German 
shells.  Jutland had exposed the frailties of the British capital ships and decisive 
victory was not a foregone conclusion if the fleets met at sea again.  Given the risks, it 
would have been foolhardy indeed to denude the Grand Fleet further of the destroyer 
screen required to protect it from the U-boat.   
There is, however, one additional factor relating to the availability of escort 
vessels which, on the face of it, might swing the argument in favour of Jellicoe’s 
critics.  Lloyd George describes the matter thus: 
But of all their delusions the most astounding was that which concerned the 
number of British vessels sailing the high seas and needing escort.  This was 
not some obscure and disputable issue that could be determined only by risky 
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experiment.  It was merely a matter of available statistics accurately added up.  
The blunder on which their policy was based was an arithmetical mix up 
which would not have been perpetrated by an ordinary clerk in a shipping 
office.  It nevertheless bewildered the Sea Lords and drove them out of their 
course for months.
53
 
Lloyd George refers to a specific incident where figures were produced for 
publication (and for submission to the War Cabinet) showing the number of ships 
entering and leaving British ports and the number of ships sunk.  To put the best 
possible slant on the losses, both to discourage the enemy and to encourage neutral 
shipping companies, the returns provided by the customs service on which they were 
based were exaggerated.  Small coastal craft arriving or leaving from another British 
port, sometimes two or three times a week, were included and the returns specified 
that the number of merchant vessels of all nationalities of over one hundred tons that 
entered or left British ports in a week was 5000.
54
   
According to Marder, one of Jellicoe’s staff, Commander Henderson, ‘saw the 
light’ and realised that the meaningful figure of ocean going steamers that required 
convoy arriving and departing was 120 to 140 of each per week.
55
  Finding escorts for 
40 or so arrivals and departures per day would not have constituted the 
insurmountable problem that 700 arrivals and departures did.  Further, it seems that it 
was not only Lloyd George who claimed that the Admiralty were bemused by this 
blunder.  In a paper produced by the Ministry of Shipping in 1917, the comment was 
made that although the returns ‘may not have misled a knowledgeable enemy, it did 
mislead those whose energies were devoted to meeting this offensive’.56   
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However, the contention that the Admiralty relied on these figures appears to 
be a fallacy.  Firstly, Smith, in his 1935 article in The Naval Review, vehemently 
denied that these returns influenced the matter, declaring firstly that ‘Commander 
Henderson ascertained the true figures at the Ministry of Shipping after a fruitless 
search in other quarters’ and secondly, that ‘from personal experience he never heard 
any officer who had the least responsibility for these questions make the slightest 
reference to the form, except to state losses.’57  Secondly, Smith’s version of events is 
supported by the fact in January 1917 he prepared a memorandum, using the 
Operations Division’s figures, on the estimated volume of British vessels leaving 
North American ports.  This concluded that in January 1917 there would be about 304 
ships, or about ten per day, leaving the US.
58
  Obviously, this memorandum does not 
take account of ships arriving from destinations other than the US but it does show 
that the Admiralty was fully aware of the scale of the traffic requiring protection.  As 
Nicholas Black contends, the significance of these figures ‘is that the rejection of the 
convoy was not simply based on the belief that trade was so vast that it could not be 
escorted’.59   
Whether or not the contradictory statement from the Ministry of Shipping 
stems from some inter departmental rivalry is impossible to say.  Yet, in the context 
of Lloyd George’s views of the matter, it is of note that the published shipping losses 
was a matter that frequently came before the War Cabinet, but nowhere in the minutes 
of Cabinet Meetings over the relevant period is there an indication that Lloyd George 
or other participants in these meetings posed the question that would have unravelled 
the so-called ‘arithmetical mix-up’.  Thus again, it would seem that Lloyd George’s 
criticism was not justified by the facts. 
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Two further points can be made in mitigation of this criticism of the 
Admiralty.  The first is one that is often forgotten or ignored by biographers and 
historical commentators, but is well made by Admiral Bacon in his biography of 
Jellicoe.  The organisation of mercantile convoys was a highly complex logistical 
affair.  Before December 1916, some limitations had been imposed on merchant 
shipping movements, the control of imports and requisitioning of merchant ships for 
military purposes.  However, these vessels were mainly owned and operated by 
private companies over which the Government had limited control.  Following what 
can, in hindsight, be seen as a well-defined pattern of avoiding state intervention until 
crisis dictated otherwise, by late 1916 the tonnage shortage was such that the 
Government was forced to intervene.  Under the powers contained in the New 
Ministries and Shipping Act 1916, the allocation of tonnage, licensing of voyages and 
control of port facilities was brought under a new Ministry of Shipping.
60
  However, 
this reorganisation, which included the transfer of the Admiralty’s Transport Division 
to the new ministry, was not completed until April 1917.  Consequently, as Bacon 
wrote, ‘It will now be easily appreciated that no successful convoy system could have 
been inaugurated unless those in control had dictatorial powers over the times of 
sailing, the cargoes carried and the constitution of the convoys.’61  Thus, even if 
Jellicoe had in principal overturned the Admiralty’s existing policy on convoys 
immediately after being appointed First Sea Lord, or alternatively, immediately 
following Germany’s proclamation that it would embark on an unrestricted submarine 
campaign, it would not have been practically possible to implement the new policy.    
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 The second point is that although a major contributor in countering the U-boat 
threat, the convoy system was not the panacea that some commentators think.  Allied 
shipping losses in May 1917 fell to 596,629 tons but it is thought that this was due to 
a reduced number of U-boats active in operational theatres during that month rather 
than to the introduction of the convoy system.
62
  By the end of June, despite the 
increased number of convoys sailing, the losses through submarine activity had again 
increased and on average remained at over 300,000 tons per month until the end of 
1917.
63
  It was not until after May 1918 that the losses consistently averaged less than 
200,000 tons per month.
64
   
Further, little cognisance is given to the impact of the offensive measures 
being developed by the Anti-Submarine Division.  Marder argues that ‘sinking 
submarines is a bonus, not a necessity … it is immaterial whether or not the 
submarine gets sunk in the process, because what matters is that the ships deliver 
cargoes regularly and adequately, and this, the First World War proved, can be 
assured by a system of convoy.’65  This is only part of the answer.  For if U-boats had 
not been sunk at a rate greater than the rate that new U-boats were commissioned, the 
increase in the number of submarines operating must necessarily have increased their 
chances of success.
66
   
Moreover, as Terraine points out, heavy casualties would have led to a loss of 
efficiency through dilution in the quality of the crews.
67
  The number of U-boats sunk 
in the first six months of 1917 (21) doubled in the second half of 1917 (42), indicating 
the increasing effectiveness of the development and deployment of anti-submarine 
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measures particularly in mining, use of the hydrophone and more extensive use of the 
depth-charge.
68
  Thus, it was not just the introduction of the convoy system that 
ultimately thwarted the U-boat threat.  It was a combination of that and the offensive 
measures developed by the Anti-Submarine Division that ultimately solved the 
problem, which in turn gives credence to Jellicoe’s leadership and effectiveness as 
First Sea Lord. 
 
 
Credit Where Credit is Due 
 
Lloyd George was not content with accusing the Admiralty of undue delay in 
implementing the convoy system.  He also claimed that it was he who compelled the 
Admiralty to introduce it.  Jellicoe, on the other hand, denies this and maintains that 
the Admiralty introduced it on its own initiative.  
  The controversy over this surfaced, at least publicly, after the war and to that 
extent it may be considered of questionable relevance to the issue of whether or not 
Jellicoe’s approach justified the perceived lack of confidence in his abilities.  
However, as mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the issue does demonstrate 
the extent of the Admiralty’s flexibility or rigidity, depending on the way the 
argument falls.  Also, if, as Carson alleged, Lloyd George’s claim is a lie, the 
implication would seem to be that in making the claim, Lloyd George sought to 
justify an inappropriate course of action.  However, as with much involving the 
controversy over the introduction of the convoy, the respective claims are difficult to 
reconcile.   
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Lloyd George contends that, on 25 April 1917, ‘I informed the Cabinet that I 
had decided to visit the Admiralty and there take peremptory action on the question of 
convoy.  Apparently, the prospect of their being overruled in their own sanctuary 
galvanised the Admiralty into a fresh inquisition.’69  Not surprisingly, Jellicoe takes 
issue with that point of view.  His account is that it was a detailed memorandum from 
Duff dated 26 April 1917 that persuaded him to introduce a general convoy system, 
not any action on the part of Lloyd George.  In The Submarine Peril he states: 
It has frequently been erroneously stated that the Admiralty decision in this 
matter was the result of pressure brought to bear on the Admiralty from the 
War Cabinet and civilian quarters.  Possibly this idea has arisen from the 
proceedings of the War Cabinet on April 25, but is quite incorrect.  The views 
of experienced naval officers on a technical question involving the gravest 
responsibility could not possibly be affected by outside opinion, however high 
the quarter from which that opinion emanated.
70
 
Historians are likewise divided on the issue.  As Marder points out, Churchill, Captain 
Roskill, Admiral Dewar and A J P Taylor amongst others, favour what has become 
‘the standard interpretation’.71  This was extravagantly expressed by Lord 
Beaverbrook: 
On the 30
th
 April, with the submarine peril at its height, the Prime Minister 
descended upon the Admiralty and seated himself in the First Lord’s Chair … 
This was possibly an unprecedented action … The meeting was a minor 
triumph for the Prime Minister.  A re-examination of the figures of shipping 
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losses prepared by the Minister of Shipping had brought a frame of mind in 
which the admirals were at least willing to experiment with a convoy.
72
  
However, this ‘standard interpretation’ is open to challenge on a number of counts.     
Firstly, the relevant War Cabinet minute is less precise than suggested by Lloyd 
George.  It states that ‘the Prime Minister should visit the Admiralty with a view to 
investigating all the means at present in use in regard to anti-submarine warfare,’ not 
that he should take ‘peremptory action’.73  Secondly, there is the timing of events.  
The Duff memorandum was issued to Jellicoe on the 26 April 1917, four days before 
Lloyd George’s visit to the Admiralty.  Against this, it could be argued that it was the 
threat of Lloyd George’s visit that spurred Duff into action.  However, if the length 
and content of this memorandum and the work necessary to compile it is considered, 
it is unlikely that it could have been produced at such short notice.
74
  Thirdly, there 
were other significant factors that came together more or less simultaneously which 
influenced the Admiralty’s thinking and caused a change of mind.  As stated, the 
merchant shipping losses had increased dramatically through the latter part of April.  
The daily loss reports coming into the Admiralty must have caused consternation and 
the absence of effective offensive counter measures forced those seeking a solution to 
consider any alternative however contrary to entrenched instincts.  The numbers of 
British escort vessels being built was increasing and finally, and most significantly, 
the entry of the US into the war on 7 April 1917 precipitated the immediate 
availability of additional escort vessels. 
Also in this context, Duff’s version of events is worthy of comment.   
In a note to Jellicoe concerning the accuracy of drafts of the Official History, he 
wrote: 
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The first I heard that llGeorge’s [Lloyd George’s] visit to the Admiralty was 
primarily in connection with the Convoy Organisation, was when the Chapter 
on convoy came under discussion.  My impression was that he came to look 
into Admlty Organisation generally … There is no foundation for the belief 
that his visit was in any way the cause of my suggestion that the time had 
arrived for starting convoy.  It must be obvious that if Ll. G came with the 
intention of forcing a convoy on an unwilling Admlty, he would have dealt 
with you and not with the Director of a Division of the War Staff.  (A.L.D) … 
My Minute of 26
th
 April had no connection whatever with Ll. G’s visit.  It was 
the direct result of: (1) The serious and progressive loss of ships weekly. (2) 
The assured prospect of additional naval forces becoming available as the 
organisation developed. 
These two factors changed the situation and warranted the introduction of the 
convoy without delay.  Had the losses remained stationary, the risk [of 
introducing convoy] in my opinion would not have been justified until the 
measures in course of development had been brought into use.
75
 
Ultimately then, the issue becomes one of credibility.  Marder, commenting on the 
above, wrote that he saw  
No reason whatever to doubt the truth of Duff’s statement.  It was his minute 
of 26 April, not Lloyd George’s intervention that was decisive in converting 
the First Sea Lord to a trial of the convoy system.  And this minute was 
prompted, not by the news of the Prime Minister’s coming visit to the 
Admiralty, but by the two factors mentioned above, and by a third, 
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Henderson’s figures on arrivals and departures in the ocean trades, which Duff 
received at this time.
76
   
Certainly, the evidence would support Marder’s views in that it was the ‘serious and 
progressive shipping losses’ and ‘the prospect of additional naval forces’ becoming 
available that swayed the decision in favour of the general convoy.  As to the third 
factor, Commander Henderson was no doubt instrumental in developing statistics that 
enabled detailed escort requirements to be calculated and worked closely with the 
Ministry of Shipping to that end.  However, it is doubtful that the production of these 
statistics actually influenced the decision.  As indicated, from the information collated 
by Captain Smith on the Atlantic trade early in January 1917, the Admiralty were 
under no illusions as to the volume of shipping and consequently the resources 
required to provide adequate escorts. 
 There is a further point that warrants discussion on this issue.  Sir Maurice 
Hankey also seeks credit for converting the Admiralty to the convoy system, claiming 
that on 11 February 1917 he ‘had a brainwave on the subject of anti-submarine 
warfare,’ namely that convoy was the only effective answer to the U-boat.77  This 
‘brainwave’ culminated in a memorandum to Lloyd George, which set out the 
objections that had been made and concluded that although these were ‘formidable’, 
the advantages of the convoy far outweighed the disadvantages.
78
  This memorandum 
was apparently read to Jellicoe and Duff at a meeting with Lloyd George and Hankey 
on 13 February 1917, but once again its significance is the subject of contradictory 
views.  Newbolt describes the memorandum as the ‘clearest and most authentic 
account of the reasoning which enabled the War Cabinet to sustain their constitutional 
part in the conduct of the war; not as technical experts, but as responsible leaders 
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bringing in their powers at the decisive moment to carry forward and support their 
high executive officers’.79  Jellicoe, on the other hand, is dismissive of the 
significance of the memorandum, remarking that he ‘did not personally recollect this 
discussion, so that it could not have left much impression on my mind’.80  More to the 
point, it would seem that at the time Lloyd George also did not attach much urgency 
to the matter as six weeks passed before he gave it further consideration, much to 
Hankey’s frustration.81  Hankey believed that this delay was due to Lloyd George’s 
preoccupation with the pending offensive on the Western Front under the command of 
General Nivelle and his desire to avoid ‘a spectacle of disunion’ on the eve of the first 
meeting of the newly constituted Imperial War Cabinet.
82
  He might also have added 
that being at odds with Sir William Robertson on the appointment of General Nivelle 
to command the allied armies over the head of General Haig, he did not wish to be 
seen to be fighting with both his senior military and naval advisers simultaneously so 
soon after the formation of his coalition government.  Nevertheless, it can be argued 
that he was not justified in the level of criticism he directed at the Admiralty when he 
was also guilty of delay. 
  Finally in this context, there is an issue related to the chronology of the 
events and which links back to Duff’s aforementioned comments on the question of 
risk.  Germany launched the unrestricted campaign on 1 February 1917.  As 
mentioned, Jellicoe had indicated to the Imperial War Cabinet Meeting on the 26 
April that convoys would be introduced on a general basis as soon as the required 
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number of escorts had become available.  The first convoy sailed from Gibraltar on 10 
May 1917.
83
  Therefore the length of time between the launch of the unrestricted 
campaign and introduction of the first convoy was just two months.  Moreover, 
although the figures of British losses sunk by U-boats in February and March 1917 
rose to 256,000 tons and 284,000 tons respectively, the situation had actually eased in 
the first two weeks of April and during that period losses were almost the same as the 
average for the first quarter of 1917.
84
  The losses for the first two weeks in April 
were therefore appreciably below the highest level to which they had risen.
85
  Further, 
steps taken to cut the length of certain voyages, to reroute ships and to impose 
restrictions on imports resulted in indications that through the early part of April, the 
shipping situation was actually improving.
86
  However, in the second half of April the 
situation changed dramatically.  In what has been termed ‘black fortnight,’ almost 
400,000 tons of British shipping alone was sunk and as stated, by the end of April the  
total of world shipping sunk by U-boat had risen to over 834,000 tons.
87
  Thus, it can 
be argued that in the first two and a half months of the year, although the losses had 
become serious, they did not become critical until the end of April 1917.  Hence, the 
time it took for the Admiralty to react to the changing situation was extremely short 
indeed.  Further, this sequence of events seems to accord with Duff’s remarks 
regarding risk had the ‘losses remained stationary’, thereby supporting his contention 
that the Admiralty made the decision to implement the general convoy system on its 
own initiative.  
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Conclusions 
 
The consensus of the majority of historical commentators is that Jellicoe 
delayed unduly in introducing a general convoy system.  The tenor of the 
aforementioned remarks of Hough and Winton reflect the fierceness of much of that 
criticism.  Even Nicholas Black, who is more sympathetic to Jellicoe’s performance 
as First Sea Lord than most, claimed that Jellicoe had ‘largely failed’ in finding a 
solution to the submarine crisis.
88
  However, this seems to be a perception, possibly 
stemming from the vitriolic criticism engendered by Lloyd George, which has not 
been seriously challenged. 
 Considering firstly the question of who was responsible for introducing the 
convoy system, there is no doubt that external pressure was applied to the Admiralty 
to consider the matter, notably by the Board of Trade, Hankey and, towards the end of 
April 1917, Lloyd George and the War Cabinet.  However, ultimately it was Jellicoe’s 
own decision and the evidence is such that he made the decision before Lloyd 
George’s visit to the Admiralty on 30 April.  In an interview given to the Morning 
Post following the publication of Lloyd George’s War Memoirs, Carson claimed that 
Lloyd George’s assertion that it was he who initiated the convoy system was ‘the 
biggest lie ever told.  Jellicoe did not oppose the convoy system but required time to 
organise it.’89  Whether or not it was the ‘biggest lie’ Lloyd George ever told is 
debatable, but from the foregoing, there is little doubt that his claim was a gross 
exaggeration. 
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  A second point that appears to have received scant attention is whether the 
timescale that elapsed between Jellicoe becoming First Sea Lord and the decision to 
implement the convoy could be considered reasonable given the consensus of views, 
rightly or wrongly, held both at the Admiralty and amongst merchant ship captains, 
that ships sailing singly were less vulnerable to attack than those sailing in convoy.  In 
this context, both the shortage of available escorts and the fact that Germany did not 
launch the unrestricted campaign until the beginning of February 1917 must also be 
considered.  In these circumstances, it must be said that a period of two and a half 
months is not particularly long.  When Jellicoe joined the Admiralty, there was no 
organisation in place that could have implemented the convoy system, and until the 
Ministry of Shipping had been established and organised, there was no mechanism for 
compelling ship owners to sail their ships in convoy. 
 Jellicoe had a major dilemma.  He had insufficient escort vessels.  This was 
not an illusion as later claimed by Captain Dewar or as a consequence of any 
‘arithmetical mix up’.  Work undertaken by Capitan Webb at Jellicoe’s request in 
January 1917 had provided a realistic assessment of the Atlantic traffic and it was 
concluded on the basis of that information that there were insufficient vessels to 
implement a full convoy system.  Jellicoe’s dilemma was that to provide the necessary 
trade protection he would have to denude the Grand Fleet of part of its destroyer 
screen, thereby reducing the fleet’s superiority over the High Seas Fleet.  As Jellicoe 
later wrote in a paper for the War Cabinet:  
The Grand Fleet is the centre and pivot on which all naval operations depend.  
It is true that its operations are confined to the North Sea but on its very 
existence depends the possibility of carrying out the all-important operation of 
safeguarding our line of communications.  The safety and efficiency of the 
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Grand Fleet to a large extent depend … on its destroyers and to carry out any 
policy that involves a reduction in [their] number increases the already 
considerable risks that we now take.
90
  
The irony is that, as discussed in Chapter VII below, shortly after expressing that 
view, Jellicoe was prepared to modify his position and risk reducing the capability of 
the Grand Fleet in order to further the battle against the U-boat.  However by that time 
it had become more evident that the High Seas Fleet would not sally from its harbours 
and engage the Grand Fleet in a major action.  In February 1917, Jellicoe was surely 
right to exercise caution, particularly given the number of legitimate and ‘formidable’ 
disadvantages of the convoy system perceived both from within and outside the 
Admiralty. 
 There is no doubt that in hindsight the convoy proved successful in combating 
the U-boat and it is arguable that history dictated that it was the obvious solution and 
hence should have been introduced earlier.  However, it was not the only factor 
involved in defeating the U-boat.  Contrary to Marder’s view, the U-boat also had to 
be sunk and in this respect the development of offensive weaponry such as the depth-
charge, hydrophone and an intensive mining strategy, played an important part. 
  The criticism directed by Lloyd George at the Admiralty under Jellicoe over 
the introduction of the convoy system is therefore unjustified.  Jellicoe himself 
expressed the view that the perception of his failing to act promptly in introducing the 
convoy system may have contributed to his eventual dismissal.  However on the basis 
of the foregoing, objectively any loss of confidence by the Prime Minister on this 
count was misplaced and the politicians and press who were so critical of the 
Admiralty were too impatient.           
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Chapter IV 
 
                 
Justified or Unjustified Cause  
 
 
Introduction 
 
In his War Memoirs, the Prime Minister, Lloyd George, stated that by June 
1917, he had decided to remove Admiral Sir John Jellicoe from office.
1
  At that time, 
Jellicoe himself recognised that a probable cause for his dismissal would be the 
perceived delay in introducing the convoy system, writing that ‘politicians have been 
… intriguing against myself and the Admiralty for some little time … Of course it is 
all as a result of the submarine campaign and it seems impossible to put into the head 
of the ordinary landsmen that a submarine is a very different class of vessel to deal 
with.’2  Given the seriousness of the shipping situation and the potential impact of the 
U-boat campaign on the future war effort, it would not have been surprising if Jellicoe 
had been replaced at that time.  Indeed, as discussed later, there is little doubt that 
Lloyd George would have sacked Jellicoe then had he been able to do so.  He 
certainly pressed Sir Edward Carson to make a change.   
However, Jellicoe was not dismissed at that time.  As noted, he remained in 
office for a further six months, by which time the U-boat threat had been contained,   
if not eliminated.  As Admiral Sims, in command of the US Navy’s operations in the 
United Kingdom, wrote immediately following Jellicoe’s dismissal, ‘I was distressed 
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to hear of your leaving the Admiralty when the effects of all your anti-submarine 
measures are showing such great success.’3   
The reasons for Jellicoe’s dismissal after this lapse of time are clouded by the 
contradictory statements by Lloyd George and Sir Eric Geddes, who had succeeded 
Carson as First Lord, as to who was ultimately responsible for the dismissal.  In direct 
contrast to Lloyd George’s claim that he had decided to dismiss Jellicoe, Geddes 
categorically denied any outside pressure on him to do so, denied that Lloyd George 
had ever attempted to influence his judgement and claimed that he alone had arrived 
at the conclusion that a change in the office of First Sea Lord was needed.
4
  
This contradiction begs the question as to who was responsible, bearing in 
mind that Geddes was only appointed First Lord after the convoy system had been 
introduced and when the indications were that shipping losses were diminishing.  
Further, it does not appear that Geddes, at any time after his appointment, sought to 
change the overall naval strategy.  Thus, the question arises as to whether there were 
genuine alternative grounds for the dismissal that arose subsequent to Geddes joining 
the Admiralty, or whether he was merely a tool used by Lloyd George to engineer the 
dismissal which Lloyd George was already intent upon when an opportune moment 
arose.   
The answers to this question are of significance in the context of the current 
enquiry for three reasons.  Firstly, if Geddes was merely the tool of Lloyd George, the 
implication is that he wished to be absolved of responsibility, which in turn suggests 
that he would have difficulty publicly justifying the dismissal.  Secondly, if, as very 
nearly transpired, a constitutional crisis arose, Lloyd George had an available 
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scapegoat in Geddes.  Thirdly, given the importance of the role of First Sea Lord at 
such a critical stage of the war, it can be argued that the unjustified dismissal 
impinged upon the democratic accountability of executive government to Parliament.  
This third point was well made in a parliamentary debate on the naval Estimates in 
March 1918, by the Member of Parliament, Mr Ronald McNeill, when Jellicoe’s 
dismissal was discussed at some length:           
But I am sure my right hon. Friend [Bonar Law, then Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, who had also commented on the dismissal], would not say that 
when an event so very striking takes place that a man, who is universally 
recognised as the greatest scientific administrator the Navy has, is dismissed at 
a critical point in the War, therefore the principle, reasonable as it is which my 
right hon. Friend has just laid down, can be held to silence not only criticism, 
but inquiry in this House of Commons … I doubt very much whether, on the 
whole, it would not be in the interests of the country for a clean breast to be 
made of it and that the Government should do one of two things - either 
explain to the country that Lord Jellicoe was no longer competent for the 
work, or, if they feel they can no longer do that, that they should restore him to 
the post in which the whole of the country and the whole of the Navy have 
complete confidence in him.
5
 
The ‘principle’ which Bonar Law had made in the debate was that it was not 
necessary for Government to give reasons every time a change was made to the head 
of one of the armed services.  However, McNeill must be correct in his assertion.  The 
principle Bonar Law alluded to should not be used in matters of national importance 
to avoid proper inquiry into the actions of government, all the more so in this 
                                                 
5
 Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, 6 March 1918.    
 99 
particular case where, as is discussed later, Jellicoe’s dismissal was not even the 
subject of proper debate in Cabinet.  Clearly, the question as to who was best suited to 
lead the Navy through the war was a matter of national importance; and from the 
tenor of other speeches made during the debate, McNeill was not alone in his opinion.  
However, McNeill’s protestations and his proposed courses of action were ignored, 
which in itself suggests that the Government, in the form of Lloyd George and 
Geddes, had difficulty in justifying the action taken.  
  Admiral Bacon also had difficulty in finding justification for the decision.       
It has already been noted that Bacon’s opinions should be regarded with some 
circumspection.  Yet, his assessment in this context remains perceptive.  In his view, 
Jellicoe’s dismissal ‘was one of the chief of several short sighted acts committed by 
the British Government in the last year of the War, and one which indirectly affected 
greatly Lord Jellicoe’s reputation’.6  He goes on to suggest that: 
The inference drawn by the public generally must have been that there were 
weighty reasons to prompt such an act.  It is therefore necessary to examine 
the reasons that were advanced for this step, and to determine so far as is 
possible from the known facts, what justification the politicians had for his 
removal.  The difficulty of doing so is somewhat reduced owing to the fact 
that separate reasons were given to different persons in authority.  If these 
reasons are proved to be false, then Sir John’s dismissal can be triply 
condemned.
7
 
Bacon’s reference to ‘separate reasons’ being given to different persons probably 
relates to the debacle that occurred between Geddes and the other Sea Lords 
immediately after the dismissal, which is the subject of later discussion.  However, 
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Bacon’s logic in determining what the ‘weighty reasons’ might have been and 
whether or not there were genuine grounds for removing Jellicoe appears sound.   
 In the previous chapter, the conclusion drawn was that the controversy over 
the introduction of the convoy did not justify Jellicoe’s dismissal.  This chapter will 
therefore consider what other reasons for the dismissal there may have been in the 
intervening six month period.  There is no doubt that there were a number of recorded 
events through October, November and December 1917 that gave rise to differences 
of opinion between Jellicoe and Geddes.  Jellicoe himself acknowledges that ‘for 
some weeks before I left the Admiralty I had occasion to take exception to the 
methods of Sir Eric Geddes, the First Lord, although no serious disagreement 
occurred.’8   
These matters included the issue of honours for Admiral Duff, the aftermath of 
the destruction of two Scandinavian convoys in October and December 1917 and a 
dispute over the method of sealing off the Dover Straits from German Submarines and 
the related competence of Bacon.  Each of these issues will be considered further in 
this chapter to determine whether alone or in combination they justified the dismissal.  
 
 
Honours for Duff 
 
The first incident that falls for discussion here relates to Jellicoe’s 
recommendation of honours for Admiral Duff.  To understand both the circumstances 
and the tenor of Geddes’ objection to this recommendation, it is appropriate again to 
quote Jellicoe:   
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The next incident was the subject of an honour for Admiral Duff whom I had 
recommended for a K.C.B in the New Year’s Honours.  
Geddes … asked if I had recommended him for his services afloat or at 
the Admiralty.  I replied the latter.  He said he objected to his manner, and I 
said I was recommending for his services and not his manner. 
Geddes said he did not like his manner to him or the wording of some 
of his minutes.  I then said that I feared he did not realise that the Sea Lords 
were his colleagues and not his subordinates, and it was both their right and 
their duty to state their opinions quite clearly and frankly, realising of course 
that he was the responsible minister.
9
 
Jellicoe obviously considered that Duff’s services in establishing the Anti-Submarine 
Division fully warranted a knighthood.  On the other hand, Geddes’ objection 
apparently lay, not in Duff’s performance or capability, but in his manner.   
This exemplifies the difference of approach between Geddes and Jellicoe.  
After five months as First Lord, Geddes still had to come to terms with the traditions 
of the Navy and the statutory role and responsibilities of the Board of the Admiralty.  
His inclination was still to act as ‘Chief Executive’ in a manner similar to running the 
railway company he had managed before the war and to regard his fellow members of 
the Board as subordinates, rather than as colleagues holding joint responsibility for 
the activities of the Navy.  However, the dispute between Geddes and Jellicoe over 
this issue did not appear serious.  According to Jellicoe, ‘after some further talk’ 
Geddes agreed to put Duff’s name forward for the honour, presumably conceding that 
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Duff’s work at the Admiralty was indeed justified.10  Certainly, in isolation this 
incident would not warrant Jellicoe’s dismissal. 
 One further point should be noted in this context.  The disagreement, such as it 
was, between Geddes and Jellicoe over Duff’s honour, was not related to any 
substantive operational or strategic issue.  It was related to the manner in which the 
Board of the Admiralty was accustomed to conducting its business.  In other words, it 
was the way in which the Admiralty went about its affairs, not what it was doing, that 
appeared to concern Geddes.   
 
 
The Scandinavian Convoys 
 
The second difference of opinion arose from a more serious and more complex 
problem, namely the sinking of two Scandinavian convoys by German surface ships.  
Both of these events gave rise to considerable adverse press comment, particularly in 
the Daily Mail.  The first incident arose on 17 October 1917 when a westbound 
convoy of 12 merchant ships, accompanied by four escort vessels, was attacked by 
two German light cruisers about 65 miles east of Lerwick.  Nine of the merchant 
vessels and two destroyers were sunk.  The German cruisers escaped unscathed 
despite the Admiralty knowing that the German cruisers were at sea and, at the time, 
two squadrons of British cruisers were in the approaches to the Skagerrak and a 
further three squadrons of British cruisers were sailing just to the north of the Dogger 
Bank.   
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The ensuing Court of Enquiry attributed the loss to the ‘ill advised decision’ of 
the commander of the escort to attack the superior German force rather than 
attempting to draw it off.  However, it would seem that the Admiralty also appears to 
have been at fault in that it did not advise Admiral Beatty, responsible for the 
protection of the Scandinavian convoys from surface attack, as to the likely 
whereabouts of the German cruisers.  If he had known, it is possible that he would 
have altered the disposition of the British cruisers at sea.
11
  
 The second incident occurred on 12 December 1917.  This time, an eastbound 
convoy from Bergen to Lerwick, comprising five neutral merchant ships, 
accompanied by two British destroyers and four armed trawlers, was attacked by four 
modern German destroyers.  All ships in the convoy, apart from one of the escorting 
destroyers, were sunk and again the German force escaped unscathed.  As Newbolt 
wrote in the Official History: 
The British destroyers were no match for their opponents, and they were, 
moreover, in the leeward position.  The Northwest swept a blinding storm of 
spray into the faces of the gunners and when the Partridge and the Pellew [the 
British destroyers] were in the trough of the waves, nothing was to be seen of 
the enemy except their masts and the tops of their funnels.  The Germans 
made admirable use of their advantage, and as usual their fire was extremely 
accurate and rapid.
12
  
Despite these excuses of inferior forces and foul weather, unquestionably there was 
some systemic failure.  As in the previous incident, other British warships were in the 
vicinity but not close enough to intervene.  However, it appears from the Court of 
Enquiry relating to this incident, held on 18 December 1917, that the commander of 
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the escorting force was not aware of this.  Beatty, to give him credit, accepted full 
responsibility for the strength (or lack of strength) of the escort, but not for the sailing 
time of the convoy, which was decided by the Admiralty.  Thus the Court of Enquiry 
concluded ‘that the cause of this regrettable incident was the continuation of a system 
of control of convoys which had previously proved ineffective for providing attack 
against fast surface vessels … The evidence shows that the responsibility is too 
divided and that no definite orders for guidance had been given.’13 
 Consequently, it is arguable, particularly after the second incident, that the 
Admiralty was at fault both for failing to introduce a system of convoy with 
significantly strengthened escort cover and for not ensuring that ship commanders had 
the appropriate intelligence information.  Certainly the press thought so, and not only 
the Northcliffe press in this particular instance.  The Daily News described the 
incident ‘as a disaster which will create indignation as well as a deep concern in the 
public mind’ and the Pall Mall Gazette asserted that the affair had come so close to 
the previous catastrophe ‘that the public mind will have considerable need of 
reassurance as to the state of our commerce defences’.14 
Yet, as was often the case, this press criticism was not wholly justified and 
there were factors that militated against the Admiralty’s culpability.  Firstly, the 
attacks on the Scandinavian convoys by surface ships represented a new tactic 
introduced by Admiral Scheer as a result of the success that convoys were having 
against U-boat attacks.  As Admiral De Robeck, in command of the Lerwick shore 
base, said at the Court of Inquiry regarding the second attack, ‘I consider that the 
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reason they [The German Naval Command] are risking their surface ships against the 
convoys is that their submarines have achieved so little against us.’15   
Secondly, the Admiralty were unlucky in the timing of the second attack.  
After the first attack, a full scale review of the Scandinavian convoy system was 
initiated by Jellicoe.  In the words of Admiral Sir William James, then a Captain at the 
Admiralty, ‘There was a devil of a row about this and Beatty came here to the 
Admiralty for a meeting.’16  The meeting was held on 22 October 1917, and from that 
meeting, by 5 November, plans for a revised system had been developed.  These plans 
were under final consideration at a conference at Longhope on 10 December 1917; 
i.e., two days before the second attack.
17
  The issue then is not that the Admiralty 
failed to act, but whether it acted with sufficient expedition to improve matters.   
The third factor is more generic and one that constantly troubled the Admiralty 
throughout the war.  As discussed in Chapter III, the Admiralty lacked the resources 
to meet all the demands upon it.  Beatty, like Jellicoe before him, persistently 
complained of the inadequacy of screening destroyers to protect his capital ships from 
submarine attack.  As Beatty said at the Court of Inquiry following the second attack:  
Now that the enemy have interfered with over-sea traffic, the protection must 
take a place in the Admiralty policy as it is quite impossible to preserve the 
Fleet in a state of readiness at all times to meet enemy forces and at the same 
time be capable of providing absolute protection to the convoys across the 
North Sea.
18
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Beatty’s comment links to the fourth factor, an argument well made by the 
conservative press journals, such as the Spectator and the Daily Telegraph, after the 
first attack, namely that the North Sea is a large place and it was impossible to prevent 
a few swift, powerful enemy raiders from steaming out from time to time in darkness 
or low visibility and overwhelming the convoy and its escort.
19
  In other words, unless 
the naval escort for each convoy was strengthened considerably, either in terms of the 
number or power of the escort vessels or both, it was not possible, given the area to be 
covered, to provide this ‘absolute protection’ against swift ‘hit and run’ surface  
attacks.  Beatty had been unwilling to compromise the readiness of the Grand Fleet to 
provide additional escort cover.      
 Prima facie, therefore, it can be said that the mitigating factors were such as to 
warrant a powerful argument that Jellicoe’s dismissal on the grounds of these two 
incidents alone was not justified.  However, the striking factor here is that it was not 
the attacks on the convoy per se that led to the contretemps between Geddes and 
Jellicoe, but the way in which the Court of Enquiry that followed the second incident 
was to be managed.  According to Jellicoe:  
I had a bad cold during the weekend after the attack and was in bed on the 
Saturday when Sir H. Oliver was sent over by Sir E. Geddes to see me.  He 
said the First Lord desired an immediate enquiry ordered and that it was to be 
composed of very senior Flag Officers whose names were to be reported for 
approval, and that all the facts were to be brought out.  He added that if I 
refused to order this sort of enquiry he intended to send up Lord Fisher to 
enquire into it.  Sir Rosslyn Wemyss also saw me and said he had told the 
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First Lord that Naval Courts of Enquiry were quite common and that there was 
no need to make a fuss about them as the procedure was well understood.
20
 
From this, Wemyss clearly thought that Geddes was overreacting to the situation and 
did not understand the usual naval processes for conducting Courts of Enquiry.  
Jellicoe also considered that Geddes was overreacting.  His response to the 
prospect of Fisher being sent north to investigate was robust.  He wrote from his 
sickbed: 
Oliver tells me you mentioned to him this morning a proposal to send Lord 
Fisher to Scapa to inquire into the question of the attack on the Scandinavian 
convoy.  I can hardly believe that the suggestion is serious.  Such a step would 
go some way to destroy the confidence of the officers in the Fleet in the 
Admiralty.  Lord Fisher has not been to sea since about [date deleted in 
original] & he has absolutely no experience of modern warfare, but what is 
more important the Navy would not trust his judgement & impartiality.
21
 
These were harsh words from the prodigy of Fisher whose career benefited 
significantly from his mentoring.  However, following his resignation as First Sea 
Lord in the aftermath of the Dardanelles debacle, Fisher was not then highly regarded 
within the Navy.  Although he had been First Sea Lord for the second time from 
October 1914 to May 1915, Jellicoe’s opinion of his lack of relevant experience is 
correct in as much as Fisher had not held a sea command for 15 years.  That factor, 
combined with Fisher’s penchant for intrigue and indeed his age, suggests that 
Jellicoe’s assessment that sending Fisher north would undermine the confidence of 
the officers in the Grand Fleet was correct.
22
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Two other points emerge from this exchange.  Firstly, the desire to protect 
Beatty and his subordinates in the manner described is indicative of Jellicoe’s loyalty 
to his subordinates.  Secondly, Geddes must have been aware of Fisher’s reputation.  
That and the tenor of the note suggest that Geddes, in threatening to send Fisher to 
conduct an inquiry, was either naive or was acting in a fit of pique.  Moreover, this 
difference of approach was compounded in that Geddes altered the telegram that 
Jellicoe had drafted to send to Beatty and reinserted wording to include the demand 
that, contrary to normal procedure, the Admiralty approve the names of the officers 
conducting the inquiry.  Geddes also sent an additional telegram to Beatty demanding 
that ‘nothing but a full and searching enquiry would satisfy the public’.23  However, 
the saga did not end there.  To continue Jellicoe’s account: 
On Sunday he sent over to me a draft of an announcement to make in 
Parliament.  It was worded so as to throw blame on Sir D Beatty, and in such a 
way as to give the idea that the loss of convoy was a disaster of the  greatest 
magnitude as well as preventable.  I objected to this wording, altered it a great 
deal and sent it back.  Most of my alterations were adopted, but not all and the 
announcement was not a happy one.
24
 
This also suggests that Geddes was naïve both in political terms and in the affairs of 
the Navy.  The destruction of the convoy was serious, but certainly not of the ‘greatest 
magnitude’.  It may well have been preventable had the recommendations agreed 
during the 22 October meeting been implemented sooner, but on security grounds it 
would not necessarily have been prudent to admit that publicly.  Certainly, it would 
have inappropriate to place the blame publicly on Beatty before the outcome of the 
Court of Enquiry was known.  
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Moreover, Jellicoe’s approach to the communication with Beatty over the 
matter was subsequently vindicated.  On visiting the Grand Fleet on 22 December 
1917, he found Beatty ‘furious about the telegram which I then saw for the first time 
as sent by Sir E Geddes’.25  Beatty thought that the telegrams implied that his 
authority was being usurped, that the disposition of his ships had been faulty, and 
implied that he might ‘pack’ the Court.26  On his return to the Admiralty, Jellicoe told 
Geddes that he agreed with Beatty’s view that the telegrams ‘were insulting’.27  
Geddes, apparently, ‘did not like Jellicoe’s frankness’.28  Nevertheless, despite it 
being arguable that Beatty overreacted, he was later able to extract a letter of apology 
from Geddes which he then read to the assembled company of his Flag officers.
29
  
  Thus, it is clear that Geddes conceded to Jellicoe’s point of view in not 
sending Fisher to conduct the enquiry.  To an extent Geddes also accepted Jellicoe’s 
approach to the matter by modifying the draft telegram to Beatty.  Further, in 
subsequently giving Beatty the apology, it can be argued that Geddes overreacted to 
the situation and that Jellicoe’s approach to the matter was warranted.  Moreover, as 
in the case of Geddes’ objection to Duff’s honours award, again it was the way in 
which the Navy conducted its affairs more than any substantive operational or 
strategic matter that appeared to cause the problem between Geddes and Jellicoe.  
Geddes had no complaint over the substantive recommendations made to improve the 
protection of the Scandinavian convoys.  Thus, given these circumstances, it is 
difficult to conclude that either the destruction of the convoys or Jellicoe’s reaction 
after the incidents warranted his dismissal.   
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Admiral Bacon and the Dover Patrol 
 
A third matter that Jellicoe thought may have contributed to his dismissal 
relates to a dispute over the Dover mine barrage.  In contrast to Hough, Marder 
thought this to be ‘the immediate cause of Jellicoe’s dismissal’.30  Patterson, in his 
biography of Jellicoe, describes the dispute thus: 
[Admiral Wemyss], supported … by Keyes … felt that more could be done to 
prevent German submarines passing through it’ [the Dover Barrage] which the 
Intelligence Department had established they were doing without much 
difficulty.  Bacon, the architect of the Barrage, obstinately refused to believe 
this.  Towards the end of December Wemyss therefore proposed both to 
Geddes and Jellicoe that Bacon should be replaced. Geddes agreed; Jellicoe, 
who was prone to carry loyalty to his friends almost to a fault, dissented.
31
 
Leaving aside for the moment the question of whether Jellicoe’s loyalty was 
misplaced, it appears that Marder and Patterson have placed too much reliance on 
Admiral Wemyss’ version of events.  In his memoirs, Wemyss states: 
The Intelligence Department satisfactorily proved to me that the enemy did 
pass the Straits successfully and almost unchallenged.  Sir R Bacon on the 
other hand maintained that they did not, that his system of nets was 
satisfactory and that the proof of this lay in the fact that no ship had ever been 
torpedoed in his area … Towards the end of December I brought the subject 
up very insistently before both the First Lord and the First Sea Lord, and my 
contention was that Bacon was not being successful in his anti-submarine 
measures, that we should leave no stone unturned to try and stop the passage 
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of these craft and that we had better try somebody else and go on changing 
until we found somebody who could.
32
 
This, despite Wemyss proximity to the matter, is a gross oversimplification of events.   
 Firstly, whilst Bacon may have been sceptical about the number of U-boats 
thought to be passing through the Dover Straits, he was far from satisfied about the 
effectiveness of the barrage.  The original barrage, constructed in September 1916, 
consisted of a line of moored mine nets running between the Goodwin Sands to the 
outer ends of the Ruytingen Shoals, i.e., running to the east of the line between Dover 
and Calais.  This was supplemented by a line of deep mines about half a mile to the 
west of the mine nets. The purpose of the barrage was both to assist in the protection 
of Allied cross channel shipping from German surface attack and to inhibit the 
passage of German submarines to the western approaches to Britain.  However,        
as early as February 1917, Bacon had recognised that the original barrage was not 
particularly effective and had submitted an additional scheme to the Admiralty 
whereby another line of deep mines would be run from Folkestone to Gris-Nez.          
However, sufficient mines for the additional minefield were not made available to 
him until November 1917.  Nevertheless, the new minefield was virtually complete by 
the time Jellicoe, and shortly thereafter, Bacon was dismissed.   
Secondly, the dispute did not concern the barrage per se.  The nub of the issue arose 
from a report of the Channel Barrage Committee which had been established by 
Geddes, with the newly appointed Director of Plans, Admiral Keyes, as Chairman, 
and with wide terms of reference ‘to investigate and report on the possible measures 
for constructing a barrage between England and France’.33  It is notable that despite 
being in command of the Dover patrol and having experience of the problems 
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encountered with the original barrage, neither Bacon nor a representative of the Dover 
Patrol was appointed to this committee.  The Committee’s report, dated 29 November 
1917, was a partial indictment of Bacon.  It concluded ‘that the present barrage forms 
no effective obstacle to the passage of submarines’.34  On the other hand, it also 
concluded that ‘Admiral Bacon’s latest proposal regarding the Folkestone to Gris-Nez 
mine-field coincides generally with the views of the Committee.’35  Three other 
recommendations that are pertinent here were made.  Firstly, the area above the 
minefield should be more closely patrolled by surface vessels to force U-boats to dive 
into the minefield.  Secondly, the area above the minefield should be brightly 
illuminated, ultimately by searchlights in specially constructed stationary lighthouse 
ships, but pending their availability, by flares and searchlights on patrol vessels.  
Thirdly, the Committee recommended that ‘the construction, maintenance, defence 
and patrol of the same should be under the control of one officer, who should be 
solely and directly responsible to the Admiralty in all matters relating thereto.’36 
         Bacon objected to the first recommendation on the grounds that he did not have 
the resources to meet the 24 hour patrols suggested by the Barrage Committee and to 
meet his other responsibilities, notably protecting the cross Channel shipping from 
surface attack.  He objected to the second because he believed the suggested interim 
measures would light up the patrol vessels making them vulnerable to attack.  He had 
no objection in principle to illuminating the minefield, but he wanted to wait until the 
stationary light ships were ready.  Indeed, in one of several letters Bacon wrote to 
Geddes on the issue, he remarked that ‘if the Admiralty are whole hearted in the 
matter and will provide me with the material and follow my plan we can practically 
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close the Straits, but if my plan is emasculated by makeshift lightships or fears - 
groundless - of the loss of shipping it will be a failure.’37 
However, it is Bacon’s response to the third point that caused the most 
irritation within the Plans Department of the Admiralty, but more in the manner than 
in the actual substance of the objection.  In a further letter to Geddes, Bacon wrote, 
‘The whole matter is one of compromise and difficulty and must be run on practical 
experience and not on preconceived notions.’38  Moreover, he later commented that: 
The above statement put, as politely as I possibly could, the obvious fact that it 
was better to leave the defence of the Straits to the Admiral who had local 
knowledge, experience, and the whole responsibility entailed by the command 
at Dover, than to allow dabbling by a committee who had no local knowledge, 
experience or responsibility.
39
 
From this it is evident that Bacon was challenging the competence of the Barrage 
Committee on the grounds that they did not have the requisite experience.  In his 
reference to ‘compromise and difficulty’ he was asserting his right as commander of 
the Dover Patrol to utilise the resources available to him as he, and not the Barrage 
Committee, considered appropriate.  Indeed, Bacon’s sensitivity to interference was 
not without support at the Admiralty.  For example, in one docket, Admiral Oliver 
noted that ‘it is undesirable to give Senior Officers detailed orders as to the 
disposition and working of vessels under their command.’40 
 Thus summarising, towards the end of 1917 a dispute had arisen between the 
Plans Division at the Admiralty and the officer commanding the Dover Patrol on the 
temporary method of illuminating the minefield, the extent to which the minefield 
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should be patrolled and as to who should be responsible for prioritising resources 
within the Dover Patrol, the Admiralty or the local admiral in command. 
  Keyes’s frustration over the dispute was evident and culminated in an internal 
note to Jellicoe that included the following comments: 
Concur with D.C.N.S [Deputy Chief of Naval Staff] as to the undesirability of 
giving Senior Officers detailed orders as to the dispositions and working of 
vessels under their command.  The present case, however, would appear to be 
one in which some departure from established custom is necessary … The net 
result is that up to the present no adequate steps have been taken, and the 
enemy continues to pass through the Straits of Dover without hindrance … 
The measures which the Vice-Admiral are to take to meet this very serious 
situation … are so inadequate that the Admiralty must either take action by 
directing certain measures to be carried out and accept the responsibility, or 
they must accept the still greater responsibility of knowing that the measures 
which the Vice Admiral proposes are inadequate to deal with a situation which 
is vitally affecting our power to carry on the war.
41
  
Thus, on the one hand Keyes agreed with Oliver on the general principle that the 
Admiralty should not be giving local commanders ‘detailed orders’ as to the 
disposition of ships, but in his view the persistent intransigence of Bacon to devote 
sufficient resources to patrolling the minefield to the detriment of other critical 
activities warranted a departure from the general principle.  Keyes’ overriding 
concern was to combat the U-boat threat, which ‘vitally’ affected the war effort, by 
preventing their passage through the Channel.  
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Jellicoe’s response to Keyes’ note is illuminating from a number of 
perspectives. Firstly, he stated that: 
I am not able to accept the sweeping indictment of the work of the V.A. [Vice 
Admiral] Dover, as stated by the Director of Plans.  The V.A’s dispositions are 
based on experience, not only of the submarine action but of destroyer attacks, 
and he is naturally reluctant to ignore the latter in the attempt to deal with the 
former.
42
 
Thus, Jellicoe rejected the criticism of Bacon and was supportive of Bacon’s right to 
allocate his resources according to the dangers as he perceived them.  Moreover, the 
use of the term ‘sweeping indictment’ implies that Jellicoe thought Keyes had been 
over critical. 
 However, Jellicoe then proceeded to endorse Keyes’ recommendations by 
ordering Keyes as follows:   
The submarine menace is the greatest danger with which we are faced and all 
other considerations must give way to combating this menace and to denying 
the Straits of Dover to the enemy’s submarines … In order to carry out this 
policy it is essential that the attention of the Dover Force should for the 
present be directed to anti-submarine measures, and to provide the strong 
patrols necessary for this purpose …  
Patrol craft are to be provided in sufficient numbers in the vicinity of 
the deep minefield to force every submarine that is attempting to pass to dive 
into the minefield and a great number of drifters will be required in 
conjunction with patrol boats to achieve this objective … The use of a very 
large number of drifters and patrol boats in the vicinity of the deep minefield 
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will necessitate a strong destroyer force to safeguard them against an attack by 
the enemy’s destroyers based on Zeebrugge and pending the provision for the 
proposed boom vessels fitted with searchlights, it is considered necessary for 
the patrol boats and destroyers to use their searchlights intermittently, the 
drifters using flares … 
Inform the V.A. [Vice Admiral] that the arrangements are to be put in 
place at the earliest possible moment, and request him to forward his scheme 
of patrol to the Admiralty at a very early date. 
43
 
Thus, Jellicoe overrode Bacon both in the matter of providing patrol vessels for the 
barrage and in the matter of lighting the barrage temporarily by flares.  Consequently, 
Jellicoe was prepared to give absolute priority to preventing the passage of U-boats 
through the Channel.   
 A further conclusion can be drawn from this response.  In recognising that 
Bacon had wider responsibilities and that Keyes had been over-critical on the one 
hand, but on the other, was prepared to accept the greater risk of surface attack to 
focus on the U-boat issue, the order was measured and balanced.  As such it counters 
the argument, discussed in Chapter VIII, that stress had impaired Jellicoe’s 
judgement.  Moreover, the fact that Jellicoe was prepared to override Bacon’s 
objections in no uncertain terms dispels any concept of misplaced loyalty towards 
Bacon, in so far as it relates to giving necessary orders.  
 Whether Jellicoe’s decision not to replace Bacon in these circumstances 
constitutes misplaced loyalty is a different issue.  It is not easy to come to any 
conclusion on this as the interpretation of the events of those directly involved differs 
considerably.  On the one hand, Wemyss was adamant that Bacon should be replaced, 
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holding the view that ‘as Bacon was not successful in anti-submarine measures … 
Jellicoe maintained Bacon was the best man we had for the job and should remain.  I 
on the other hand maintained that he was not.’44  Moreover, Wemyss was prepared to 
resign over the issue.  He had not been particularly comfortable in the role of Deputy 
First Sea Lord because he believed he was not being given sufficient responsibility, 
and the difference of opinion with Jellicoe over Bacon was the final straw which 
‘determined me to resign’.45  The question of replacing Bacon was therefore a matter 
of considerable importance to him.  
  To Jellicoe on the other hand, the dispute had not assumed the same 
magnitude.  His version of events was: 
I fancy that Admirals Wemyss and Keyes represented to Sir E. Geddes their 
view that Admiral Bacon should be replaced.  As to this, I always said that if 
Sir R. Bacon did not carry out the wishes of the Board, he would, of course, 
have to go, but so far he had as quickly as was possible altered his 
arrangements in accordance with any views expressed by me.  This process 
was going on and it was early yet to talk of any such measure as supersession. 
An Admiral must be responsible for carrying out Admiralty orders in the way 
he thought best. 
We [Geddes and Jellicoe] had not any particular difference of opinion 
on the subject.  Sir E Geddes saw Admiral Bacon on the subject and was 
apparently satisfied with the interview.
46
  
Unfortunately, neither the Geddes papers in the public domain nor the biographical 
work by Auckland Geddes, provide any direct clarification of these contradictory 
accounts.  However, Bacon did meet with Geddes on the barrage issue and after this 
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meeting Geddes acknowledged that ‘I was glad to hear from our conversation that the 
matter will continue to receive your unremitting attention on the lines approved by the 
Board.’ 47   This implies that Geddes was satisfied with the outcome of the meeting.      
  Certainly, after Jellicoe’s intervention, Bacon did take action to implement all 
the steps recommended by Keyes and his Barrage Committee.
48
  Keyes, on the other 
hand, did not agree that Bacon had implemented these steps ‘as quickly as possible,’ 
and it would thus seem that Jellicoe’s use of the term ‘as expressed by me’ has a 
considerable bearing on his decision not to remove Bacon.  In other words, Bacon was 
prepared to execute a direct order from Jellicoe, but was reluctant to brook 
interference by an Admiralty committee which lacked, as he thought, the necessary 
experience of his command.   
          There are two further factors that may have influenced Jellicoe in the matter.   
Marder suggests that ‘Bacon’s personality enters into the picture’ and there can be 
little debate about this.
49
  Bacon, whilst recognised as being clever and often 
innovative, was at times irascible and arrogant and he was not particularly popular in 
some quarters of the Navy.  As he confessed to Geddes, ‘I own I like my own way.     
I own in some matters I have firm convictions.  But then I know the place and am 
generally right!!  I own I do not suffer fools gladly.’50  Moreover, his recalcitrance 
irritated Wemyss who was of the view that Bacon’s letters to the Admiralty disclosed 
‘what is in my opinion, an impossible attitude of mind on Admiral Bacon’s part, and 
show the impracticability of carrying out in the Channel any scheme which does not 
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originate in Dover’.51  Thus, it is not surprising that Wemyss advocated Bacon’s 
removal from the Dover Patrol. 
  However, it was not just Bacon’s personality that ‘entered the picture’.  
Keyes, too, was single minded and opinionated and saw his contretemps with Bacon 
as the ‘battle for the closing of the Dover Straits’.52  He had been brought to the 
Admiralty by Wemyss in September 1917 as Director of Plans, having previously 
been Wemyss’ second in command of naval operations in the Dardanelles fiasco.  
Thus, it can be said that he was as much Wemyss’ man as Bacon was Jellicoe’s.   
Also, according to Marder, there were suspicions that one of the Barrage Committee’s 
objectives was to have Keyes replace Bacon in command of the Dover Patrol.
53
   
Oliver certainly thought as much, believing that since Keyes was appointed Director 
of Plans he had ‘devoted himself to engineering a plan to unship Bacon from the 
Dover Patrol on the grounds that submarines still sometimes got through the Straits’.54  
That view is supported in correspondence from Keyes where he writes, ‘I do think 
Bacon has been delivered into the hands of the Board.  They have ample grounds for 
kicking him out – on his own showing.’55  Further, it has been said that ‘Bacon had 
more brains in his little finger than Keyes had in his head.’56  Jellicoe was not over- 
enamoured with Keyes’ appointment as Director of Plans in the first place, possibly 
because of this relative lack of intellect.  Thus, whilst he was prepared to overrule 
Bacon’s objections and support Keyes and the Barrage Committee’s 
recommendations, he did not see Keyes as a suitable replacement for Bacon.  
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 The other factor to be borne in mind is that irrespective of Bacon’s reluctance 
on this issue, there is no doubt that in all other respects his command of the Dover 
Patrol was successful.  In the Epilogue to The Dover Patrol, Bacon wrote that ‘we had 
maintained sea communication with the Armies in France, without intermission, in 
spite of destroyers, submarines, mines and air-craft, and our commerce had passed 
freely and with almost equal security to and from the Thames as it did peacetime.’57  
This is no exaggeration. The boundaries of the command extended from the Scheldt to 
the North Foreland and from Beachy Head due south to the French coast, an area of 
some 4000 square miles of water.  Throughout the war, 125,100 merchant ships 
passed through the Patrol, of which only 73 were sunk.
58
  Further, over 12 million 
troops were transported across the Channel with only 85 lives lost in just one 
incident.
59
  Bacon commanded the Patrol for over two and a half years and even 
Keyes, despite his difference of opinion on the barrage issue, later admitted that ‘the 
activities of the Dover Patrol were immense and Admiral Bacon had built up an 
enormous organisation, which carried out its daily duties with great regularity and 
efficiency.’60  Given these circumstances, Jellicoe’s loyalty to Bacon was not 
misplaced.   
  One further aspect of this debate warrants discussion.  Often in warfare, the 
aftermath will vindicate the efficacy of any decision.  It did not do so in this instance.  
On 19 December 1917, the first day on which Bacon fully implemented Jellicoe’s 
orders regarding night time illumination of the minefield, the German submarine UB-
56 was forced by the searchlights and flares to dive into the minefield and was blown 
up.  Keyes later claimed that this provided ‘an overwhelming argument in support of 
                                                 
57
 Bacon, Dover Patrol, II, 607. 
58
 Ronald Handley, The Dover Patrol Memorial, (Dover, 1998), 8, 9.   
59
 Ibid. 
60
 Keyes, Naval Memoirs, ii, 159. 
 121 
the policy the Plans Division had so insistently urged, and Sir Reginald Bacon had so 
strenuously resisted’.61  Further, he is probably correct in his claim that the sinking of 
UB-56 sealed Bacon’s fate as he was replaced by Keyes as commander of the Dover 
Patrol a week after Jellicoe’s dismissal.  However, on 14 February 1918, Bacon’s 
worst fears were realised.  That night, destroyers of the High Seas Fleet Second 
Flotilla sailed into the Channel undetected and attacked the barrage patrols.  The 
destroyers sank seven drifters and a trawler and severely damaged a further five 
drifters, a trawler and a minesweeper and then escaped unmolested.  Newbolt, in his 
description of the raid, concluded that ‘the trawlers burning flares were particularly 
vulnerable.’62  Thus, it can be said that the arguments advocated by Bacon and Keyes 
regarding the advantages and disadvantages of patrolling and lighting of the barrage 
both had merit.  Jellicoe’s view is less sympathetic, claiming after the war that ‘the 
heavy losses sustained were due to the system of patrols adopted by Keyes against the 
advice of Bacon.’63  The irony is that it was Jellicoe who had ordered Bacon to adopt 
Keyes’ proposals. 
At the beginning of this discussion on the dispute over the barrage, the 
argument was made that Wemyss’ version of events was over-simplified.  
Undoubtedly, Bacon was reluctant to believe that a large number of U-boats were able 
to pass through the Channel to the Western Approaches.  However, the issue goes 
beyond that.  In terms of overall strategy, Bacon firmly believed as commander of the 
Dover Patrol that his remit was wider than just preventing submarines passing through 
the Channel.  Consequently, he was not prepared to divert resources such that the risk 
of surface attack to Channel shipping was increased.  Jellicoe was prepared to accept 
                                                 
61
 Ibid, 143. 
62
 Newbolt, Official History, V, 218. 
63
 Jellicoe, Errors in Naval Operations, quoted, Marder, FDSF, 5, 44.   
 122 
that risk on the basis that his absolute priority was to counter the U-boat threat.  
Bacon accepted that and acted upon Jellicoe’s orders accordingly.  
 Bacon also accepted that the Dover barrage was deficient.  Some nine months 
before the Barrage Committee had been convened, he had developed a plan for 
improving the barrage.  Lack of suitable mines meant that the plan could not be 
implemented.  Nevertheless, the Barrage Committee had concurred with that plan.   
The major difference between Keyes and Bacon related to the extent to which 
the new barrage should be patrolled and illuminated at night.  In the latter case, there 
was no difference in principle.  Keyes wanted the patrolling vessels to use flares 
immediately.  Bacon thought that the risk of the patrolling vessels being subject to 
surface attack was too high and wanted to wait until permanent lighting stations could 
be constructed.  Again, in the interests combating the U-boat, Jellicoe was prepared to 
accept that risk. 
It is also quite clear that there was a personality clash between Bacon and 
Keyes.  Both were strongly opinionated and there is evidence to suggest that Keyes 
was trying to oust Bacon.  If Bacon, or at least a representative of the Dover Patrol, 
had been appointed to the Barrage Committee, the dispute may well have been 
avoided.  Jellicoe would have been aware of the personality clash.  His note to Keyes 
certainly indicates that he was not prepared to countenance ‘a wholesale indictment’ 
of Bacon’s capability as a consequence of the difference of opinion.  
The issue then is whether in these circumstances Jellicoe’s loyalty to Bacon 
was misplaced and, if Marder is correct in his assertion that it was the immediate 
cause of Jellicoe’s dismissal.  Jellicoe believed that as far as Geddes was concerned 
the matter had been resolved to Geddes’ satisfaction.  If that was the situation, 
Marder’s assertion is not correct.  Defining strategy and resolving differences of view 
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between the Admiralty and senior operational commanders was an inherent part of the 
role of the First Sea Lord.  Given all the foregoing circumstances, Jellicoe fulfilled his 
responsibilities.  His loyalty to Bacon was not unduly misplaced and as a 
consequence, the issues over the mine barrage did not justify his dismissal. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
It is difficult to justify Jellicoe’s dismissal from any of the issues described in this 
chapter.  Geddes conceded ground on the issue of honours for Admiral Duff and in 
isolation some disagreement that stemmed from a person’s particular manner (unless 
abusive), as distinct from his competence, should not constitute a reason for dismissal 
of an Admiral from high office.  Geddes had no issue over Duff’s competence.  
Whilst it may be argued that Duff, in charge of the Anti-Submarine Division, ought to 
have recognised the potential of the convoy system sooner than he did, his dedication 
and efforts in implementing it and in overseeing the development of offensive anti-
submarine weapons was hard to fault.   
 As to the attacks on the Scandinavian convoys, whether Geddes’ apology to 
Beatty over his approach to the enquiry process was born out of true contrition or 
merely a desire to appease Beatty in the immediate aftermath of Jellicoe’s dismissal is 
impossible to say.   However, the fact that he did so justified Jellicoe’s concerns about 
the manner in which Geddes wished to handle the enquiry.  Moreover, following the 
first of the attacks, the Admiralty did take steps to review the existing convoy 
protection arrangements.  It can be argued that the switch of German tactics ought to 
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have been anticipated.  However, as Geddes pointed out to the House of Commons 
during the Naval Estimates debate on 1 November 1917:  
The Scandinavian convoy system was started in April of this year, and more 
than 4,500 vessels have been convoyed by the British Navy in that convoy 
alone.  This is the first occasion upon which a single ship has been lost by 
surface attack in the Scandinavian convoy … we must, I think, write it down 
as one of the legitimate risks of war.
64
  
In these circumstances, if there was a degree of complacency at the Admiralty as to 
the effectiveness of the system then in use, it is understandable.  Moreover, Geddes 
could not publicly declare that the incident was ‘a legitimate risk of war’ and then use 
the incident as a legitimate reason for sacking Jellicoe. 
  Whether or not the destruction of the second convoy could have been 
avoided if the Admiralty had acted more quickly must also be open to debate, but in 
the context of the decision to dismiss Jellicoe, this is largely irrelevant as it was the 
process of establishing blame at an operational level that caused the contretemps 
between Jellicoe and Geddes, not the fact that the attacks had occurred.  Also, it can 
be argued that if fault was to be attributed to the Admiralty, Geddes ought also to 
shoulder some blame.  As can be seen from his appointment of the Barrage 
Committee, he was not slow to intervene in operational matters when he thought fit.  
 It is perhaps in the contretemps over the Dover mine barrage that the strongest 
argument for justifying Jellicoe’s dismissal lay.  As noted, Marder believed that it was 
the catalyst for the dismissal.  However, when the circumstances are fully analysed it 
is difficult to conclude that those commentators who view Jellicoe’s loyalty to Bacon 
as being ‘misplaced’ are correct.  Jellicoe was prepared to override Bacon because, 
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strategically, defeat of the U-boat had priority over any other factor.  He must have 
been aware of the internal politicking between Bacon and Keyes.  Bacon implemented 
the Barrage Committee’s recommendations immediately on receiving direct orders 
from Jellicoe to do so.   
However, perhaps the most telling factor here is that Geddes did not appear to 
force the issue of Bacon’s removal from command.  There is no suggestion in 
Jellicoe’s notes or in the Geddes papers in the National Archives that Geddes insisted 
on Bacon’s removal or that this was a resigning matter.  Indeed, the correspondence 
supports Jellicoe’s view that following Geddes’ interview with Bacon the matter had 
been resolved satisfactorily.  Further, if Geddes had appointed a representative of the 
Dover Command to the Barrage Committee in the first place, it is quite possible that 
the whole dispute would have been avoided. 
 On the one hand, logically it can be argued that if none of the above incidents 
in isolation warranted dismissal, a combination of the incidents could not warrant the 
dismissal.  On the other hand, it could be argued that it was the cumulative effect of 
all these incidents which ultimately led Geddes to the conclusion that he and Jellicoe 
were incompatible.  However, there was no disagreement on strategic or operational 
matters.  The differences as regards the matter of the Duff honours and the aftermath 
of the Scandinavian convoy incidents were related to the manner in which Geddes 
treated his associates on the Admiralty Board and other senior commanders.  In 
modern day parlance this may be described as a difference in management style.           
Jellicoe did not believe that these incidents had led to any serious 
disagreement between Geddes and himself.  It may have been that Geddes did not 
appreciate the challenge to his management style, but given the critical nature of 
Jellicoe’s role, that alone was not sufficient to warrant his dismissal.   
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Chapter V 
                                
 
         Conspiracies 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter the argument was made that the series of incidents 
which occurred between June 1917, when Lloyd George said he had decided to 
replace Admiral Jellicoe, and the end of December 1917, did not justify Jellicoe’s 
peremptory dismissal.  This chapter will argue that despite there being no grounds for 
dismissing Jellicoe, as early as May 1917 Lloyd George was conspiring to remove 
him from office.  At the end of June, however, Lloyd George found himself in a 
political dilemma and as a consequence could not remove Jellicoe at that time.  
Nonetheless, in the words of Sir Maurice Hankey, Lloyd George was still ‘hot for 
getting rid of Jellicoe’ when the opportunity arose, irrespective of whether or not he 
had grounds for doing so.
1
  Furthermore, Sir Eric Geddes, appointed First Lord of the 
Admiralty in July 1917, would be the means through which this would be achieved.       
It will also be argued that Lloyd George’s desire to remove Jellicoe was 
personally motivated.  In this context the difficult personal relationship that existed 
between Lloyd George and Jellicoe both before the war and through 1917 is of 
relevance.       
The second aspect that will be considered in the context of Lloyd George’s 
intrigue is the role that General Sir Douglas Haig played in the matter.  That Haig, as 
Commander in Chief of the British Army in France, may have been involved in a 
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conspiracy to remove Jellicoe from office appears surprising, particularly as both men 
advocated the same war strategy before the War Cabinet; namely that ‘side shows’ 
should be abandoned in favour of concentrating forces on the Western Front.  
However, Haig’s position was under threat at the time, to the extent that it has been 
suggested that Haig’s involvement in Jellicoe’s removal was an attempt to deflect 
attention away from him.
2
   
The third matter that will be considered in this chapter is the virulent press 
campaign waged against the Admiralty through the latter part of 1917, particularly by 
the newspapers owned by the press baron Lord Northcliffe.  It was suggested by a 
number of politicians that this campaign, if not directed by Lloyd George, was at least 
condoned by him.
3
  Also, there is strong circumstantial evidence arising both from a 
consideration of the press campaign itself and the relationship that existed between 
Northcliffe and Lloyd George which supports the theory that the press campaign was 
an integral part of a conspiracy to remove Jellicoe.  Indoctrinating the public about 
deficiencies at the Admiralty would certainly have eased Lloyd George’s path in this 
respect. 
 
 
An Uneasy Relationship 
 
Before the war, Jellicoe and Lloyd George held strongly differing views on the 
matter of naval estimates when Lloyd George, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, sought 
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to introduce major social reforms to Britain.  However, before reaching the nub of this 
contention, it is pertinent to understand the background to their relationship.  
 Firstly, it should be noted that during the first two and a half years of Lloyd 
George’s Chancellorship in Asquith’s 1908 to1915 Liberal Government, Jellicoe was 
at the Admiralty as Controller of the Navy.  As such, he was primarily responsible for 
the Navy’s shipbuilding programme.  At this time, the German navy’s warship 
building programme was approaching its zenith.  Secondly, in Jellicoe’s own words 
his ‘years in office [as Controller] were difficult’.4  It was a period when the size of 
capital ships and the calibre of guns constituting their main armament were steadily 
increasing.  Further, it was not only the size of capital ships that concerned Jellicoe, it 
was also their number.  ‘Secret information’ on Germany’s forward construction 
programme, which Jellicoe had received from a ‘private source’, resulted in a critical 
memorandum written in January 1909, from four Sea Lords to Sir Reginald 
McKenna, then First Lord of the Admiralty.
5
  This Memorandum stated:  
We concur in the statement of the First Lord that there is a possibility that 
Germany, by the spring of 1912, will have completed 21 Dreadnoughts 
(including large cruisers) and that there is a practical certainty that she will 
have 17 by that date; whereas, presuming we lay down six in the coming year, 
we shall only have 18 …  
We therefore consider it of the utmost importance that power should be 
taken to lay down two more armoured ships in 1909-10, making it eight in all.
6
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Thus, Jellicoe was involved in the controversial political debate regarding the 1909-
1910 Naval Estimates in which the Tory press, campaigning vociferously for a larger 
Navy, adopted the infamous slogan, ‘We want eight and we won’t wait!’7  
Space here does not permit a detailed account of that controversy and the 
political ramifications that ultimately ensued.  Suffice to say for the purposes of this 
argument, Lloyd George was vehemently opposed to the Admiralty proposals as, if 
accepted, they would have significantly compromised his plans for social reform and 
reneged on the Liberal Party’s pre-election pledge to reduce expenditure on 
armaments.  In writing to Asquith he considered that the discussion on the Naval 
Estimates  
threatens to re-open all the old controversies which rent the [Liberal] party for 
years and brought us to impotence and contempt … I therefore earnestly pray 
you not to commit to the very crude & ill-considered Admiralty demands 
without giving full consideration to the arguments urged upon you by … other 
members of the Cabinet who cannot see their way to assent to these demands.
8
 
It is evident from this that Lloyd George had a poor opinion of the basis for the 
Admiralty’s calculations.   
However, he lost the debate.  After several weeks of heated argument, during 
which threats of resignation on both sides were made, McKenna and the Sea Lords 
triumphed, with the Cabinet ultimately agreeing for provision to be made in the 1909-
1910 Estimates for all eight capital ships to be built.  If, then, as one of his 
biographers suggests, Lloyd George could do nothing more than ‘gnash his teeth and 
talk about a betrayal of Liberal principles’, it is conceivable that he harboured a 
grudge against Jellicoe, particularly as it later transpired that Jellicoe’s assessment of 
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the German build programme on which the Cabinet decision was based was 
exaggerated.
9
  Given that the competition for funds with the Navy had a serious 
impact upon Lloyd George’s ambitious plans for social reform, this conflict must 
have left him bearing a grudge against Jellicoe and the Admiralty.  As Winton said, 
given Lloyd George’s attitude to the Navy during the war, the Admiralty’s triumph 
over Lloyd George on the Naval Estimates ‘might have been something of a Pyrrhic 
victory’.10  
  Evidence of ill will between Lloyd George and the Admiralty at this time can 
also be found in a note that Jellicoe sent to McKenna recording remarks made at a 
meeting in January 1909 in the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey’s office.  
According to Jellicoe, during a discussion on the relative times that British and 
German manufacturers took to produce heavy gun mountings, Lloyd George suddenly 
remarked, ‘I think it shows extraordinary neglect on the part of the Admiralty that all 
this should not have been found out before.  I don’t think much of any of you 
Admirals and I should like to see Lord Charles Beresford at the Admiralty and the 
sooner the better.’11  Again, according to Jellicoe’s note, McKenna’s immediate 
riposte to Lloyd George was, ‘You know perfectly well that these facts were 
communicated to the Cabinet at the time we knew of them and your remark was “It’s 
all contractors’ gossip” or words to that effect.’12 
This reference to Lord Charles Beresford must have been particularly insulting 
as, at the time, the Navy was severely divided by a dispute that was both public and, 
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at times, vitriolic, between Beresford and Admiral Sir John Fisher, then First Sea 
Lord.  Beresford had been in command of the Mediterranean Fleet from 1905 to 1907 
and then the Channel Fleet from 1907 to 1909.  Throughout his naval career he had 
also served intermittently as a Conservative Member of Parliament.  The history of 
this feud between Fisher and Beresford is complex, but essentially it stemmed from 
two factors.  Firstly, Beresford’s ambition to achieve the ultimate position of First Sea 
Lord had been thwarted by Fisher on account of his promotion to Admiral of Fleet, 
thereby extending his time in office beyond the usual retirement age of 65.  Secondly, 
Beresford was opposed to both the wholesale changes to the Navy’s organisation that 
Fisher had introduced during his first term as First Sea Lord and to the ruthless 
methods by which he sought to introduce them.  Beresford’s criticism of the 
Admiralty and Fisher’s methods at times verged on mutiny.  By 1908, the schism in 
the Navy, in the words of Marder, ‘had become so subversive to the discipline of the 
service, so scandalous in the eyes of the public, and so dangerous to the security of the 
nation, that all shades of press opinion were calling for a halt to the dissension’.13  By 
December 1908 McKenna had eventually succeeded in obtaining Cabinet approval to 
merge the Channel Fleet (which Beresford then commanded) and the Home Fleet 
thereby giving the Admiralty the opportunity to remove Beresford from his command.  
The matter did not end there, however.  Ultimately, Beresford’s persistent public 
attacks resulted in a Cabinet inquiry into the Navy, which although in the main 
vindicated the Admiralty, it resulted in Fisher’s premature retirement in March 1910.    
It is also of note that although he was Fisher’s prodigy, Jellicoe appears not to 
have made any comment in any of his books, in his autobiographical notes or in 
available correspondence about the feud between Fisher and Beresford.  By all 
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accounts, he managed to negotiate a path between the two factions, which in the 
circumstances cannot have been easy.  Nevertheless, the fact that Jellicoe felt obliged 
specifically to record the informal exchange between Lloyd George and McKenna 
suggests that the remarks must have rankled.   
  There is no evidence that the paths of Lloyd George and Jellicoe crossed 
again to any meaningful extent until December 1916 when Lloyd George became 
Prime Minister and Jellicoe had been appointed First Sea Lord.  However, the 
establishment of a new War Cabinet, which, in Jellicoe’s opinion, required his all too 
frequent attendance at their meetings, again brought the two into close contact.
14
  
Then, even if their past differences had diminished through the passage of time, their 
respective personalities would not have endeared them to one another.  Lloyd George 
was a political animal.  Whilst he has been described as a ‘statesman of the first rank’ 
and as ‘The Man who Won the War’, others hold the opinion that his character was 
seriously flawed.
15
  In the words of one of his biographers: 
His faults had been pretty glaring and pretty constant … He bullied; he fibbed; 
he blustered; he wheedled.  He could be outrageously intolerant. He engaged 
in wholesale misrepresentation and chicanery on a grand scale.  He was 
selfish, vain and boastful.  He attributed mean motives to his opponents and 
splendid intentions to himself.  He was devious and cunning … He was a 
rogue, a trickster, an opportunist, a will of the wisp.
16
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By all accounts he used all these ‘attributes’ to achieve his ends.  Moreover, he 
believed that the ‘mark of genius’ in a man of action is that, when faced with a novel 
or difficult situation, ‘he extricates himself by adopting a plan which is at once daring 
and unexpected.’17  In other, words, Lloyd George was not inclined to take a 
conservative or cautious approach to a problem.  
Jellicoe was of a different ilk.  He was a professional sailor with an analytical 
mind.  He was methodical and self controlled.  In the words of one historian, ‘He 
believed in naval traditions, procedures and decorum, among which were loyalty, 
scrupulous fairness and a genuine concern for the personal affairs of his officers and 
men.’18  Jellicoe, as has been seen from the discussion on strategy and the convoy 
controversy, was cautious, and with that caution came a perception that he was overly 
pessimistic, particularly when the shipping losses were at their peak.  It is little 
wonder that the two men did not always see to eye.  
 Jellicoe’s pessimism is evident from one particular oft quoted example.  Just 
after the US entered the war, Jellicoe explained the seriousness of the U-boat threat to 
Admiral Sims, who commanded the US Navy’s detachment in Britain.  When Sims 
asked if there was any solution to the problem, Jellicoe apparently replied, 
‘Absolutely none that we can see now.’19  However, this pessimistic approach must be 
considered in the context of both the prevailing circumstances and Jellicoe’s strongly 
held views on the strategic approach that ought to be adopted by the War Cabinet.  
His views stem from his initial assessment of the disparity between the rate of 
merchant shipping losses and the rate at which ships could be replaced and can be 
seen from a paper he sent to Admiral Beatty shortly after he arrived at the Admiralty:  
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One of the greatest difficulties with which the Admiralty has to contend 
consists of the immense amount of shipping which is engaged in maintaining 
the Army in all parts of the globe, particularly the Army at Salonika … The 
tax on our shipping is immense, as is also the tax on our war-vessels - 
destroyers and other craft - for escort duty in the Mediterranean.  Similarly, we 
have to feed Egypt with troops, while very considerable number of vessels is 
continuously employed in bringing troops home from the Colonies.
20
  
  Again and again through the first half of 1917 Jellicoe sought to have these 
views adopted by his political masters.  In February 1917, shortly after Germany 
announced that it was embarking on its unrestricted U-boat campaign, he argued, ‘It is 
evident that the material available is quite inadequate for efficient protection of both 
transports and other merchant shipping in all of the various areas over which the 
attack is spread.’21  He advised the War Cabinet that it only had two alternatives, 
namely accept the serious losses then being incurred, or reduce the number of 
transports and supply ships that required escort ‘so that more adequate protection may 
be given to ships bringing supplies to our country and to our allies’.22  The paper 
concluded:  
The Board of the Admiralty is of the opinion that, in view of the present rate 
of loss of merchant tonnage it is imperatively necessary that steps should at 
once be taken to effect the second of these two alternatives.  The only 
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practicable method of doing so is by reducing our commitments for the supply    
of the various expeditions in Salonika, Egypt, East Africa and Mesopotamia.
23
 
In April 1917, Jellicoe wrote, ‘it is a continual fight to prevent more side-shows being 
started.  He [Lloyd George] is at present mad on one in Palestine, fed from the sea.’24  
Later in the same month in a note to Carson, Jellicoe went so far as to state: 
It should be clearly intimated that the Admiralty can no longer accept 
responsibility for conducting the war on its present basis … In my opinion the 
War Council fails entirely to realise the position in spite of the repeated efforts 
which I have made to explain its gravity.  It may be that I have not spoken and 
written with sufficient emphasis.  If that is the case I regret it, but will not 
repeat the error in this paper.
25
 
Finally in this vein, at the War Cabinet meeting on 20 June, Jellicoe stated, ‘There is 
no point in discussing the plans for next Spring. We cannot go on.’26  These constant 
remarks must have irritated the optimistic Lloyd George.    
However, it can be argued in defence of Jellicoe’s approach that the shipping 
situation was dire and without an immediate answer to the submarine threat, the only 
solution then available to the Admiralty was to preserve both naval and mercantile 
shipping by withdrawing from peripheral theatres of the war.  Again to quote Jellicoe, 
‘the [submarine] menace can only be met with by a radical change in the policy with 
regard to the overseas expeditionary forces.’27  This was a belief vehemently held and 
the position had been exacerbated with the introduction of the convoy system.  It was 
thus a frustration to Jellicoe that his views were not accorded proper credence by his 
political masters.  Indeed, Jellicoe’s insistence was such that it caused Hankey to 
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remark, ‘I sometimes wondered whether his [Jellicoe’s] pessimism was not assumed 
in order to induce politicians to make a still greater naval effort.’28  Hankey was 
perceptive and given Jellicoe’s comments to Carson about not having written ‘with 
sufficient emphasis’, on the issue, Hankey’s assertion undoubtedly has merit. 
It was not just in the context of his pessimism that Jellicoe’s insistence on 
withdrawing from the peripheral theatres of the war placed him at odds with Lloyd 
George.  It was also a reflection of a fundamental difference in war strategy.  After the 
failure of General Nivelle’s campaign during the spring of 1917, there was 
considerable debate between Lloyd George and his two principal army commanders, 
Generals Robertson and Haig, about where the thrust of the military campaign should 
be focused.  The army commanders were adamant that all efforts and resources should 
be directed towards the Western Front in the belief that ‘if our resources are 
concentrated in France to the fullest possible extent, the British armies are capable 
and can be relied upon to get great results this summer – results which will make the 
final victory more assured and which may even bring victory this year.’29  Lloyd 
George, on the other hand, after the huge casualties sustained at the Battle of the 
Somme in the previous year and the failure of the Nivelle campaign, was reluctant to 
commit more men and other resources to embark on yet another bloody campaign in 
France.  His view was that Germany should be attacked through the peripheral 
theatres further east, believing that if Austria-Hungary could be knocked out, 
‘Germany would be at our mercy’.30  Thus, Jellicoe’s insistence on withdrawing from 
the peripheral theatres aligned him firmly with the views of Robertson and Haig, 
much to the chagrin of Lloyd George.  As Jellicoe noted: 
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My consistent support of the policy of concentrating our military efforts on the 
Western Front and my criticism of the secondary Eastern campaigns as 
placing a strain on our naval and shipping resources … undoubtedly tended to 
inspire Mr Lloyd George, (a convinced Eastener) with hostility towards my 
views and was no doubt one of the factors leading up to my dismissal at the 
end of 1917.
31
  
Ian Colvin, in his biography of Carson, gives an even more graphic perspective of the 
Prime Minister’s attitude to Jellicoe, claiming that being baffled by the ‘granitic front’ 
of Robertson’s resistance to further eastern campaigns, Lloyd George ‘turned to the 
simpler elements of the sea, and wasted his eloquence on vain attempts to launch the 
Grand Fleet upon the fortified harbours of the enemy’.32  The fact that he met an 
equally hard front from his First Sea Lord in refusing to contemplate risking the ships 
of the Grand Fleet on such operations would not have improved the relationship 
between them.   
Lloyd George had a dilemma.  It is likely that Robertson, Haig and possibly 
Jellicoe would have resigned if he had persuaded the War Cabinet to adopt his 
strategy.  He would then have had to replace them with military and naval chiefs who 
were prepared to execute that strategy.  It was not a route he chose to take.  In the face 
of such combined opposition, Lloyd George ultimately bowed to the views of 
Robertson, Haig and Jellicoe and in July 1917 the War Cabinet gave approval for the 
Flanders campaign to proceed.  Jellicoe’s participation in the cabal must have irritated 
Lloyd George as much as his pessimism.  
Whether this difference of opinion justified Lloyd George’s decision to 
remove Jellicoe is questionable.  Generally, a fundamental difference in opinion as to 
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strategy would undoubtedly constitute grounds for a government to replace a senior 
military or naval adviser.  That was not the case in this instance; although it had 
considerable reservations, the government agreed to implement its military advisers’ 
plans.  Moreover, the principal protagonists in this instance were Robertson and Haig.  
Jellicoe only played a supporting role.  On that basis it should have been Robertson 
and/or Haig that should have been removed.  After all, it was not the Navy’s fault that 
the Passchendaele offensive ground to a halt in the mud at the cost of 250,000 British 
casualties.
33
  
 Nevertheless, whether from the earlier days of his Chancellorship or as 
wartime Premier, Lloyd George must have perceived Jellicoe as one who frequently 
thwarted his ambitions. 
 
 
Haig’s Intervention 
 
Lloyd George claims that his decision to dismiss Jellicoe was influenced by General 
Haig, stating in his War Memoirs that ‘a conversation I had with Sir Douglas Haig in 
the early summer of 1917 finally decided me’.34  It is, however, difficult to understand 
Haig’s motivation in this respect.  In his squabble with Lloyd George over military 
strategy, Haig had sufficient worries without interfering in the affairs of the 
Admiralty.  Moreover, as discussed, he had in Jellicoe an ardent supporter for the 
strategy of withdrawing from eastern theatres of the war and concentrating resources 
on the Western Front.  
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 Further, this support did not just extend to the arguments within the War 
Cabinet.  It also had an operational element.  A key objective of the planned military 
offensive through Flanders in the summer of 1917 was to free Ostend and Zeebrugge, 
used as German submarine bases, through a combined military and naval seaborne 
attack.  Admiral Bacon, in command of the Dover Patrol, and his staff were closely 
involved in the planning of this operation.  Haig noted in his diary that on 17 June 
1917 ‘Admiral Bacon came to Calais to meet me. He is whole heartedly with us and 
has urged in writing to the Admiralty the absolute necessity for clearing the Belgian 
Coast before winter.’35  Again, the following day, Haig noted that a meeting at the 
Admiralty with both Jellicoe and Bacon ‘was quite satisfactory, the Navy promising 
to help me in the matter of guns and aeroplanes’.36  Thus, it would seem that up to that 
point Haig had no cause to complain about his relationships with the Admiralty 
insofar as it affected his strategy or operations.  
  However, this apparent satisfaction was short lived and it was Sir Eric 
Geddes again who was instrumental in effecting the change of heart.  Therefore, 
before analysing the reasons for this change and Haig’s motives for involving himself 
in the matter, it is pertinent to understand Geddes’ background, his relationship both 
with Lloyd George and with Haig, and the circumstances in which he moved to the 
Admiralty as Controller in May 1917.  
At the outbreak of war, Geddes, after a multifaceted career that included time 
in India in 1904 organising complicated railway traffic on the Rohilkund and Kumaon 
Railway, was a senior manager with the North Eastern Railway Company.  In May 
1915, keen to make a greater contribution to the war effort, Geddes joined the 
Ministry of Munitions, established under Lloyd George following ‘the munitions 
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scandal’.  According to Geddes’ brother, Auckland, ‘The work of Eric and his 
brilliant team in straightening out the shell – production muddle marked a turning 
point in the War.’37  From there Geddes moved with Lloyd George to the War 
Department and thence to Haig’s command in France as Director General of 
Transportation, with the remit of solving the then chaotic logistics problems of 
supplying the front lines with men and supplies.  In this he was also successful.  
Again, according to his brother, ‘Eric’s triumph – and it was a real triumph – was that 
by organisation, improvement of road and rail facilities … the almost unimaginable 
feat of successfully doing all this was achieved in the Battle of Arras.’38  There is 
unquestionably an element of brotherly bias in these remarks, but nevertheless, 
Geddes was successful in both these roles.
39
  More to the point in this argument, he 
was highly regarded and on good terms with both Lloyd George and Haig.  Indeed, at 
one time Lloyd George was moved to write that ‘I shall be delighted to break bread 
with your merry men.  The best menu will be your Weekly Reports and the returns of 
the last few weeks will provide the most sparkling champagne.’40  Later, when 
Geddes was transferred from Haig’s command back to Britain, Haig wrote to the War 
Office stating that ‘I have the honour to place on record my appreciation of the 
eminent services this officer has rendered.’41  Moreover, Haig’s admiration was such 
that when Geddes was appointed to the Admiralty, he ‘arranged that although Geddes 
will become a Lord of the Admiralty, he will remain as a Consultant on railway 
                                                 
37
 Geddes, Forging of a Family, 231.  
38
 Ibid, 238. 
39
 Winston Churchill described Geddes as a man who ‘possessed not only the practical organising 
power of a skilful business man, but the quasi-official outlook of the head of a great public service.  To 
this he added those qualities of mental and physical energy, of industry and compulsive force, often 
successful, always admirable and never more needed at this time’. Winston Churchill, The Great War, 
(London, undated), II, 1013.   
40
 Letter, Lloyd George to Geddes, 22 May 1916, quoted, Geddes, Forging of a Family, 230.  
41
 Letter, Haig to The War Office, 12 May 1917, quoted, ibid, 239. 
 141 
questions attached to my staff’.42  Given the extent of the Controller’s responsibilities, 
this retention as a consultant may seem bizarre, but it does highlight both Haig’s 
belief in the man’s abilities and the fact that a close association was maintained after 
Geddes’ departure from Haig’s command.   
If Geddes’ retention as a consultant was bizarre, so also were the 
circumstances surrounding his appointment as Controller.  Originally, he had been 
called home by the Army Council to assume the role of Inspector-General of 
Transportation.  As Geddes had largely resolved the transportation problems at the 
front in France, the Council considered that he was the best person to resolve similar 
problems which ranged across all theatres of the war.  However, Lloyd George once 
more intervened.  Again, Auckland Geddes offers an interesting perspective on this 
intervention.  He was of the opinion that the problems with the Admiralty were 
analogous to the problems that had given rise to the munitions scandal and to the 
transportation issues that had been prevalent on the Western Front.  He believed 
Lloyd George was at odds with both Carson and Jellicoe and was angered by the 
delays in ship building and development of anti-submarine weapons.  Auckland 
Geddes believed it was for these reasons that Lloyd George had decided that his 
brother should be appointed to the Admiralty as Controller instead of Inspector- 
General of Transportation, and ‘insisted that Eric should be placed in charge of the 
provision of naval supplies – to do for the navy what the Ministry of Munitions was 
now doing successfully for the Army’. 43  Apparently Jellicoe then insisted that the 
Controller must be a naval officer, whereupon Lloyd George countered by creating 
Geddes a Vice-Admiral.  Auckland Geddes then continued: 
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It is difficult to say who was made the most angry by this manoeuvre.  Eric 
was painfully conscious that he knew nothing about naval supplies. Jellicoe 
had to be coerced by the P.M into acquiescence … The Lloyd Georgian 
solution was grotesque: Eric was to remain a Major General with some vague 
responsibility for Army transport … The existence of the Vice-Admiral-
Major-General provided a superb opportunity for cartoonists.  Eric was 
supposed to have intrigued himself into this position, whereas in fact he 
loathed it.
44
  
From this it is clear that Geddes was not enamoured or comfortable with the role 
Lloyd George had foisted on him.  Thus, given Geddes’ ignorance of naval matters, 
his level of discomfort with his new role and the close working relationship he clearly 
had with Haig, it was not surprising that Geddes turned to Haig for advice. 
   This Geddes did in no uncertain terms.  On 7 May 1917, during a meeting at 
Haig’s headquarters in France, Geddes complained  ‘that the Admiralty expect to win 
without fighting or running risks, that old inefficient officers are seldom removed, and 
that altogether our naval arrangements are most unsatisfactory’.45  Whether problems 
at the Admiralty were perceived or real have been discussed previously, but what is 
striking about this remark is that it was made two days before Geddes officially 
assumed the role of Controller.  Presumably, therefore, his remarks were based on 
opinions from outside the Admiralty, rather than from his own assessment.  Again, 
having been Controller for just six weeks, on 20
 
June 1917, Geddes complained to 
Haig.  This time it was about Carson who, according to Geddes, having just recently 
married, ‘Is very tired and leaves everything to a number of incompetent sailors’.46  
He thought Jellicoe was ‘feeble to a degree and vacillating’ and concluded that the 
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appropriate course of action was to arrange to put the matter before Lloyd George and 
also the King.
47
  Then at lunch on 24 June, Geddes, who was again ‘very anxious 
about the state of the Admiralty,’ made the extraordinary proposal, to which Haig 
evidently agreed, that Robertson be appointed as ‘Head of the Board of the 
Admiralty’, in place of Carson.48 
  Following that, on 25 June 1917, Haig spoke to Lloyd George and to another 
member of the War Cabinet, Lord Curzon, regarding the ‘seriously inefficient state of 
the Admiralty’, both of whom ‘seemed much perturbed already’.49  Even Asquith, 
whom Haig met later the same day, said that he knew at the beginning of the war how 
unsatisfactory the state of the Admiralty was and ‘how ignorant most of our high 
naval officers were of the role of our Navy in a World War’.50  Consequently, Haig 
and Geddes were invited to join Lloyd George at breakfast the following day where 
‘Geddes gave his views very definitely,’ Lloyd George ‘decided something must be 
done immediately’ and the proposal ‘to put Robertson in Carson’s place was 
considered, replacing Jellicoe and two or three other “numbskulls” now on the Board, 
etc’.51  Later that day when the proposal was put to Robertson that he should become 
First Lord, he apparently declined ‘as that would mean becoming a politician’.52  Haig 
then returned to his headquarters in France with the matter unresolved.   
Given these circumstances, what can be deduced as to Haig’s motivation? 
Political and historical commentators have differing views.  Admiral Bacon, in his 
biography of Jellicoe, writes: 
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Mr Lloyd George in his War Memoirs states that Sir Douglas Haig expressed 
the opinion that Sir John should leave the Admiralty.  Anything more foreign 
to Sir Douglas’s general reserve and discretion can hardly be imagined.  There 
is, moreover, nothing in Sir Douglas’s diary or papers that gives the slightest 
colour to such a statement.
53
 
There is little doubt that Bacon, working closely with Haig on the plans for the 
combined operation to free the Channel Ports, had a high regard for Haig which 
coloured his view.   However, as evidenced by the foregoing extracts from Haig’s 
diary, Bacon was wrong in that Haig was involved in the discussions regarding 
changes to be made at the Admiralty.  Whether Haig specifically suggested Jellicoe’s 
removal is impossible to say without any categorical evidence.   
Lord Beaverbrook had a different perspective.  He interpreted Haig’s activities 
during June 1917 as part of ‘a well-organised, thoroughly considered and widespread 
campaign to drive the First Lord and also Jellicoe out of office’ and then adds: 
It is interesting to speculate on Haig’s motives.  It may have been that he was 
moved by genuine anxiety.  He had informed Lady Haig as early as May that 
he looked on Jellicoe as an ‘old woman’.  Or again, it is possible that that he 
may have been interested in diverting the lightning from striking at himself, 
for the dismissal of Haig had been a principal objective of Lloyd George for 
many months.
54
 
Marder takes the view that ‘it was the former, with the shared alarm over Jellicoe’s 
views drawing the Prime Minister and the Field-Marshall into a temporary alliance.’55  
However, this interpretation is difficult to accept.  Lloyd George had little confidence 
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in his military advisers; a view he was apt to proclaim to the War Cabinet.  Haig was 
therefore under some considerable pressure.   
Moreover, there is the proposal that Robertson be appointed First Lord of the 
Admiralty to consider.  Although Robertson and Haig showed a united front against 
Lloyd George to the War Cabinet, the evidence suggests that Robertson did have 
reservations about the Flanders offensive, particularly in light of the apparent 
reluctance of the French army to lend its full support.  For example, on 4 June 1917 
Robertson wrote to Haig stating that ‘the general situation at present requires a great 
deal of watching.  The strain everywhere is becoming great and we need to consider 
every move in all theatres very carefully.’56   On 9 June 1917 Haig noted in his diary:  
He [Robertson] wished me to realise the difficult situation in which the 
Country would be, if I carried out large and costly attacks without full 
cooperation by the French.  When Autumn came round, Britain would then be 
without an Army!  On the other hand it is possible that Austria would make 
peace, if harassed enough. Would it not be a good plan, therefore, to support 
Italy with guns?
57
 
This suggestion to redeploy resources from the Western Front was anathema to Haig 
and therefore despite the perceived united front, Haig may well have considered 
Robertson’s support to be on the wane and the proposed transfer to the Admiralty as 
opportune.  In any event, as the historian David Woodward has remarked, the 
suggestion may have been a ‘surprise and delight’ to Lloyd George, who had ‘long 
hoped to destroy the Robertson-Haig monolith in strategy and now wonder of 
wonders, Haig was offering him an opportunity to end Robertson’s strategical 
                                                 
56
 Letter, Robertson to Haig, 4 June 1917, David Woodward (ed.), The Military Correspondence of 
Field Marshal Sir William Robertson, (London, 1989), 197. 
57
 Haig, Diary Entry, 9 June 1917, NLS, Acc. 3155, 114. 
 146 
dictatorship with minimum fallout’.58  Thus, whilst there may have been an element 
of patriotic concern in Haig’s motives, the extent of his discord with Lloyd George 
and the attempt to move Robertson does support Beaverbrook’s notion that Haig was 
‘diverting the lightning’.  After all, as shown in the part he played in the removal of 
Sir John French and his own appointment as Commander of the British Expeditionary 
Force in France in December 1915, Haig was well capable of intrigue and political 
machinations when it suited his purpose.     
  Yet, the somewhat bizarre nature of events leaves the impression that 
Beaverbrook’s notion is not the complete answer either and, indeed, the proposal 
regarding Robertson might not have induced the element of ‘surprise’ that Woodward 
attributed to Lloyd George.  Here, some re-analysis of certain facts gives rise to a 
different interpretation that matches the circumstances.  Firstly, Geddes, in the work 
undertaken at the Ministry of Munitions and subsequently at the War Ministry, was 
clearly ‘Lloyd George’s man’.  Secondly, there is a question over the timing of 
events.  As noted, Auckland Geddes stated that his brother ‘knew nothing about navy 
supplies’.  From that and his previous roles, it can be assumed that, similarly, he knew 
little about naval strategy, or the inner workings of or staff competence within the 
Admiralty.  Yet, two days before he started as Controller, Geddes was at Haig’s 
headquarters in France complaining that ‘our naval arrangements are most 
unsatisfactory’.  Also, it will be noted that Lloyd George’s intervention in the 
appointment of Geddes as Controller was made just after his trip to the Admiralty on 
30 April 1917.   Further, after just six weeks in office Geddes was again making 
complaints to Haig.  It can be argued that that was not sufficiently long in a position, 
which was alien to him, to make such a damning assessment of the state of affairs at 
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the Admiralty.  Also, as noted in Haig’s diary of 24 June 1917, it was Geddes, not 
Haig, who suggested moving Robertson to the Admiralty.  On the basis of Geddes’ 
relative ignorance of naval matters and the personalities involved, this gives rise to the 
suspicion that the proposal did not emanate from Geddes, but from a third party with 
strong views about deficiencies at the Admiralty and who wished to make changes to 
its staff, namely Lloyd George.    
Thirdly, Lloyd George had a dilemma.  His attempt to undermine Haig by 
subordinating him to General Nivelle in the early part of 1917 had backfired in the 
failure of the spring offensive on the Western Front.  As Lloyd George’s secretary, 
Francis Stevenson wrote, ‘In the meantime, Nivelle has fallen into disgrace and let D. 
[Lloyd George] down … Sir Douglas Haig has come out on top in this fight between 
the two Chiefs, & I fear D. will have to be very careful in future as to his backings of 
the French against the English.’59  Moreover, he had ‘grave misgivings as to the 
correctness of the advice given by the Military Advisers to the Government’.60   
Ultimately, responsibility for matters of overall strategy rested with him, but to obtain 
the consent of his colleagues on the War Cabinet against the advice of his two most 
senior military advisers would have been politically extremely difficult.  There was a 
real possibility that such a course would have resulted in the resignation of both 
Robertson and Haig, which in turn could well have brought down his Coalition 
Government.
61
  Further, his dilemma extended to the Admiralty.  As noted, he was at 
odds with it in terms of its strategy, organisation and people.  However, Carson was 
the doyen of the right wing of the Conservative Party.  Removing him unilaterally 
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could well have meant loss of Conservative support and again, the consequent 
collapse of the Coalition Government.  Likewise, removing Jellicoe would have 
incurred the wrath of the Navy and could well have invoked the resignation of the 
Board of the Admiralty, with the same political result.  Even Beatty, who was not 
always wholly supportive of Jellicoe, was at this time moved to write to Jellicoe 
stating, ‘And you must stick at all costs to your intention of not volunteering to go; 
that would be fatal.’62  
 The final factor to consider in this analysis is the relationship which each of 
Haig and Lloyd George had with King George V.  Haig had moved in royal circles 
from early in his career, regularly communicated directly with the King and was a 
frequent guest at Buckingham Palace.  He had been ADC to Edward VII in 1902 and 
had married Doris Vivian, a Maid of Honour to Queen Alexandra.  On the other hand, 
Lloyd George’s relationship with the King was, at best, inequable.  The King was 
titular head of both the Army and Navy.  In April 1917, ‘sharp words’ had passed 
between the King and Prime Minister over the latter’s subordination of command of 
the British Expeditionary Force to Nivelle without first informing the Palace.
63
   
Therefore, if further confrontation with the King were to be avoided, any attempt to 
interfere with those in charge at the Admiralty would require, if not the King’s 
approbation, at least his acquiescence.  Lloyd George’s path in this respect would 
have been smoothed if the problem and proposed solution had been suggested, or at 
least commended, by a highly-regarded third party such as Haig. 
Thus summarising, Geddes, an able administrator, but not a politician, was 
asked by Lloyd George to undertake a role for which he had little experience, in 
circumstances whereby Lloyd George, rightly or wrongly, believed changes at the top 
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of the Admiralty must be made.  He was frustrated by the combined obduracy of his 
top military and naval advisers, but could not take direct action because of the 
political risk to his government.  Further, he had been at odds with his monarch.  
Geddes, who was politically naive, complained persistently about a department of 
which he had little detailed knowledge to one of those military advisers, Haig, who 
had high regard for Geddes’ ability and was close to the King.  Moreover, he 
proposed a solution that can best be described as bizarre, but which would break the 
military advisers’ union.  Haig may not have had a particularly high opinion of 
Jellicoe, but he had no reason to intervene from an operational perspective.  He may 
have been motivated to do so both from ‘patriotic’ reasons and to divert the ‘lightning 
strike.’  However, Lloyd George was a renowned manipulator.  Geddes, for all his 
administrative capability, was in essence ‘controlled’ by Lloyd George.  Indeed, 
Carson’s wife referred to him as Lloyd George’s ‘satellite’.64   
If the forgoing factors are pieced together with the timing events, then the 
conclusion can be drawn that Haig’s intervention resulted not just from patriotic 
reasons or for attempting to avoid ‘the lightning strike’.  It was engineered by the 
Prime Minister as a means of breaking the Robertson/ Haig alliance and of making 
changes at the Admiralty.  The evidence also suggests that before Geddes had an 
opportunity to assess the problems that existed at the Admiralty for himself, he was 
told by Lloyd George what these problems were.  Moreover, the evidence suggests 
that the proposal to appoint Robertson as First Lord could also have come from the 
Prime Minister.  In other words, both Geddes and Haig were manipulated by Lloyd 
George in his attempt to remove Jellicoe from office.  Thus, despite his penchant for 
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exaggeration, Lord Beaverbrook’s claim that Haig’s involvement was ‘part of a well 
organised plan’ to oust Jellicoe seems valid.    
 
 
The Role of Northcliffe  
 
On 29 December 1917, the following statement appeared in the Cologne 
Gazette: ‘The retirement of Sir John Jellicoe is hardly surprising.  In England it is not 
unusual for leading men, even in a military position to be sacrificed to public 
opinion.’ 65  Carson would have endorsed that statement.  On 6 March 1918, in the 
House of Commons debate on Naval Estimates, he stated:  
I saw no one and I knew no one in the Navy who could advise me of anybody 
who was at all equal to Sir John Jellicoe for the particular position he 
occupied.  When I made that speech at the Constitutional Club … I was 
smarting under constant and persistent efforts of a section of the Press to try 
and get Lord Jellicoe turned out of his post.  The whole time that I was First 
Lord of the Admiralty, one of the greatest difficulties I had was the constant 
persecution … of certain high officials in the Admiralty who could not speak 
for themselves – which I have no doubt, I could have traced to reasons and 
motives of the most malignant character.
66
 
These are strong words from Carson.  It is evident from this that he believed a section 
of the press was intent in having Jellicoe removed from office and, in the use of the 
term ‘malignant character’, he believed that public interest was not the primary 
motive for doing so.   
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Carson did not name the particular section of the press responsible for the 
‘constant persecution’.  Jellicoe, however, had no doubt that it was the press magnate, 
Lord Northcliffe, who was responsible and who was instrumental in his dismissal.  At 
the end of June 1917, i.e., at the time Lloyd George said that he had decided that 
Jellicoe must go, Jellicoe wrote, ‘I fancy there is a scheme on foot to get rid of me … 
I expect it will be done first by discrediting me in the Press.  That is the usual political 
move and I have seen signs of it already.’67   More specifically, in the account Jellicoe 
gave of the circumstances leading to his dismissal, he wrote: 
That evening I received a letter from Geddes dismissing me. The assumption 
in my mind is that Lord Northcliffe was pressing the Prime Minister to get rid 
of me, the Prime Minister was pressing Geddes, the latter wanted to avoid 
trouble and so tried to get away from the Admiralty, but failing that carried out 
the desire of Northcliffe.
68
 
Both Geddes and Lloyd George persistently denied any scurrilous use of the press in 
this context.  In the Parliamentary Debate referred to above, when the issue of 
Jellicoe’s dismissal was under discussion, Geddes stated that ‘I personally saw certain 
representatives of the Press and protested against these attacks.’69  In the same debate, 
a remark by Bonar Law, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, is also revealing. 
The Prime Minister has assured me in private that he had absolutely nothing  
whatever in any shape or form with anything that appeared in the Press in this 
connection, and my right hon. Friend beside me (Sir E Geddes) has not only 
said in private, but over and over again he has said it in the House, and I think 
it is entirely unfounded to have any suggestion that any member of this 
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Government, either the Prime Minister or the First Lord, has taken a course 
which … was an utterly despicable course.70 
The latter two statements clearly contradict those of Carson and Jellicoe.  Thus, two 
particular questions arise.  Firstly, was Jellicoe correct in his assertions that the press 
would be the vehicle used to manoeuvre him from office, and secondly, despite the 
denials, was Northcliffe actually involved in this?  There is no direct evidence either 
way, and therefore it is pertinent to examine the relationship between Lloyd George 
and Northcliffe, and the particulars and nature of the campaign itself.     
If, then, Northcliffe’s involvement appears likely, two further questions arise.  
Firstly, did he act of his own accord or did he act in collaboration with Lloyd George?  
Secondly, was the press campaign justified in the public interest either in terms of the 
strategy adopted by the Admiralty or in its direction of naval operations, or was there 
some other motive for it?  However, before dealing with these particular questions, it 
is appropriate to provide some background to Northcliffe. 
At the outbreak of the war, Arthur Harmsworth, Viscount Northcliffe, was the 
pre-eminent journalistic force in Britain.
71
  He controlled approximately 30% of the 
London morning and evening press, substantially more than any of his competitors.
72
  
However, what made him unique was that, in The Times and the Daily Mail, 
Northcliffe had both a quality and a popular newspaper under his control, thereby 
reaching a wide spectrum of society.  Moreover, he was more involved in the editorial 
work than other proprietors of the day.  Indeed, it has been said that as far as the Daily 
Mail was concerned, for all practical purposes, he was effectively editor as well as 
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proprietor.
73
  His influence was huge.  In the opinion of A J P Taylor, Northcliffe was 
a ‘newsman first, last and all the time’, and that there was no doubt that he held ‘a 
prominent place in the accounts of the rise of the new journalism, the press barons and 
the political press in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries’.74  According to the 
historian, John McEwen, he was frequently described as ‘the Most Powerful Man in 
the Country’.75  On the other hand, Northcliffe has also been severely criticised.  The 
political biographer, E T Raymond, warned in 1919 that ‘his present indirect power 
was one of the chief dangers of the state’.76  A more recent political commentator, 
Hugh Cudlipp, described Northcliffe as ‘a man corrupted by power and wealth, who 
desecrated journalistic standards and became dominated by the pursuit of political 
power, unguided by political prescience’.77  Churchill described him as a person ‘who 
wielded personal power without official responsibility, enjoyed secret knowledge 
without the general, and disturbed the fortunes of national leaders without being 
willing to bear their burdens’.78  Thus, Northcliffe was a man of some influence, and 
if these criticisms have validity, a man who was inclined to use that influence to meet 
his own ends irrespective of means.  Moreover, it was an influence he exercised with 
some arrogance and it was one that Lloyd George both sought to exploit and feared.
79
    
Reverting to the question as to whether Northcliffe was acting on his own 
account or in collaboration with Lloyd George, the nature of the relationship between 
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them is clearly material to the argument.  Northcliffe had initially been introduced to 
Lloyd George in the House of Commons in 1909.  Northcliffe’s brother, Cecil 
Harmsworth, who was present at that first meeting, described the encounter thus: 
‘During the whole of this time LlG. [Lloyd George] devoted all his powers to 
capturing N [Northcliffe].  It was a dazzling performance.’80  Clearly then, from the 
beginning of their association, Lloyd George recognised the potential for Northcliffe 
either to harm or to assist in realising his political ambitions.  However, Northcliffe 
cannot have been wholly blinded by the ‘dazzling’ performance as thereafter this was, 
in the opinion of A J P Taylor, ‘a curious on-and-off relationship’.81  For instance, the 
Daily Mail was vociferous against both the Parliament Bill engendered by the House 
of Lords revolt against Lloyd George’s ‘Peoples Budget’ of 1909 and later Lloyd 
George’s special creation, The National Insurance Scheme.  On the other hand, 
Northcliffe’s papers offered far less criticism than perhaps was appropriate in relation 
to Lloyd George’s involvement in the Marconi share scandal, which threatened to 
bring his political career to an untimely end.
82
  
This curious relationship continued throughout the war.  Both The Times and 
the Daily Mail were instrumental in exposing ‘the great shell scandal’ of 1915 that 
ultimately resulted in the curtailment of Lord Kitchener’s power as War Minister and 
Lloyd George’s appointment as Minister of Munitions.  As Lord Esher later 
remarked: 
Finally, by becoming the watchword of faction, this dispute became the 
historic ensign for the legitimate ambition of a man [Lloyd George] who was 
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destined to lead the people of England with such fire and vigour that their 
fleets and armies were ultimately to achieve what in May 1915 seemed beyond 
achievement.
83
 
In other words, Esher appears to be asserting that it was the Northcliffe press that was 
responsible for launching Lloyd George on the road to the Premiership.  Through 
1916, during which Lloyd George acted as War Minister, and despite Francis 
Stevenson’s concerns over the trustworthiness of Northcliffe, the relationship was 
more ‘on than off’.  Cecil Harmsworth noted in his biography of Northcliffe that the 
early summer of 1916 was ‘a period of something like real friendship between 
them’.84  Finally, in the context of this relationship, the Northcliffe press aided Lloyd 
George’s cause enormously during the political crisis of December 1916, which 
culminated in the collapse of the Asquith government and the succession of Lloyd 
George to the premiership.
85
 
Thus, going into 1917, a situation pertained whereby the Prime Minister had a 
‘friendly’ association with the most influential newspaper magnate in the country.  On 
the one hand, he had exploited this to further his own ambitions, but on the other hand 
it had resulted in a degree of obligation.  In other, words, the nature of the relationship 
was such that Lloyd George would have had no hesitation in exploiting it to meet his 
political ends and Northcliffe would have obliged him, so long as he was not acting 
against his own interests. 
Turning to the nature and content of the press campaign per se, a number of 
points emerge.  Firstly, there is the issue of timing.  For the first part of the year, with 
one exception, the content of commentary about the Admiralty was reasonably 
balanced and was to a large extent directed to those in charge of the Admiralty prior 
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to Jellicoe’s appointment as First Sea Lord.86  For example, the Daily Mail editorial of 
27 January 1917 commented, ‘So different is this new kind of war from the old that 
experience in past surface naval war is rather a disqualification than an advantage for 
it … Our veneration for white whiskers is a positive danger in a war of this kind.’87 
In the same vein, in an Article on 29 January the war correspondent of the Daily Mail, 
Lovat Fraser, remarked: 
We must be content to accept the firm assurances of Sir Edward Carson and 
Admiral Jellicoe given on Friday to the Navy League, that steps which it is 
hoped will be adequate are being taken to counter the depredations of enemy 
submarines.  The pity is that the late Board of the Admiralty lacked 
foresight.
88
  
Moreover, following the announcement of the organisational changes made at the 
Admiralty in May 1917, in particular the appointment of Geddes as Controller, 
reporting was considerably more positive.  An article on 15 May referred to ‘A good 
beginning at the Admiralty’ and continued with the comment, ‘After a thousand days 
of war we are beginning to return to the system that existed in Nelson’s day.’89   Even 
more complementary was an editorial three days later that stated:  
The figures [for shipping losses] which were published yesterday show that 
for the week ending May 13 there had been a very marked reduction in the 
number of ships sunk by submarines.  That is all to the good and though we 
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cannot as yet be certain that the improvement will be maintained, we 
congratulate the officers and men of the Navy very warmly upon it.
90
     
However, after the end of June 1917, matters changed.  In early July, an editorial in 
the Daily Mail proclaimed that ‘Ships and men will not be rashly and foolishly 
sacrificed if we have strategists in charge who know what war is … The recent 
changes as Mr Lovat Fraser has pointed out did not go far enough or high enough.’91 
Through August 1917, the criticism intensified both in its frequency and its 
virulence.  Again by way of example, an article in August 1917 by ‘A Naval Student’ 
claimed, ‘Its [The Admiralty’s] attitude towards that of the Navy is very much that of 
a stupid and elderly nurse who believes that a high spirited child is almost certain to 
get himself into trouble and danger unless he is constantly being repressed and 
prohibited.’92   By the end of October 1917, the regularity and demeaning nature of 
criticism was such that Geddes, at Jellicoe’s behest, felt obliged to seek advice from 
the Attorney General, F E Smith, as to whether legal action could be taken against the 
Daily Mail to prevent the criticism.  Issues arising from that advice are discussed 
below.  What is evident from the foregoing extracts is that the change of tenor of the 
criticism after the end of June was sudden and marked.  No explanation for this is 
given within any articles or editorials appearing in the Daily Mail during this period.  
It could be argued that legitimate concern over the increase in the published shipping 
losses for June 1917 over May 1917 was the reason.
93
  However, this does not take 
account of the fact that the figures for June were still better than those for April 1917.  
Nor does it explain why the virulence of the articles increased as the year progressed, 
despite the fact that the shipping losses reduced.    
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There is an alternative possibility.  As mentioned, the debacle that followed 
the meetings at the end of June 1917 between Lloyd George, Geddes and Haig that 
culminated in Robertson’s refusal to accept the role of First Lord, Carson’s elevation 
to the War Cabinet and Geddes’ appointment as First Lord effectively made it 
politically impossible for Lloyd George to dismiss Jellicoe at that point.  Lloyd 
George therefore had to bide his time.  Thus, given the nature of the relationship 
between Lloyd George and Northcliffe, it is reasonable to assume that it was at this 
point that they colluded in embarking on a campaign of publicly disparaging the 
activities of the Admiralty.  This change of editorial policy would certainly have 
matched an ambition to ease the path to Jellicoe’s dismissal at a later and more 
politically convenient time. 
The second point that emerges from the nature of the press campaign is drawn 
from the content of various articles.  Here a distinct pattern can be seen in that 
throughout July, August and September 1917, virtually all of the articles that appeared 
in the Daily Mail focused on two particular issues.  The first was a demand for 
publication of accurate information as to merchant shipping lost by U-boat action.  
The other was a persistent demand to improve the strategic thinking at the Admiralty 
by bringing in brighter, younger officers who had studied warfare and whom the 
authors of the articles were convinced could be found in abundance throughout the 
fleet.  For example, an editorial on 2 August proclaimed, ‘Until we have officers who 
are masters of the history of war – which is also the science of strategy – and who can 
plan a proper offensive, in charge of our Staff and Operations Divisions, we have not 
exhausted every resource.  There are such men in our Navy on the captains’ and 
commanders’ lists.’94  Again, an editorial on 18 September, remarked, ‘There are men 
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who have made a close study of the problem [of sinking U-boats] … Have they been 
called in and have the younger minds been given a chance of attacking the problem.’95  
  It could be argued here that the obvious solution to any moribund organisation 
is an infusion of new blood and that this editorial theme was simply a reflection of 
that belief.  However, what is striking is that at this time, Lloyd George, impatient 
over the delays in introducing the convoy, was continually pressing Carson to make 
sweeping changes at the Admiralty.  As noted, according to Carson, ‘Sack the lot’ and 
‘why don’t you get fresh men with sea-experience?’ were favoured expressions.96   
Thus, the themes of the critical press articles matched Lloyd George’s persistent 
complaints about the need for younger blood, which again suggests a degree of 
collusion between Northcliffe and Lloyd George over the nature of the press 
campaign.  
Two further points should be noted with regard to the press campaign.  Firstly, 
it is evident through the autumn of 1917 that the criticism of Jellicoe, both by 
inference, and eventually by name, increased in intensity.  This culminated in a series 
of articles which were particularly malevolent.  On 19 October, following the German 
capture of Riga the editorial read: 
The country will naturally expect him [Sir Eric Geddes] to deal with the 
question of how far his strategical advisers at the Admiralty are responsible for 
this humiliating display in the Baltic.  It will also equally naturally expect him 
to consider very seriously whether the recent changes in the high command in 
Whitehall have gone far enough.
97
 
It is arguable that it was quite within the public interest for the press to challenge the 
Navy’s strategy of not sending the battle fleet (or a section of it) into the Baltic, but a 
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more balanced critique would have at least made reference to the difficulties and 
potential risks of so doing. 
Similar criticism arose following the attack on the Scandinavian convoy on 18 
October 1917.  An article on the 22 October read, ‘The British navy is an 
incomparable weapon if only it is placed in hands with the skill to wield it.  It is not 
the fleet at sea that is concerned – for no one blames our seamen – but the Admiralty 
in London.’98  Again, it might be argued that criticism over the debacle that led to the 
sinking of the convoy was justified, but in this instance a knowledgeable author 
writing a balanced piece would have realised that certain mistakes made were in fact 
at an operational level.  As mentioned previously, responsibility for escorting the 
Norwegian convoys fell within the remit of Beatty as Commander of the Grand Fleet.   
In other words, in this instance it was the ‘fleet at sea’ that was primarily at fault.   
  These disparaging remarks continued.  On 25 October 1917 an editorial 
entitled ‘Weaknesses at the Admiralty’, proclaimed that ‘we have not yet found a man 
or set of men at the Admiralty with the instinctive genius for carrying on our naval 
share of the war.’ 99  This was accompanied by an extremely unflattering photograph 
of Jellicoe.  The editorial of 1 November 1917 claimed that ‘the best Navy in the 
world may be paralysed by feeble control – our strategical direction for which our 
First Sea Lord is primarily responsible – has shown weakness in three various theatres 
of war.’100  Perhaps the strongest indictment of all appeared in the editorial on 21 
November, which read, ‘Sir Edward Carson at the Constitutional Club said he “read” 
day after day in the Daily Mail attacks upon Sir John Jellicoe and then he added, “this 
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sort of thing must stop.”  We demur.’ 101  From the foregoing it is evident that the 
Daily Mail was waging a personal vendetta against Jellicoe.  
 There is a further factor that adds to the contention that the Daily Mail 
campaign exceeded reasonable standards of journalism.  As mentioned, by the end of 
October, the articles had become so extreme that Geddes sought legal advice from the 
Attorney General as to whether action could be taken to prevent them.  His advice 
was that the Daily Mail articles of 23 October and 27 October 1917 would contravene 
the Defence of the Realm Act regulations to the extent that ‘the probable or likely 
effect of the articles … is to use language likely to prejudice the administration of the 
Navy’ and that ‘I think on the whole, a magistrate ought to convict.’102  His advice 
was rejected on the basis that it would not be expedient for the Admiralty to be 
exposed to court action where they would be required to justify their actions publicly.  
That the Cabinet decided not to prosecute in these circumstances is understandable, 
but what is less clear is why Smith’s alternative suggestion of ‘communicating with 
Lord Northcliffe, who is after all almost a colleague of ours’ was not followed.103  
Given Northcliffe’s quasi-governmental role, Lloyd George could well have taken 
steps to intervene.  That the adverse criticism continued unabated would suggest that 
he did not. 
The implication from the foregoing is that Lloyd George condoned the attacks 
on Jellicoe by the Daily Mail.  There is no direct evidence that he went further and 
actually conspired in perpetuating the press campaign against the Admiralty.  
However, he had the motive for doing so and in the circumstances it would appear to 
be more than coincidence that the themes of Lloyd George’s complaints matched 
those of the press articles.       
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The rationale for Northcliffe’s complicity is more difficult to comprehend.   
He was not ‘anti-military’.  The reverse was the case.  Despite the ever-increasing 
casualties on the Western Front, Northcliffe was extremely supportive of General 
Haig personally and of his strategy of concentrating all available military resources 
there.  Northcliffe’s newspapers were constantly urging that politicians should not 
intervene in military strategy or operations.  Indeed, according to Haig, Northcliffe’s 
support was such that at the beginning of January 1917, after meeting with Lloyd 
George in Paris, ‘He [Northcliffe] told him it would be impossible to continue to 
support his Gvt if they continued to scatter their forces in the Balkans, when all sound 
military opinion urged concentration on the Western front!’104  That Jellicoe was also 
a strong advocate of this particular strategy makes Northcliffe’s attitude towards him 
even more surprising.   
What then, was the reason for the belligerence?  Jellicoe believed that it 
resulted from a case of mistaken identity.  After the war, in a letter to Commander 
Frewen, he explained: 
Northcliffe came one day to the Admiralty in 1917 to see Sir Edward Carson 
about air raids at Ramsgate and Sir Edward asked me to be present.  
Northcliffe arrived before Sir Edward and I received him. He became very 
abusive about the Naval Air Force at Dover … Commodore Geoffrey Paine, 
head of the R.N.A.S [Royal Naval Air Service] at the time, who was present, 
did not mince his words in replying to Northcliffe … and gave Northcliffe 
‘what for’ pointing out that the R.N.A.S did not pretend to stop air raids.   
They were for a totally different purpose … I think that Northcliffe mixed up 
the   1
st
 Sea Lord and the head of the R.N.A.S, as he wrote Sir E Carson after 
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the interview an abusive letter about me which Sir Edward showed me … At 
any rate, the Northcliffe press consistently attacked me subsequently.
105
  
Whether Jellicoe was correct in thinking that Northcliffe was mistaken must be open 
to question as it would have been surprising if someone in Northcliffe’s position was 
unaware of the distinction between the rank insignia on Paine’s and Jellicoe’s 
uniforms. 
  However, what is not open to doubt is that Carson received correspondence 
from Northcliffe, which, if not abusive, was uncomplimentary.  Jellicoe does not give 
a date as to when the meeting with Northcliffe took place, but the letter Jellicoe 
mentioned is probably one dated 17 March 1917 in which Northcliffe wrote: 
The matter about which I spoke is one that I thoroughly understand, and I 
know Sir John Jellicoe is wrong.  I hope he is not misleading you in other 
matters … I hope I am not trying to teach my grandmother to suck eggs, but 
watching events in a very tiny part of our sphere of naval operations for two 
and a half years, I have never seen any sign of prevision.
106
 
Carson’s response was robust, stating, ‘I do not like it to be suggested that Sir John 
Jellicoe may be misleading me, as I have the most complete confidence in him,’ 
which could not have done much to appease Northcliffe.
107
  Thus, irrespective of 
whether Jellicoe was correct in thinking that it had been him and not Commodore 
Paine who had given Northcliffe 'what for’ during the course of their meeting, the 
subsequent correspondence makes it clear that Northcliffe had doubts as to Jellicoe’s 
integrity and foresight.   
                                                 
105
 Letter, Jellicoe to Frewen, 8 July 1921, Patterson, Jellicoe Papers, II, 412.  At the time Frewen was 
assisting Sir Julian Corbett in compiling The Official History.  
106
 Letter, Northcliffe to Carson, 29 March 1917, quoted, Thompson, Politicians, 136.  
107
 Letter, Carson to Northcliffe, 29 March 1917, quoted, ibid. 
 164 
There is a further factor which aggravated Northcliffe.  This was his inability 
to obtain (and he believed it to be the press’s right to obtain) information from the 
Admiralty regarding naval operations.  In contrast to Haig, Jellicoe was reticent in his 
dealings with the press.  Again, this reticence can be seen from his correspondence 
with Frewen after the war: 
You may ask what the truth is about the removal of the Daily Mail 
correspondent from the Grand Fleet.  The only occurrence in this direction 
was that while the Iron Duke was at Invergordon … Admiral Pears one day 
informed me that a Daily Mail correspondent was at Inverness and was 
coming on … to gather naval news from the ships.  Admiral Pears asked if he 
was to be allowed to come and of course I said ‘Certainly not’ and he had to 
go back to London. There was nothing more than that.
108
  
Jellicoe may not have thought much about the incident, but it is conceivable it 
remained in Northcliffe’s mind.  Certainly, this inability to acquire information 
continued to trouble Northcliffe in the following year when he wrote to Carson 
stating: 
It is possible that if the public do not hear more about the Navy, they will 
demand unwise changes in the administration of the Navy.  I send you the type 
of simple narrative that is being ‘killed’ as we say, by your people. Such 
narratives are in the nature of advertisements of the Navy, of which we hear so 
little.  Out of sight, out of mind.
109
 
Once again, Carson’s response was more than sufficiently robust to deal with the hint 
of threat within the letter. 
                                                 
108
 Letter, Jellicoe to Frewen, 8 July 1921, Patterson, Jellicoe Papers, II, 412. 
109
 Letter, Northcliffe to Carson, 5 March 1917, BL, Add. MSS 62158. Unfortunately a copy of’ ‘the 
narrative’ is not with the correspondence. 
 165 
I am in complete sympathy with your view that the more the public can learn 
of the work the Navy is doing, the better … But there are some things that if 
published would help the enemy and perhaps the most important of these is 
our use of ‘decoy’ vessels of all kinds … The First Sea Lord and the War Staff 
regard it as vital that the doings of these ‘decoys’ should be kept as secret as 
possible.  They assure me that however harmless the narrative may read to you 
or me, the details it contains would be of immense value and would give them 
an insight into our methods which would go far in increasing our difficulties – 
already so grave.
110
 
Given that the submarine campaign had reached its zenith at that time and decoy ships 
were the one means devised that had proved successful against the U-boat, Carson’s 
response is understandable.  Nevertheless, it is yet another instance where Northcliffe 
had been rebuffed at the behest of Jellicoe.  
 There is one other factor which may have contributed to Northcliffe’s 
motivation for railing the Admiralty.  On 25 February 1917, Northcliffe’s house in 
Essex was hit during a bombardment by German destroyers.  The bombardment 
struck the library where Northcliffe regularly worked and killed a woman and baby 
and wounded two others who lived nearby.
111
  Northcliffe afterwards complained to 
Carson about the ineptitude of the Navy and Carson responded to the effect that the 
Admiralty could not guarantee there would be no such raids in the future.  Again, the 
timing of this event does not quite match the timing of the change of tenor of the press 
critique, but nevertheless Carson’s response can only have added to Northcliffe’s 
grievances. 
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     In his biography of Northcliffe, The Times war correspondent, Hamilton 
Fyffe, stated that when it was necessary to supersede Admiral Jellicoe, ‘Northcliffe 
had to do the politicians’ work for them’ and that Lloyd George had suggested to 
Northcliffe, ‘You kill him [Jellicoe], I’ll bury him.’112  Fyffe gives no reference as to 
when or in what circumstances that remark was made and the research undertaken has 
failed to corroborate Fyffe’s allegation, but from the circumstances discussed here, 
there is no doubt that the intent behind the remark, if not the remark itself, was 
accurate.  There was a close association between Lloyd George and Northcliffe that 
Lloyd George would have had no hesitation in exploiting.  Much of the adverse press 
comment originated in the Daily Mail, particularly in the leader articles, which were 
often written by Northcliffe.  As one early biographer stated, it was Northcliffe’s own 
leaders which gave the Daily Mail ‘its dynamic force’.113  Lloyd George wished to 
sack Jellicoe and make changes at the Admiralty.  However, in June 1917, he had a 
dilemma.   He did move Carson from the Admiralty and appoint Geddes in his place.  
To remove Jellicoe at the same time would in all probability have been political 
suicide.  He had to bide his time and in the meantime disparaging the Admiralty 
publicly would diminish the political risk when he did remove Jellicoe.  
  Northcliffe had a low opinion of Jellicoe.  Whether, as Jellicoe thought, this 
was as a result of being given ‘what for’ during the course of his meeting with Jellicoe 
and Commodore Paine is questionable, but there is no doubt from his correspondence 
with Carson that Northcliffe had little regard for Jellicoe’s competence.  Moreover, 
the Admiralty would not provide his newspapers with information about naval 
operations that he thought they were entitled to acquire.  Nor would they guarantee 
protection from German coastal bombardment.  The press campaign waged against 
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Jellicoe and the Admiralty was at times vitriolic and in content mirrored the 
complaints regarding Admiralty personnel that Lloyd George persistently made to 
Carson.  Thus, although Lloyd George denied any scurrilous use of the press in this 
regard, if all these factors are taken together the evidence (albeit circumstantial) does 
point to the conclusion that Lloyd George and Northcliffe conspired publicly to 
disparage Jellicoe and the Admiralty.  Jellicoe’s contention that his dismissal was as a 
result of Northcliffe’s bidding is a perhaps step too far in assessing Northcliffe’s role 
in the matter.  More likely, it was a conspiracy jointly hatched with, as Fyffe’s remark 
implies, Northcliffe being the assassin and Lloyd George the undertaker.   
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The analysis of the circumstances surrounding Geddes’ appointment as 
Controller, the timing of his complaints to Haig about the state of affairs at the 
Admiralty, the fact that Geddes’ complaints were a reiteration of the views of Lloyd 
George, all point to the conclusion that Haig’s involvement in the plan to remove 
Jellicoe was engineered by Lloyd George.  
Haig’s motivation for supporting the attempt to remove Jellicoe is less clear 
given Jellicoe’s support for Haig’s military strategy.  It may be that as Lord 
Beaverbrook claimed, Haig saw this as a means of deflecting the ‘lightning strike’ 
from him.  However, to an extent that issue becomes irrelevant in as much as Haig 
was pulled into the matter by Lloyd George and Geddes.  In other words, he had little 
option but to become involved. 
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 Determining Lloyd George’s motivation for involving Haig is more difficult, 
particularly if the somewhat bizarre proposal, supported by Haig, to move General 
Robertson from the War Office to replace Sir Edward Carson as First Lord is added to 
the equation.  It may have been that he thought Haig’s close association with King 
George V would have helped to secure the King’s approval for sacking Jellicoe.  On 
the other hand, there is no doubt that Lloyd George would have been keen to break 
the triumvirate of Robertson, Haig and Jellicoe that strongly opposed any change to 
their military strategy.  Merely moving Robertson to the Admiralty would not have 
achieved that objective.  Robertson was as obdurate a personality as Carson, so there 
was no guarantee that he would have acceded to Lloyd George’s demands to remove 
Jellicoe.   
In any event, ‘the well organised plan’ failed.  Robertson refused to move.   
Lloyd George resolved his dilemma by making Carson a full member of the War 
Cabinet and appointed Geddes as First Lord in his place.  He had ‘his man’ in place, 
but given Geddes’ lack of political and naval experience, he could not risk the furore 
that would have resulted had he removed Jellicoe at the same time.  
Failure of the intrigue with Haig did not deflect Lloyd George from his 
objective of removing Jellicoe and although there is no direct evidence, circumstantial 
evidence suggests that despite his public denials, Lloyd George exploited his 
relationship with Northcliffe in seeking to denigrate the public perception of the 
Admiralty under Jellicoe.  As noted, the timing of the change of the tenor of the Daily 
Mail articles and the fact that the criticisms proffered aligned with Lloyd George’s 
perceptions of the Admiralty’s failings support this view.  Public perception that 
Jellicoe was not up to the task, whether ill conceived or not, would certainly have 
assisted Lloyd George in justifying the dismissal. 
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Northcliffe’s motives are more difficult to determine.  Justified press criticism 
is in the public interest.  Nevertheless the nature of the criticism was such that it went 
beyond the bounds of objective journalism and this would suggest an element of 
personal motivation on the part of Northcliffe.  From his correspondence with Carson, 
he clearly had no regard for Jellicoe’s competence or his integrity.  It may have been 
that this was a reflection of views imparted to him by Lloyd George, but it is 
nevertheless clear that in his direct dealings with the Admiralty his views had been 
rejected and his demands rebuffed.  Given Northcliffe’s status and personality, that is 
not a situation that would have endeared Jellicoe to him and hence no doubt 
contributed to his willingness to embark on the campaign against the Admiralty.  
However, Jellicoe, in claiming that Lloyd George had dismissed him on the 
instructions of Northcliffe, probably over-emphasised the role that Northfield played 
in the matter.  Lloyd George was clearly determined to remove Jellicoe from office in 
any event and the conspiracy with Northcliffe to use his newspapers to demean 
Jellicoe and the Admiralty was simply a means to that end. 
The fact that Lloyd George engaged in these intrigues begs the question as to 
why he felt it necessary to do so.  He admitted that he had decided to dismiss Jellicoe 
at the end of June 1917, although from the foregoing discussion on Haig’s 
intervention, it is evident that he had contemplated doing so at least a month 
beforehand.  The assumption therefore must be that Lloyd George was not prepared to 
risk the furore that would have resulted both politically and from within the Navy. 
That in turn leads to a conclusion that despite the conflict in personalities and the 
differing views on military strategy, Lloyd George did not consider that he had 
sufficient grounds to justify removing Jellicoe.  If the dismissal was genuinely 
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warranted, he could have stated the reasons, and avoided the need for the 
conspiracies.    
 This leaves the thought that Lloyd George’s determination to remove Jellicoe 
from office was founded in the resentment of the fact that eight years previously, 
Jellicoe had been instrumental in the government giving precedence to the capital ship 
building programme over Lloyd George’s social reform programme.  To repeat 
Winton’s comment, given Lloyd George’s attitude to the Admiralty during the war, 
winning that battle was ‘a Pyrrhic victory’. 
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Chapter VI       
                   
   
               The Dismissal and its Aftermath 
 
 
 Introduction 
 
Despite Admiral Jellicoe being conscious of the press campaign waged against 
him and the Admiralty, and the fact that he had some differences with Sir Eric 
Geddes, there is little doubt that he was surprised by his dismissal.  Whether this was 
because he did not feel that it was warranted, because it was peremptory, or because 
of its timing, he did not reveal.  What did rankle him, however, was that there was no 
reason given.  As noted in Chapter I, Jellicoe, in his response to the dismissal letter, 
complained that Geddes did not ‘assign a reason’ for his action.1  Similarly, he 
complained to Admiral Beatty, ‘I received a letter [of dismissal] last night from the 1st 
Lord notifying me of this and giving no reason.’2  Even in writing to King George V, 
Jellicoe complained that ‘he [Geddes] gives no reason for his desire.’3  As is also 
mentioned, Jellicoe never did receive a rational explanation, nor has one ever been 
given by those directly involved in the matter. 
 However, several historical commentators have speculated as to the reasons 
for the dismissal.  Arthur Marder believed that it was the dispute between Admirals 
Bacon and Keyes over the Dover Barrage that was the immediate cause.
4
  On the 
                                                 
1
 Letter, Jellicoe to Geddes, 24 December 1917, NA, ADM 116/1807.  
2
 Letter, Jellicoe to Beatty, 25 December 1917, Patterson, Jellicoe Papers, II, 252.  
3
 Letter, Jellicoe to King George V, 25 December 1917, quoted, Roskill, ‘Jellicoe’s Dismissal’, 75.  
4
 Marder, FDSF, 4, 337. 
 172 
other hand, Paul Halpern hypothesised it was the two attacks on the Scandinavian 
convoys that caused Jellicoe’s downfall.5  Stephen Roskill thought that it was brought 
about by a combination of Jellicoe’s inability to decentralise and stress related health 
problems.
6
   
However, Roskill’s article is primarily a narrative account of events and he 
leaves it to the reader ‘to judge for himself whether … Geddes’ method of making the 
change was judicious, and whether he was justified in claiming the political support 
for his action which he did claim’.7  Thus, whilst he reproduces much of the relevant 
correspondence amongst those involved in the matter, he does not analyse this 
correspondence in depth or place it in the context of certain relevant background 
events, either of which may have assisted the reader in making his own judgement.  
Moreover, Roskill makes no attempt to assess if the dismissal was justified. 
This chapter seeks, therefore, to amplify Roskill’s account and draw 
conclusions on the issues on which Roskill believes the reader should make his own 
judgement.  It will do so firstly, by considering the events in the context both of the 
War Cabinet meetings that took place immediately preceding and following the 
dismissal and of Geddes’ desire to leave the Admiralty and return to the railways.  
This, it will be argued, supports the contention that Jellicoe’s removal was engineered 
by Lloyd George.  Secondly, the chapter will re-analyse the somewhat bizarre events 
which occurred after the dismissal and which involved Geddes and the other Sea 
Lords.  Thirdly, it will consider the related correspondence that passed between 
Geddes and, respectively, Sir Edward Carson, Arthur Balfour and Lloyd George, all 
of whom became embroiled in the affair.  Here the argument will be that Geddes 
unjustifiably used the names of his two predecessors as First Lord of the Admiralty in 
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an attempt to appease the other members of the Admiralty Board, thus suggesting that 
both Geddes and Lloyd George recognised the possibility of a ‘mutiny’ by the other 
Sea Lords in circumstances where there was no real justification for Jellicoe’s 
dismissal. 
 
 
An Opportunity Seized  
 
On assuming the Premiership following the collapse of the Herbert Asquith’s 
coalition in December 1916, Lloyd George reorganised the machinery of Government 
so that the war was ‘managed’ through a small committee chaired by himself and 
known as the War Cabinet.  It generally met on a daily basis.  In addition to Lloyd 
George, as at the end of December 1916, its members were Bonar Law, Sir Edward 
Carson, G R Barnes, Lord Curzon, Lord Milner and the South African, General 
Smuts.  Apart from Bonar Law as Chancellor of the Exchequer, none of the members 
had departmental responsibility.  Departmental heads were asked to attend as and 
when required, as were the chief military and naval advisers, usually Sir William 
Robertson as Chief of the Imperial General Staff and Jellicoe on behalf of the Royal 
Navy.  
 Thus, given the remit of the War Cabinet, it might be assumed that there 
would have been some discussion over such an important issue as the dismissal of the 
First Sea Lord.
8
  Indeed, Auckland Geddes, in his biography of his brother, claims 
that during the course of the War Cabinet meeting of 21 December 1917, ‘There was 
a long discussion.  At the end it was decided … that Admiral of the Fleet Viscount 
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Jellicoe of Scapa should cease to become first Sea Lord.’9   However, there is no 
mention in the War Cabinet meeting minutes of 21 December of any discussion on the 
replacement of Jellicoe.  Nor was there any mention of the matter in the minutes of 
the next meeting held on 24 December 1917, or in the minutes of the meeting held on 
26 December where Wemyss is recorded as being present as Deputy First Sea Lord, 
i.e., the position he held before Jellicoe was dismissed.
10
  Further, Jellicoe was present 
for at least part of the meetings held on 21 December and 24 December and there is 
nothing at all in the notes he wrote regarding his dismissal to suggest that at this time 
he was given any inkling he was about to be replaced.  All these factors point to a 
conspiracy of silence between Lloyd George and Geddes.
11
 
The other significant factor that was not considered by Roskill in his article on 
Jellicoe’s dismissal is that Geddes did not wish to remain at the Admiralty.  From the 
outset it is clear that Geddes was not comfortable in his role as First Lord.  His brother 
remarked that ‘plunged into a strange environment governed by age-long tradition of 
which he was ignorant, Eric felt like a fish out of water’.12  The Cabinet Secretary, 
Maurice Hankey, also noted that after Geddes was appointed First Lord, he ‘took a 
long time to settle down’.13  Further, this discomfiture was probably not helped by the 
disagreements with Jellicoe referred to in the previous chapter.  Thus, it is not 
surprising that when the opportunity of a more suitable alternative role in 
transportation arose, he sought to move. 
This opportunity had arisen as a consequence of the poor state of the railways 
across all Allied theatres of the war and the impact that this had on the logistics of 
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troop and materials movement on the respective fronts; a problem that would be 
exacerbated by the pending influx of American troops.  The matter had been 
discussed at several Anglo-French leadership conferences through the autumn of 
1917, and, finally, at the November Allied Conference in Paris, it had been concluded 
that the situation was so bad that the only person with the relevant experience to 
resolve the problem, and with sufficient prestige with the French military advisers, 
was Geddes.  Further, it appears that at that time Lloyd George had agreed to Geddes’ 
move.  However, as was his wont, Lloyd George changed his mind.  Consequently, on 
20 December 1917, Geddes wrote to Lloyd George in the following terms: 
 I am deeply concerned at the view the Cabinet is taking about the                     
Transportation abroad. 
The transportation problem of the Allied Armies by sea and land is, I 
think, conceded to be not only the basis of our man power effort, because it 
governs the American strength in Europe, but also the basis of our strategy and 
tactics, because it gives us the only power of successful surprise or quick 
concentration for mass defence in warfare as it has developed … 
My present work is that of a Political Chief among Naval Experts, and 
my scope is to me depressingly limited.  I am essentially an executive man 
now employed in a non-executive job – a square peg in a round hole – and I 
feel that I am far less difficult to replace at the Admiralty than in 
Transportation … 
It goes without saying, of course, that I abide by the decision of the 
Cabinet and yourself, but I am, I venture to think, entitled to say to you … that 
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procrastination or an ill advised appointment may well mean disaster.  The 
Navy is no such urgent or uncertain problem.
14
 
Three points emerge from this letter.  Firstly, despite having been at the Admiralty for 
eight months, Geddes acknowledges that he is still not the right person for post of 
First Lord.  Secondly, he suggests that despite the differences he has had with 
Jellicoe, there is nothing of any urgency that requires attention at the Admiralty; 
certainly nothing as serious as the transportation problems on the continent.  His 
comment in this respect implies that at that point he had no urge to dispense with 
Jellicoe’s services.  Thirdly, despite his willingness to accept the Cabinet’s decision 
on the role he should undertake, the tenor of the letter suggests a strong plea for 
release from the Admiralty. 
 Further, this plea continued during the War Cabinet meeting held on the 
following day.  Here, Geddes asserted that he could serve his country better in the role 
suggested by Lloyd George at the Versailles conference.
15
  However, although the 
Cabinet was unanimous in its view that ‘Sir Eric Geddes was the most suitable 
person, if indeed he was not the only person with all the right qualities and 
qualifications for the transport post’, the minute of the meeting recorded that ‘the post 
of First Lord of the Admiralty was second to none in importance’ and consequently 
the Cabinet did not reverse their original decision that Geddes should stay at the 
Admiralty.
16
  
Two other facts are pertinent to this discussion.  Firstly, the War Minister, 
Lord Derby, was against the decision, as was General Smuts who, in the subsequent 
meeting on 24 December, asked, to no avail, that the matter be reconsidered and 
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‘strongly urged that Sir Eric Geddes should undertake the [transport] work’.17  The 
other fact is that after the Cabinet Meeting, Geddes had yet another meeting with 
Lloyd George during which he again reiterated the request to leave the Admiralty, 
which Lloyd George again rejected.  According to Lloyd George, it was only then that 
Geddes raised the issue of Jellicoe’s fitness to continue as First Sea Lord claiming 
that: 
He [Geddes] therefore immediately raised the question of Lord Jellicoe’s 
position and fitness for his post, and said that although his personal 
relationship with Lord Jellicoe was and always had been excellent, he was 
convinced that the present Deputy First Sea Lord was better fitted to the post 
than was Lord Jellicoe … 
I knew the views of my colleagues in the War Cabinet.  Lord Jellicoe 
was informed in a most courteous letter that night, and he himself asked to go 
on leave at once.
18
  
Clearly, the fact that Geddes yet again sought to persuade Lloyd George to allow him 
to leave the Admiralty re-emphasises that Geddes was desperate to move; so 
desperate that if Lloyd George’s explanation is taken at face value, Geddes was 
prepared to leave the Admiralty in the hands of someone who, it would seem, was 
unfit for the post.  As to Lloyd George’s explanation, his statement that ‘I knew the 
views of my colleagues’ is misleading.  It is questionable whether they would have 
given their approval even if it had been sought.  Certainly, given Carson’s previous 
defence of Jellicoe and the views expressed in his later correspondence with Geddes, 
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it is probable that he would have dissented if he had been present at any Cabinet 
meeting at which the issue had been discussed.  The remark that Lloyd George 
considered that the letter of dismissal was ‘courteous’ adds to the disingenuousness of 
his statement.        
There is one final factor to consider in this particular context.  Wemyss was 
approached by Geddes on the evening of Sunday 22 December 1917 and asked if he 
would be prepared to take over from Jellicoe.  According to Wemyss, Geddes 
informed him that ‘he had been studying me for the last three months and in his 
opinion I was the best man.’19  In other words, Geddes had asked Wemyss if he was 
prepared to assume the role of First Sea Lord whilst he was still trying to persuade 
Lloyd George to allow him to relinquish the role of First Lord.  What would have 
happened to Wemyss if Lloyd George had agreed to the move and Jellicoe remained 
at the Admiralty is open to speculation. 
This somewhat bizarre set of circumstances gives rise to three questions.  
Firstly, why was Geddes so desperate to move from the Admiralty?  Secondly, why 
did Lloyd George refuse to allow Geddes to move despite the crisis in military 
transportation, Geddes’ pleas, those of his War Minister and at least two of his War 
Cabinet colleagues?  Thirdly, why was there a need for secrecy and lack of 
consultation with his War Cabinet colleagues on such an important issue as the 
replacement of the country’s most senior naval officer? 
 As to the answer to the first question, in terms of competence, Geddes himself 
recognised that, given his background and experience, transportation was his forte and 
he would have been much more comfortable in an executive rather than a political 
role.  However, according to his brother, ‘Eric realized that the P.M. intended to get 
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rid of Jellicoe.  His was to be the responsibility before the public for the First Sea 
Lord’s dismissal.’20  Geddes was reputed to be a man of some vanity and given the 
furore that was likely to arise following Jellicoe’s dismissal, he would not have 
relished the prospect of being made the public scapegoat.  Thus, it is likely that 
Geddes’ desire to move was also motivated by this possibility. 
The answer to the second question is more speculative.  Obviously the War 
Cabinet had to prioritise; the Admiralty or transportation.  In this context, Geddes’ 
argument that ‘the Navy is no urgent or uncertain problem’ is significant.  The U-boat 
threat to merchant shipping had been contained, and the anti-submarine weapons 
technology developed under Jellicoe’s auspices was starting to reap dividends in 
terms of the number of U-boats being destroyed.  The High Seas Fleet was contained 
in harbour and intelligence suggested that the British naval blockade was having an 
increasingly adverse impact on the German populace.
21
  Processes were also in place 
to improve other areas of perceived weakness prevalent at the time; i.e., the need for 
better protection of the Scandinavian convoys and deficiencies in the Dover barrage.  
Further, as will be seen, an aggressive plan to blockade the German occupied ports of 
Ostend and Zeebrugge had been approved by Jellicoe and was in the course of 
preparation, which would have gone some way towards answering criticism that 
British naval strategy was over cautious.  
Thus, it can be argued that there was a clear case for giving priority to 
resolving the transport issues.  Consequently, that would suggest an ulterior motive on 
Lloyd George’s part, namely, to use the opportunity to have Geddes remove Jellicoe, 
and as Auckland Geddes contended, ensure that the responsibility fell squarely on the 
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shoulders of the First Lord rather than his own.  Lloyd George could, of course, have 
allowed Geddes to move and dismissed Jellicoe at the same time, but in that event 
responsibility would have attached to him rather than to Geddes.  Moreover, it is 
doubtful that depriving the Admiralty of both its political head and its operational 
head at the same time would have been politically sustainable given the fragility of his 
coalition government.            
If the foregoing argument has validity, then the answer to the third question 
becomes self evident.  Had Lloyd George declared to his War Cabinet that he wished 
Geddes to remain at the Admiralty because he was contemplating replacing Jellicoe 
with Wemyss, there is a strong possibility that the Cabinet would have been split.  
Indeed, as already noted, Carson’s subsequent reaction to the dismissal and the way it 
was handled indicates that he may well have resigned had the matter been discussed 
in Cabinet beforehand.  By presenting his colleagues with the fait accompli, the Prime 
Minister had alleviated these possibilities.  
 Further, there can be little doubt that Lloyd George and Geddes were given 
additional respite from the potential furore by the fact that the House of Commons 
had risen for the Christmas vacation and that no newspapers were published on 
Christmas Day or Boxing Day.  It has already been noted that Winton, in his 
biography of Jellicoe, suggests that this was probably not planned but that ‘the 
emotional aftermath of the argument with Wemyss over Bacon, and the slow 
accumulation of feelings over the previous months, all combined to give the event a 
momentum of its own which made it come to pass on Christmas Eve.’22  There may 
be some merit in that argument in relation to Geddes’ motivation but it does not 
match with Lloyd George’s long held desire to remove Jellicoe.  As stated, Geddes   
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‘was just the satellite of Lloyd George.’23  In refusing to allow Geddes to move from 
the Admiralty, Lloyd George engineered the opportunity to achieve his long held 
ambition.  By having Geddes write the dismissal letter within what can have been 
only a matter of few hours at most after the War Cabinet meeting at which Jellicoe 
was present and without consulting the War Cabinet, Lloyd George certainly seized 
his opportunity and took advantage of the hiatus in parliamentary proceedings and the 
press. 
 
 
A Mutiny Avoided  
  
If the timing and the peremptory nature of the dismissal was an attempt by 
Lloyd George and Geddes to mitigate the anticipated furore, their strategy was 
ultimately successful.  However, it came very close to failure.  The news did not break 
in the press until 27 December 1917.  Not surprisingly, the Northcliffe press in the 
form of The Times and the Daily Mail approved, the latter commenting that ‘the sole 
and sufficient ground for our objections to him as First Sea Lord was the conviction 
that the naval guidance of the war in his hands was losing in initiative, flexibility and 
prevision.’24  Otherwise the press was surprisingly ambivalent, although later, on 17 
March 1918, the Morning Post reflected that Jellicoe was most discourteously treated, 
and that the business wore ‘an ugly complexion’.25 
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Politicians in the main were more disapproving.  Carson was infuriated.  In a 
letter to Jellicoe he stated, ‘I look upon your departure from the Admiralty as a 
national loss.’26  The Liberal Party’s leading politicians, Herbert Asquith, Reginald 
McKenna and Walter Runciman were of the same view.  According to Jellicoe they 
discussed the issue at some length and were disturbed by it.  They asked Bonar Law 
for some explanation but, although he had been called into the final meeting when the 
decision to oust Jellicoe was taken, he could only vaguely offer the view that no 
specific reason would be given other than that a change was considered desirable. 
However, none of Asquith, McKenna or Runciman was prepared to raise the issue in 
Parliament.  In Jellicoe’s words, ‘The three ex-Ministers considered it would be 
useless to press the question. They realised that the reasons would not be the whole 
reasons; but that the attitude adopted was one that from which no result could be 
obtained.  I agreed, and no action with my consent was taken.’27   
In his discussion with the three Liberal politicians, Bonar Law also suggested 
that the Prime Minister and Geddes thought it would be best ‘to have as First Lord an 
officer who was not committed to the older methods’.28  Jellicoe, both on his own 
account and at the behest of his political masters, had made significant changes to the 
organisation of the Admiralty.  As noted in Chapter II, he was also intent on finding 
new technological solutions to the U-boat threat.  Also, as will be seen from the brief 
vignette of Wemyss in the next chapter, Wemyss was as much ‘old school’ as 
Jellicoe.  Thus, to suggest that Jellicoe was more committed to ‘older methods’ than 
Wemyss is disingenuous.  The vague rationale provided by Bonar Law for replacing 
Jellicoe was therefore, at best, unconvincing.   
                                                 
26
 Letter, Carson to Jellicoe, 27 December 1917, BL, Add. MSS 49036.  
27
 Jellicoe, Account of Circumstances of Dismissal, BL, Add. MSS 49039.  
28
 Ibid. 
 183 
All ranks of the Navy were considerably more indignant about the dismissal 
than the leading liberal politicians.  Jellicoe’s papers in the British Library contain 
dozens of letters of support and condemnation of the press and the politicians 
regarded as being responsible.  Even Beatty, who, some have argued, was not on the 
best of terms with Jellicoe, was ‘amazed’ and wrote:  
The manner of your dismissal was apparently in keeping with the usual way 
they have at the Admiralty of dispensing with the services of officers who 
have given their whole lives to the services of their country … What 
experience Wemyss has to run the complex and great machine, I do not know, 
but I fear for the future.’29 
It could be argued from the wording of this letter that Beatty was sympathetic as to 
the manner of the dismissal and not to the fact that it was unjustified, but from the last 
sentence there is little doubt that he rated Wemyss’ capability below that of Jellicoe.  
There were no such reservations as regards justification from the naval rank 
and file.  For example, the 10
th
 Submarine Flotilla cabled:  
We heard with regret of your retirement and would wish to know what was the 
cause, you know of course that we have implicit trust in you and please do not 
take it lying down.  We want you back … You quite understand how we are 
situated and you know that we would not Mutiny because love of home and 
beauty come first …  But Speak my Lord let us hear your voice in the Grand 
Fleet for we wish to hear it.
30
 
This is, perhaps, an over emotional reaction to the dismissal, but nevertheless it does 
illustrate Jellicoe’s reputation and the respect with which he was held within the fleet.  
However, as he had realised, in reality, there was no way back.   
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It was not just in the 10
th
 Submarine Flotilla that the thought of mutiny arose 
and was then dismissed because of ‘love of home’.  The naval members of the Board 
of the Admiralty, other than Wemyss, were of a like mind and it was in their reaction 
that the greatest risk to Lloyd George’s coalition arose.  Here, again, the events took a 
somewhat bizarre turn and some narrative explanation is of assistance in 
understanding the arguments. 
 As mentioned, Jellicoe received the letter of dismissal from Geddes on the 
evening of 24 December 1917 at around 6 pm.  However, because the letter was 
marked ‘Personal and strictly private’ he felt constrained in consulting anyone as to 
what action he should take.
31
  Notwithstanding, he did consult the Third Sea Lord, 
Admiral Halsey, who agreed that it would be difficult for Jellicoe to carry on in the 
circumstances and that he should immediately take leave and tell Wemyss ‘to carry 
on’.32  Thereafter, events involving the Sea Lords and Geddes become confused, but 
the most comprehensive contemporary explanation can be found in Admiral Duff’s 
notes on the matter:   
Thursday Dec. 25
th
 1917  
About 6p.m., Halsey came to my room and told me that J. had been dismissed, 
and that the manner of his dismissal was curt, if not offensive.  Meeting of the 
Sea Lords in my room to discuss the situation.  Various opinions expressed, no 
decision reached.  Eventually went in a body to see Wemyss.  Result of 
conversation was a letter to 1st Lord, written in Heath’s [Second Sea Lord] 
name, asking for an interview in order that the reasons for J’s dismissal might 
be explained to us, as we were very much perturbed in view of the 
responsibility to the Navy and to the country… Left the conference at 8p.m., it 
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having been agreed that the letter to 1st Lord should be sent to him by special 
messenger.  Dec.26
th
.  The situation this morning is as follows: Heath 
(apparently in agreement with Wemyss) had withheld the letter, and was 
interviewed by 1st Lord (or asked for an interview).  He (G.) told Heath that 
the dismissal of the 1st S. L. was no concern of ours, that it was entirely a 
matter for the Cabinet, and that as 1st Lord he entirely declined to give any 
reasons for the course of actions taken.  But, he proceeded, as man to man, I 
am prepared to tell you what I will not tell you as 1st Ld ...  He then explained 
the circumstances in detail, and amongst other reasons for the action taken 
stated, that - some 3 months ago - a meeting had been held in the P. M’s room, 
at which were present the P. M., Balfour and Geddes.  The question of J’s 
retention was discussed, and both Mr. B. and Sir E. G. agreed that a change of 
1st S. Ld. was desirable.  On this particular statement, the whole affair 
eventually hinged. 
Tothill [Fourth Sea Lord] and Halsey were next interviewed Heath 
being present, and to him [sic, them], the 1st Lord reiterated the statement 
quoted down.  
At the end of the interview, the Sea Lords had another conference, but 
adjourned without coming to a decision, as it was felt that until Oliver and 
myself had seen the 1st Lord, a decision should be postponed.
33
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From a constitutional perspective, the appointment and dismissal of the First Sea Lord 
undoubtedly does fall within the remit of the Government acting through the First 
Lord, and technically Geddes was correct when he claimed that the dismissal was of 
‘no concern’ of the Sea Lords.  What is more difficult to understand is why Geddes 
should have refused to see them en masse or why he should have insisted that he 
would only give an explanation ‘man to man’ and not in his capacity as First Lord.  If 
there was a rational explanation for the dismissal, or indeed for its manner or timing, 
then logically he should have had no difficulty on either count.  Indeed, it can be 
argued that such a course was more likely to have avoided any ensuing furore.
34
   
It is also evident from Duff’s notes that during the course of the conversations, 
Geddes’ use of the names of his predecessors, in trying to allay the concerns of the 
Sea Lords, was critical to their response to the dismissal.  Again to quote Duff, ‘I 
argued strongly that the opinions of Balfour and Carson carried so much weight, that 
the Sea Lords would not be justified in resigning, as a protest against what - in their 
opinion - might prove a calamity to the country.’35  On that basis, and at that point, the 
Sea Lords decided not to resign. 
However, to continue the narrative, the Sea Lords then learned that Carson had 
‘absolutely denied’ that the meeting Geddes had referred to in his discussions with the 
Sea Lords had taken place and ‘furthermore declared that he had always maintained 
                                                                                                                                            
Admiralty and been counter productive.  This view was also held by Lady Carson who claimed that 
‘One admiral he [Geddes] has sacked he has had to ask back as his department can’t get on…’ Lady 
Carson, Diary Entry, 1 January, 1918, PRONI, D/1507/C/4/1.  It should also be noted that in the first 
paragraph of his notes, Duff refers to the meeting at which Jellicoe’s future was discussed as being 
attended by Geddes, Balfour and Lloyd George, but there is no mention of Carson being present. Given 
the subsequent references to Carson and other evidence mentioned later, it is assumed that this is 
probably an omission on Duff’s part.    
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that J. was the only possible man for the post of 1st Sea Lord’.36  Consequently, on    
1 January 1918, Halsey met with Carson who confirmed the foregoing.
37
 
  The affair then developed on two levels, the first involving the Sea Lords and 
Geddes and the second, involving Geddes, Carson, Balfour and ultimately, Lloyd 
George.  As regards the former, the Sea Lords met again in the evening of 1 January 
1918 and decided to write to Geddes, stating four things.  Firstly, they reaffirmed that 
they ‘had full confidence in Sir John Jellicoe’s ability and fitness to perform his 
responsible duties’ and that they ‘were most gravely concerned and disturbed by this 
sudden removal of a most able and distinguished officer’.38  Secondly, they pointed 
out that in their discussions with Geddes, he had told them that both Carson and 
Balfour, in the presence of the Prime Minister, had informed Geddes that they did not 
consider Jellicoe to be the best man for the position of First Sea Lord.  It was the 
opinions of these ‘most experienced and eminent Ministers of the Crown’ who knew 
Jellicoe ‘intimately’ that had persuaded them to accept the situation.39  Thirdly, and 
most significantly, they asserted that if Geddes could not clear up the apparent 
‘misunderstanding’ and ‘all doubts be set at rest’, they could no longer ‘continue to 
serve as your colleagues unless this is done’.40  The Sea Lords concluded by stating 
that ‘we wish to add that we have no desire to hamper the public service by our action 
and that we will continue to carry out our duties loyally until we are replaced or until 
a satisfactory explanation is afforded.’41  Roskill, in his article on Jellicoe’s dismissal, 
suggests that this memorandum was ‘somewhat minatory’.42  That seems to understate 
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the position grossly.  The memorandum was initialled by all the Naval Sea Lords 
except Wemyss, and Admirals Duff and Oliver, as respectively Assistant and Deputy 
Chiefs of Naval Staff.  They were all loyal, long serving successful sea officers, who 
were prepared to put their own careers in serious jeopardy and create what would 
have been severe disruption within the Navy.  Their resignation would have provided 
Germany with a significant propaganda opportunity.  Moreover, there was a strong 
probability that their resignation en masse would have provoked a crisis of confidence 
in the Government, with a real prospect of an ensuing collapse.  Notably, however, 
this threat revolved, not around the dismissal of Jellicoe per se, but a representation, 
made by one politician but denied by another, as to who supported the dismissal.  
By dint of some adept foot work on part the part of Geddes, the crisis was 
averted.  Firstly, Geddes sought the support of the Civil Lords of the Admiralty.  On 
the 26 December 1917, he had written to each of them advising that ‘Sir John Jellicoe 
has relinquished his post’ and stating that he was ‘confident that I can count on your 
support to secure that there shall be no dislocation of Admiralty business as a result 
this and consequent changes’.43  Further, it appears that after the Memorandum that  
threatened resignation, three of the Civil Lords (The Earl of Lytton, T J McNamara, 
and E G Prettyman) duly provided this support by meeting the Sea Lords (probably on 
3 January 1918) and sought to persuade them that for patriotic reasons they ought to 
remain and that ‘their going would create a great furore in the country; and that they 
would be universally condemned for creating turmoil in the country on a question of 
which of two men was speaking the truth’.44  Thus the Civil Lords had also adroitly 
circumvented involving themselves in any discussion on Jellicoe’s capability.  
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 Secondly, it seems that Geddes sought to divide the naval Sea Lords by 
focusing his persuasive skills on the most senior and probably the least strong willed 
of their number, Admiral Heath.  Again, according to Duff’s notes in relation to the 
events of 2
 
January, ‘No development that day, except that Heath lunched with the 
First Lord!! and seemed to have been alternatively cajoled and threatened.’45  Duff did 
not comment on the extent to which Heath was persuaded by Geddes, but Admiral 
Richmond, then a captain serving at the Admiralty, had no doubts about the matter, 
later noting in his diary, ‘Saw … Heath (2nd Sea Lord) who shouts and blusters, the 
hearty seaman all over – as dense as mud and obstinate as a mule, but I suspect easily 
frightened, for Geddes was able to put him in his kennel when he threatened to resign 
over Jellicoe’s dismissal.’46  Richmond was renowned for his acerbic character and 
for being critical of his colleagues.  Nonetheless, even making allowances for that, if 
his comments are taken in conjunction with Duff’s, it is evident that Geddes’ 
‘cajoling’ of Heath influenced the outcome.   
It is also probable that the outcome was influenced by Geddes’ formal 
response to the Sea Lord’s memorandum threatening resignation.  Geddes waited two 
days before replying formally by letter to the Sea Lords making three specific points.  
Firstly, he reiterated that he was not prepared to discuss the matter with them 
officially and complained that his previous conversation on the subject had been in 
confidence and that they had broken that confidence.
47
  Secondly, he reminded the 
Sea Lords that the appointment or removal of the first Sea Lord was ‘entirely a matter 
for His Majesty and his Majesty’s Government’.48  Thirdly, and undoubtedly the point 
that had most bearing on the Sea Lords’ decision on whether or not to resign, he 
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confessed ‘his amazement’ to this threat and reminded them ‘that at this time more 
than any other, it is the privilege of every citizen loyally and whole-heartedly to carry 
on the duties assigned to him’.49     
Duff’s notes do not mention this letter or the Sea Lords’ response to it.  
However, the fact that the response gives nothing more by way of explanation or 
clarification, by focusing on the Sea Lords’ so called ‘breach of confidence,’ and 
reminding them that Jellicoe’s dismissal was none of their business, can only have 
added to a growing perception of the futility of their position.  If nothing else, the fact 
that Geddes had already received an apology for the breach of confidence from one of 
the Sea Lords, would suggest that by the time they had received the letter their stance 
was weakening.  
Two other people influenced the Sea Lords’ decision.  Firstly, despite his 
protestations, Carson believed the Sea Lords ought not to resign.  In his article, 
Roskill refers to a statement in an unpublished biography by Oliver to the effect that 
Carson had ‘asked them [the Sea Lords] to take no further action’, but then concludes 
that as Oliver’s account ‘was written long afterwards and contains at least one definite 
inaccuracy, one may doubt whether it should be regarded as reliable evidence’.50  
Given Carson’s anger over the affair, it is understandable that Roskill reached such a 
conclusion.  On the other hand, Jellicoe’s dismissal was a particularly significant 
incident on which Oliver had been prepared to stake his career.  Consequently, it is 
unlikely that he would have forgotten who influenced his decision, even if there were 
inaccuracies over the timing of events.  Further, Halsey, in his initial request to meet 
with Carson, indicated that the Sea Lords were considering whether they should 
remain on the Board, and it would thus seem inconceivable that there was not some 
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discussion with Carson on such a critical issue.
51
  Finally in this context, in his 
biography of Carson, Colvin claims that although Carson ‘disapproved of the change’, 
he ‘added the advice to put duty before inclination and remain at their posts’.52   
Thus, contrary to Roskill’s view, there would seem no reason to doubt the 
reliability of Oliver’s remarks.  Certainly, given Duff’s comments on the importance 
the Sea Lords attached to Carson’s opinion as to whether Jellicoe should have been 
replaced, his views on the question of their resignation would also have weighed 
heavily with them.  
The other person to influence the Sea Lords was Jellicoe himself.  He states 
that ‘I advised Halsey that the Sea Lords should not resign as it would do no good and 
be bad for the Country.  Geddes would only get in as Sea Lords officers that would do 
his will and who had no knowledge of the Admiralty, and the results might be fatal to 
efficiency.’ 53  As much as anything, Jellicoe’s refusal to aggravate the situation, 
despite his self confessed ‘wounded feelings’, epitomises the dignity of the man and 
his overriding loyalty to his country.
54
  There is little doubt that this advice also 
weighed heavily with the Sea Lords in coming to their decision.  
Hence, according to Admiral Duff, ‘after interminable discussion’, the Sea 
Lords withdrew their threat of resignation, Geddes accepting that ‘there has been an 
entirely honest misunderstanding between us of the impression intended to convey in 
my reference to the opinion of others when we met on December 26th.’55  That latter 
remark conveys a sense that Geddes was backtracking.  
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  If Carson was at least partially instrumental in calming the turmoil at the 
Admiralty, as far as Geddes was concerned, he was not prepared to let the matter rest.  
On 29 December 1917, after his meeting with Halsey, he had written to Geddes 
complaining that he had been informed that Geddes had stated that at conference with 
the Prime Minister, Arthur Balfour and themselves that ‘you and I agreed it was time 
Admiral Jellicoe left the Admiralty’ and presumably out of courtesy, continued, ‘I do 
not of course believe you made such a statement, but I think it right to bring it to your 
notice.’56  Carson also stated that no such conference had taken place, and that the 
only conversation he could recollect on the subject was a private discussion that they 
had had at the Admiralty when Carson made the point that ‘he knew of know one to 
replace him [Jellicoe].’57  Not surprisingly, the response from Geddes was terse.  He 
reasserted that the meeting with the Prime Minister had taken place, but denied he had 
stated that Carson had agreed with him that Jellicoe should leave the Admiralty.
58
  
Moreover, he complained that:  
What I have said and I have confined this to a very limited circle in strict 
confidence which has been violated is that my opinion of Adml Jellicoe was 
not come to hastily and that I had some 2 1/2 months ago I thought - consulted 
my two predecessors about it & that from the interviews I felt that my opinion 
of him had been confirmed.
59
   
Further, such was Geddes’ concern about the affair, he asked his secretary, Gerald 
Steele, to talk to Carson when delivering the letter.  Steel’s account of that meeting is  
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illuminating in that he believed firstly that Carson understood and accepted the extent 
to which Geddes had used Carson’s name in providing an explanation for the 
dismissal and, secondly, that Steel was of the view that Carson would not try to 
‘aggravate the position’.60  Geddes’ handwritten endorsement on Steel’s letter reads 
‘Thanks. Quite satisfactory.’61  However, either Steel had misread the situation, or he 
had been misled by Carson as, on 1 January 1918, Carson again wrote to Geddes 
stating that ‘I find it difficult to understand why my name was introduced into the 
matter of Ad: Jellicoe’s dismissal.’62  Carson then sought to bring Lloyd George and 
Balfour into the dispute.  After some time had elapsed, Balfour’s response came in a 
lengthy letter in which, perhaps atypically, he appeared on the one hand to side with 
Carson, but on the other, to distance himself from the matter entirely.
63
  Not 
surprisingly in view of what had gone before, Lloyd George was unequivocally 
supportive of Geddes.  Carson had sought an interview on the matter with Lloyd 
George on 31 December 1917, ‘being very much concerned about the dismissal of 
Admiral Jellicoe and even more so about the appointment of Wemyss as First Sea 
Lord and resenting ‘the manner in which my name has been brought into the 
matter’.64  Lloyd George’s response is evident from two sources.  Firstly, there is a 
holograph endorsement by Geddes on a copy of Carson’s note requesting the meeting 
with Lloyd George, which confirmed both that the October meeting had taken place 
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and that Lloyd George had approved ‘the changes in detail’.65  Secondly, Lloyd 
George then wrote to Geddes confirming that ‘I am perfectly clear that such a meeting 
took place at which the four of us were present – perhaps about two months ago – and 
that it was arranged at your request.  My private secretary is able to confirm my 
recollection.’66 
  Thus, Lloyd George had not only conspired to act in a way which came close 
to causing the mass resignation of the executives in control of the Navy, in essence he 
was the root cause of an acrimonious dispute between a member of the War Cabinet 
and the political head of the Navy; something that could not have been entirely 
conducive to the war effort.  
  The matter did not end there.  The exchanges of correspondence continued for 
at least three months after Jellicoe’s dismissal, despite Balfour pointing out that ‘it is 
in the public interest that the matter be allowed to sleep.’67  As to why this happened, 
Carson was obviously aggrieved that, as a member of the War Cabinet, he had not 
been consulted.  He was angry and resented that ‘my name should have been brought 
into an explanation of his dismissal to some of the Sea Lords and that they should 
have been given the impression that I had expressed approval of his leaving office’.68  
However, he had nothing to gain from continuing the dispute.  There was no way 
back for Jellicoe, and in the interests of the conduct of the war, he had advised the Sea 
Lords not to resign.  Carson also resigned from the War Cabinet on 22 January 1918, 
so ostensibly thereafter he no longer had a direct involvement in the prosecution of 
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the war.
69
  Thus, it can be surmised that Colvin is correct in his assessment that apart 
from Carson’s desire not to be associated with the dismissal, he ‘intervened merely to 
do justice to Sir John Jellicoe’.70 
      Despite the fact that it would have been in Geddes’ interests to end the 
matter post haste, if for no other reason than to restore calm at the Admiralty, he  also 
was unable to let the matter rest.  In his case, however, he had little alternative.  
Roskill suggests that the ‘rumbles continued’ as ‘there had been some agitation in the 
Press … and Geddes was evidently aware that the matter might be raised in the House 
of Commons.’71  However, Roskill misses the point in as much as it was the fact that 
the matter had been raised in the House of Commons that prolonged the ‘rumbles’.  
On 5 March 1918 Geddes had made a speech in the House of Commons debate on the 
Navy Estimates for the ensuing year.  This gave Members of Parliament the 
opportunity to challenge Geddes on the issue of Jellicoe’s dismissal and over the first 
two days of the debate a number of Members did so with considerable vigour.  
George Lambert, the Liberal MP for South Molton, focusing on the Admiralty 
reorganisation that Geddes had referenced in his speech, queried whether the 
reorganisation ‘was simply an excuse for the dismissal of Sir John Jellicoe’, and 
considered that ‘the Government can find no virtue in a distinguished naval or 
military officer until they have dismissed him.’72  He further considered that Jellicoe 
deserved somewhat more sympathy in the way he had been treated and, perhaps most 
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significantly, obtained confirmation that neither Carson nor the War Cabinet had been 
consulted over the dismissal.
73
  Moreover, Geddes, when pressed later in the debate, 
refused to disclose the members of the War Cabinet with whom he had discussed the 
matter.
74
  Admiral of the Fleet, Sir Hedworth Meux, Unionist MP for Portsmouth, was 
another who was critical of Geddes stating that he ‘never was more surprised as just 
now when I heard that … Mr Lambert had extracted the fact that the dismissal of Lord 
Jellicoe was not made with the knowledge of the War Cabinet.  I cannot help 
wondering where the First Lord got his knowledge and inspiration’, the implication 
being that the decision to dismiss Jellicoe had not been of Geddes’ own making.75   
Meux went on to remark that, ‘When I saw this thing done … at Christmas I was so 
angry that I could not go to church.  I believe that is the feeling throughout the Navy.  
They were violently angry.’76   
This attack came from both Liberal and Conservative Members of Parliament.  
It was not therefore merely a ‘party’ motivated assault.  It focused, not just on the way 
that Jellicoe had been treated, but also on his relative competence and the lack of 
consultation.  Also, during the first three days of the debate, Geddes had been 
virtually unsupported.  Lloyd George had not been present, a matter which also 
attracted no little criticism in the House.  The only two other politicians present who 
had intimate knowledge of the circumstances of the dismissal were Carson and 
Balfour; the former believing the matter to be a ‘national calamity’, and the latter 
being at pains to avoid being associated with the affair.  Hence, coming from the 
House of Commons at close of business on 7 March, Geddes must have felt bruised, 
and no doubt it was this that prompted his writing on 8 March what can only be 
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described as a remarkable letter to Lloyd George, who was due to appear in the 
continuation of the debate on 11 March.  In this, Geddes firstly stated that he had 
consulted no less than three ministerial private secretaries in an effort to confirm that 
the October meeting at which Jellicoe’s future was discussed did in fact take place.77  
Secondly, he suggested, ‘It would be a great mistake to bring Mr Balfour’s opinion 
into the controversy to the discussion at all.’78  Thirdly, he wrote, ‘I hope very much 
that in any statement you make will bear in mind that it is essential that my bona fides 
and veracity… should be established … and you will do what you can to accomplish 
this.’79  This letter, from someone holding down the position of political head of the 
Navy in a world war, verges on the astonishing.  In the first place, the letter is 
garrulous and repetitive, particularly with reference to the issue as to whether or not 
Geddes and the Prime Minister met with Carson to discuss Jellicoe’s future.  
Secondly, it highlights a dilemma.  On the one hand Geddes was anxious to involve 
Balfour to prove that the October meeting took place, but on the other hand he knew 
that Balfour was of the view that Jellicoe ‘had unique experience both of work within 
the Admiralty and with work in the organisation of a seagoing fleet’ and that ‘in these 
respects he had no real rival among living sailors’.80  For Balfour, as well as Carson, 
to have expressed such a view publicly, would have undermined Geddes’ position.  
Thirdly, the plaintiff cries for Lloyd George’s support and the need to establish ‘his 
bona fides’ implies considerable insecurity on Geddes’ part.  The irony is, however, 
that when Lloyd George appeared in the House of Commons on 11 March, although 
there was some acerbic discussion on the relationship between the press and the 
Government and the manner in which the press was used by the Government, nothing 
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was said directly about Jellicoe’s dismissal.  Why this should be so given the 
persistence of certain members during the previous days of the debate is impossible to 
explain with certainty.  It can only be surmised that having been presented with the 
fait accompli of the dismissal and having made their point, as with the Sea Lords, it 
was not a matter that warranted bringing down the Government at a critical time in 
the war.  
 Despite this, however, the matter still continued to trouble Geddes for some 
time.  His papers in the National Archives contain several drafts of a statement that 
was ultimately sent to Lloyd George on 28 April 1918, the draft being marked with 
the handwritten comment, ‘In case he wishes to use it in debate on Air Ministry 
Charges on 29th April.’81  This statement has been referred to previously in the 
context of Geddes’ plea to leave the Admiralty immediately prior to Jellicoe’s 
dismissal.  As noted, it was not used by Lloyd George, but it is of significance 
because it is the only document in Geddes’ papers which at least, prima facie, 
purports to provide some explanation of the reasons for the dismissal.  The draft 
opens by stating that: 
It is distasteful to me to discuss the personal merits of an Officer who has 
provided such distinguished service in certain capacities, but it is in the 
national interest that his removal from the position of First Sea Lord should be 
explained, and it is due to my Right. Hon. Friend, the First Lord that this 
explanation should be given to the country.  
When my Right Hon. Friend became First Lord, the Cabinet – the great 
majority of the Cabinet – felt that however great Lord Jellicoe’s services may 
have been as Commander-in-Chief afloat, which position he held under great 
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strain for 28 months, he lacked certain qualities as the Chief of Naval Staff 
and as the Chief Naval Adviser of the Government. 
  I, personally, had frequently discussed his qualities – as was my right 
and duty – with the late First Lord.  I was dissatisfied with Lord Jellicoe, and I 
told the Right Hon. Friend, the member for Trinity College Dublin [Sir 
Edward Carson] that this was so.  He has referred in this House to ‘constant 
pressure’ and if it is not the duty of a Prime Minister to give a colleague in the 
position of First Lord of the Admiralty or the Secretary of State for War, his 
views as to the Chief Naval and Military Advisers of the Government, I do not 
know what his duties are.
82
 
The statement then goes on to recount elements of the reorganisation at the Admiralty 
that was carried out immediately following the appointment of Geddes as First Lord, 
the circumstances of the October meeting with Balfour and Carson and then 
continues:  
I knew the several views of my colleagues on the subject of Lord Jellicoe.  I 
held strong views myself and I had confidence in my Right Hon. Friend’s 
judgement after three years of close association with him, having regard to his 
experience of, and in, the Admiralty, from May to December … 
I took counsel with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who was in the 
building and the change advocated was agreed upon.  I knew the views of my 
colleagues in the War Cabinet.
83
 
The matter was not raised in the debate of 28 April, but whether Lloyd George would 
have used the statement if he had again been challenged on the issue must be open to 
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doubt, for apart from embellishing certain facts, it raises more questions than it 
answers. 
Firstly, despite Jellicoe’s persistent pessimism through the early part of 1917, 
there is no evidence that Jellicoe had lost the confidence of the members of the 
Cabinet other than Lloyd George either then, or immediately prior to the dismissal.  
Secondly, maintaining that he ‘knew the views of my colleagues’ implies that they 
would have approved of Geddes’ action had they been consulted beforehand.  As 
discussed earlier, at least two members of the War Cabinet subsequently disapproved 
of it.  Balfour too, did not think there was anyone better qualified for the job than 
Jellicoe.  Thirdly, the statement again begs the question as to why, if Lloyd George 
was so dissatisfied with Jellicoe during Carson’s tenure at the Admiralty, he did not 
force the issue and remove Jellicoe then, or alternatively after the October meeting at 
which Jellicoe’s future was discussed.  Finally, although the intent behind the 
statement was to provide the country with an explanation for Jellicoe’s removal, on 
analysis, it does not.  Lloyd George does not explain why he was dissatisfied with 
Jellicoe, the ‘qualities’ he lacked, or the failings Geddes had observed during his time 
at the Admiralty.  What the statement does show, however, is that four months after 
the event, Geddes was still uncomfortable with his role at the Admiralty and that he 
remained concerned over his reputation. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
In the introduction to this chapter, reference is made to Roskill’s wish for his 
readers to decide whether the way Geddes went about dismissing Jellicoe was 
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judicious and whether he was ‘justified in claiming the political support for his action 
which he did claim.’84  The correspondence which Jellicoe received from within the 
Navy, from politicians and from other associates makes it very clear that peremptory 
dismissal, in a curt letter, without prior warning, and more pertinently without 
explanation, was, to say the least, inappropriate.  Lady Carson made the telling 
remark, ‘A great row on at the Admiralty as Sir Eric Geddes has dismissed Jellicoe as 
one might a dishonest butler and everybody in the navy is seething with discontent.’85  
From the correspondence that Jellicoe received following his dismissal, there is little 
doubt that Lady Carson’s comment was a reflection of the views within the Navy.  
Lloyd George and Geddes, in acting as they did, without the authority or consensus of 
the War Cabinet, had created a potentially serious state of affairs indeed, not least 
because of the effect it may have had within the Admiralty and throughout the fleet.  
It almost caused the resignation of naval members of the Board of the Admiralty and, 
arguably, had it not been for the sense of duty of both Carson and Jellicoe persuading 
the Sea Lords to remain at their posts, they may well have resigned.  From the tenor 
of the correspondence and Duff’s notes on the matter, had Jellicoe sought the Sea 
Lords’ backing, they may well have followed through on their original threat.  If that 
had happened, there was a real risk that Lloyd George’s coalition would have 
collapsed.  Either event would, at the very least, have handed a real propaganda 
opportunity to the enemy at a critical point in the war.  Further, although it is not 
possible to argue with certainty as to whether it would have affected German naval 
strategy, the turmoil within the Admiralty may have resulted in German naval 
command reversing its policy and risking an attack by the High Seas Fleet.  
Moreover, from a personal perspective, the correspondence between Geddes and 
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Lloyd George and Geddes and Balfour, and the public criticism he sustained, clearly 
caused Geddes considerable angst for a period of at least three months after the 
dismissal; not something that the political head of the Admiralty should be troubled 
with in war.  Thus, the conclusion is that in dismissing Jellicoe in the way that they 
did, Lloyd George and Geddes were most injudicious in their approach, except that in 
the timing of the event they avoided immediate challenge in the House of Commons 
and, following the adage that ‘yesterday’s news is no news’,  immediate and 
potentially damaging adverse press commentary.  
 Accepting that, however, gives rise to the question as to what alternatives 
Geddes could have adopted, given that he was forced into the situation by Lloyd 
George’s refusal to allow him to move from the Admiralty.  It is just possible that in 
direct discussion with Jellicoe, he may have persuaded him to leave on a ‘mutually 
agreed’ basis and allow him the dignity of talking to his colleagues and 
communicating with the fleet openly.
86
  The disadvantage of taking this approach is 
that it would have taken more time.  Thus, Lloyd George and Geddes would have lost 
the ‘opportunity’ of the Houses of Commons not being in session and of there being 
no press coverage over the Christmas period.  However, such an approach would have 
alleviated both the political turmoil and the turmoil from within the Navy.   
 With regard to the question as to whether or not Geddes was justified in 
claiming the political support of his immediate predecessors as First Lord, the answer 
must unequivocally be that he was not.  Indeed, given the furore that resulted from 
this and his subsequent pleas to preserve his integrity, in hindsight, it must have been 
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something that Geddes himself regretted.  Irrespective of whether Carson’s memory 
was at fault over the 26 October meeting and what was said there, from the strength of 
Carson’s support for Jellicoe when he was at the Admiralty (during part of which time 
Geddes was Controller), and the strength of Carson’s reaction after the dismissal, 
Geddes must have been aware of Carson’s views on matter.  If not before, then 
certainly after the October meeting, Geddes must also have been aware of Balfour’s 
views on who was best qualified to hold the post of First Sea Lord.  
Presumably, despite this knowledge, Geddes had hoped that by providing an 
explanation to the Sea Lords on a ‘personal’ basis and in confidence rather than in his 
capacity as First Lord, his explanation would remain private; his complaint in several 
letters that confidentiality had been breached would suggest so.  However, to assume 
that on such a momentous issue the essence of the conversations would not leak or 
those involved would not seek to verify his contentious claims, was naive in the 
extreme.  Geddes and his methods were not wholly respected within the senior 
echelons of the Admiralty staff, and as indicated by his requests to leave the 
Admiralty, he was not comfortable in his role.  Thus, it can be assumed that by 
implying he had the support of Carson and Balfour, he thought he would avert any 
rebellion from the Sea Lords.
87
  Ironically, it had the opposite effect.  Initially, the Sea 
Lords had concluded that they would not resign.  It was only when they were 
informed that Carson had not supported Jellicoe’s dismissal as Geddes appears to 
have claimed, that the resignation threat was made.  In claiming the support of Carson 
and Balfour, Geddes had made a serious misjudgement.  
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 Several other issues arise from the analysis of the correspondence and 
surrounding events referred to in this chapter.  Firstly, accepting that the meeting 
between Balfour, Carson, Geddes and Lloyd George was held, on or around 26 
October 1917, the question arises as to why Jellicoe was not dismissed then rather 
than two months later?  It may have been that the opinion of Carson and Balfour 
caused Lloyd George and Geddes to procrastinate.  On the other hand, at that time, the 
press campaign against Jellicoe and the Admiralty was at its zenith.  Sacking him then 
would have laid them both open to criticism that the dismissal was the result of this 
campaign and consequently that they were mere servants of the press.  The fact that 
Geddes was particularly sensitive to public criticism, as shown by his later 
correspondence with Lloyd George, supports this contention. 
The second issue relates to the extent of Lloyd George’s influence, or indeed, 
involvement in the matter.  Geddes claimed that the decision was entirely his.  
However, this claim is misleading and unquestionably he was manipulated by Lloyd 
George, who used the mechanism of rejecting Geddes’ request to move from the 
Admiralty to seize the opportunity.  Moreover, Geddes did not have the political 
experience to deal with the aftermath of the decision.  Winton claims that the way 
Geddes outmanoeuvred the Sea Lords showed ‘the uncommon degree of political 
agility he had acquired in his short time at Whitehall’.88  However, the manner in 
which he went about replacing Jellicoe, his subsequent performance in the House of 
Commons and the extent to which he sought to rely on Lloyd George to salvage his 
integrity after the event, suggests otherwise.  This in turn leads to a sense that as well 
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as engineering the dismissal, Lloyd George, with his penchant for intrigue, also 
played a prominent, if undisclosed, role in sorting out the aftermath. 
Thirdly, having thus condemned Geddes, it is possible to have a degree of 
sympathy with his predicament.  The root cause of this stemmed from the fact that 
despite the claims made in the draft statement of 28 April 1918, there was no obvious 
or justifiable reason for dismissing Jellicoe.  That factor influenced the content and 
abruptness of the letter of dismissal, which in part may have engendered the other Sea 
Lords’ hostility towards Geddes.  Geddes would not have had to claim the support of 
his immediate predecessors in providing an explanation to the other Sea Lords; and he 
would not subsequently have been subject to the attacks in the House of Commons.  
Nevertheless, at the end of the day, Lloyd George’s intrigue had proved 
successful, and Geddes, having publicly to declare that the decision to dismiss Jellicoe 
was his alone, was rendered the scapegoat.        
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         Chapter VII  
 
 
 
           
 
For Better or For Worse 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
One approach to assessing whether Admiral Jellicoe’s dismissal was justified 
is to consider if matters at the Admiralty were better after he left than before.  The 
received position is that they were.  Not surprisingly, Jellicoe’s successor, Admiral 
Wemyss, was of that view, remarking that ‘I had not been many weeks in the First 
Sea Lord’s chair before I had the pleasure of knowing that the machine was running 
more smoothly and efficiently than before.’1  Sir Eric Geddes was of the same mind.  
In his letter to Lloyd George of 28 April 1918, he claimed that: 
As a general impression as to the working conditions in the Admiralty and the 
efficiency of the machine, I have no personal doubt whatever that the 
comparison is immensely in favour of the last four months, and this is not only 
apparent here, but in our relationship with the principal fighting commands 
afloat.
2
  
However, as mentioned, this letter was written in response to a request from Lloyd 
George to provide information in anticipation of questions being raised in the House 
of Commons as to why Jellicoe was dismissed.  Having been severely criticised 
during the Navy Estimates debate in March 1918, there was little else Geddes could 
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say if he was to justify the dismissal.  Also, within the Navy, there were certain voices 
that considered that there had been an improvement.  According to Stephen Roskill, 
‘[Admiral] Beatty found the changes to his liking, and relations between him and 
Wemyss were, at this stage, far better than his relation with Jellicoe had been.’3  It 
will be argued, however, that this may have been as much due to the consensus of 
views between Wemyss and Beatty as to the role of the Grand Fleet than as to 
Wemyss’ less demanding style.  Arthur Marder was of the view that ‘the New Order   
was overall a smashing success.’4  It must be said that this remark is not typical of 
Marder’s generally balanced approach, and it may be that this is a particular instance 
where, in his admiration for Admiral Richmond, he has relied on Richmond’s view 
without due consideration.  Richmond was highly critical of Jellicoe and what he 
perceived to be Jellicoe’s over cautious strategy.   
  Whilst superficially things may have appeared better, in reality, there was no 
significant difference in the efficiency of the Admiralty or in the way it conducted the 
war.  If anything, in terms of overall strategy, it became more defensive and confused.  
Thus, if there was no material improvement, the question must arise as to why the 
change was made in the first place as Wemyss lacked the qualifications and 
experience of his predecessor.  Indeed Wemyss, when asked to assume the role of 
First Sea Lord, apparently questioned his own ability to undertake that role, 
remarking, ‘I had some doubts as to whether I should be able successfully to grapple 
with the enormous problems that confronted the First Sea Lord.’5  Geddes, 
                                                 
3
 Roskill, Earl Beatty, 249.  
4
 Marder, FDSF, 5, 9.  On hearing of Jellicoe’s dismissal Richmond remarked, ‘One obstacle to a 
successful war is now out of the way.’ Richmond, Diary Entry, 28 December 1917, Marder, Portrait of 
an Admiral, 290.     
5
 Lady Wemyss, Lord Wester Wemyss, 366. 
 208 
nevertheless, persuaded him that he was the ‘best man’ for the job.6  The first part of 
this chapter will therefore consider whether that statement was justified.   
In seeking to counter the argument that matters improved under Wemyss, the 
second, third and fourth parts of this chapter respectively will discuss the strategy 
adopted by Geddes and Wemyss, particularly as it relates to the role of the Grand 
Fleet, the continuing war against the U-boat and operational blunders and missed 
opportunities that continued to hound the Admiralty.  The fifth part of this chapter 
will consider aspects of the naval attack on the Ostend and Zeebrugge harbours which 
took place on 22 April 1918.  As noted, although discussion of this operation might 
ordinarily have fallen under the heading of strategy, it has a particular significance 
because it is the only British naval operation throughout the war that received 
wholesale press and public acclamation.  For that reason it is addressed separately. 
 
 
Jellicoe versus Wemyss  
  
Although Jellicoe and Wemyss were both products of boyhood entry to the 
Navy through the Britannia Naval College (Wemyss followed five years after 
Jellicoe) and rose through the ranks in a period of rapid technological change, their 
background, experience and route to Flag rank was very different.  As mentioned, 
Jellicoe’s background was middle class, and although his potential was identified 
early in his career by Admiral Fisher, his progression was achieved largely on merit.  
To recap, he had excelled as a student at Britannia; he was a gunnery specialist; he 
had held senior administrative posts at the Admiralty and consequently had a deep 
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knowledge of the capabilities and weaknesses of the ships in the Navy and in the 
German navy.  He had also held senior seagoing commands in peacetime and had 
excelled commanding large fleet exercises undertaken shortly before the outbreak of 
the war.  He commanded the Grand Fleet at the start of the war and was responsible 
for bringing it to battle readiness.  He led the Grand Fleet at the Battle of Jutland, the 
only significant battle fought against the High Seas Fleet, and initiated many material 
improvements dictated by the lessons learned in the course of that battle.  It had been 
Jellicoe who, in the autumn of 1916, had persuaded Arthur Balfour of the seriousness 
of the U-boat threat and it was this warning that had resulted in Jellicoe’s move from 
the Grand Fleet to the Admiralty. 
 Wemyss was of a different ilk.  He was of the aristocracy.  His father was 
James Hay Erskine-Wemyss of Wemyss Castle in Fife and his maternal grandmother 
was the illegitimate daughter of King William IV.  He was in the same Britannia class 
as his royal cousins, the future Duke of Clarence and the future King George V.  He 
spent the first three years of his time at sea cruising the world in the corvette 
Bacchante in the company of the Royal Princes.  In 1896, he served as First 
Lieutenant on the Royal Yacht Victoria and Albert, and his promotion to Captain at 
the relatively young age of 37 came as a ‘special promotion’ after being second in 
command of the liner, Ophir, which in 1901 had conveyed Prince George on a 
dominion tour.
7
  Thus, in the words of Marder, ‘Wemyss was, at least until 1914, 
regarded as a Court sailor – an officer without exceptional ability, let alone the ability 
to conceive brilliant strategic surprises.’8  Moreover, he was not a specialist (one of 
only four First Sea Lords between 1905 and 1945 not selected from gunnery or 
torpedo officers), and although he had held shore appointments in command of the 
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Royal Naval College, Osborne, and the Royal Naval Barracks at Devonport, he had 
never held a senior Admiralty appointment.  
This is not to say Wemyss was incompetent.  At the beginning of the war, he 
commanded the 12
th
 Cruiser Squadron, with responsibility for ensuring the safe 
passage of the British Expeditionary Force to France.  He acted as second in 
command to Admiral De Roebuck in the Dardanelles Campaign of 1915, and despite 
the ignominy of that campaign’s failure, Wemyss was commended for his 
organisation and execution of the evacuation of troops from Suvla, Anzac and Cape 
Helles.  He was subsequently appointed Commander-in-Chief of the East Indies and 
Egypt station and had been destined to take command of the Navy’s Mediterranean 
operations before being summoned to the Admiralty in August 1917 to fill the newly 
created role of Deputy First Sea Lord.  He was a popular officer which he owed ‘to 
his buoyancy, charm, invariable courtesy, incomparable tact and talents for 
storytelling and mixing’, attributes that no doubt stemmed from his background.9 
  Yet despite these attributes, Wemyss’ appointment raised consternation both 
within and outside the Navy.  Admiral Madden, Jellicoe’s Chief of Staff when he 
commanded the Grand Fleet wrote, ‘I am full of fear for the future; the Grand Fleet is 
all right as Beatty is strong enough to refuse to throw it away on wild cat schemes, but 
the wider field of operations is not in such able hands.’10  As mentioned previously,  
Beatty also expressed concerns about Wemyss’ ability to run as complex an 
organisation as the Admiralty and had a ‘fear for the future’.11  From outside the 
Navy, perhaps the comment made in a journal entry by Lady Carson is the most 
telling of all: 
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Phil Neville came to luncheon; he was Adml.Wemyss flag lieut: in the 
Mediterranean so was pleased I think for him to be 1
st
 Sea Lord, but thought it 
a joke as do all the fleet.  If it was peace time it would be funny, but in war it 
is dangerous and sad.
12
  
Thus, the controversy over Jellicoe’s dismissal was compounded by the choice of his 
successor.   
 That being the case, the question then arises as to why Geddes should have 
chosen someone who palpably lacked the relevant command and administrative 
experience, particularly as Geddes’ own experience of naval matters was limited.  
Clearly Geddes, having worked with Wemyss for a period of approximately four 
months, would have had an opportunity to assess Wemyss’ capabilities and because 
of Wemyss’ more relaxed style, no doubt found him more malleable than Jellicoe.  
However, the choice of Wemyss as a potential successor was not made in December 
1917, but in July 1917, i.e., shortly after Geddes was appointed First Lord.  Thus 
again, the hand of Lloyd George appears in the affair.   
Two factors support this contention.  Firstly, given that Wemyss had served in 
the Eastern Mediterranean throughout the first half of 1917, it is unlikely that Geddes 
would have been sufficiently aware of Wemyss’ capabilities to make any 
recommendation.  However, Lloyd George was renowned for going behind the backs 
of his senior military and naval advisers and seeking information and advice from 
their juniors.  Indeed, he admits as much in his memoirs, claiming that amongst 
others, ‘Captain – now Admiral Sir Herbert – Richmond, to whom reference was 
made, was one of the able young men whom I found helpful.’13  It was during the 
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course of a meeting Richmond had with Lloyd George on 5 June 1917 that Richmond 
recommended Wemyss as a successor to Jellicoe.
14
  
The second factor stems from an intriguing entry in Lady Wemyss’ diary for 
26 July 1917, which reads ‘Marriotte arrives from England to expressly tell him 
[Wemyss] that there is an intrigue on foot to appoint him First Sea Lord in place of 
Jellicoe – it seems that it is the young Navy with whom he appears not to be very 
popular.  R [Wemyss] says that nothing in this world would induce him to accept.’15 
However, despite his wife’s remarks, Wemyss was reluctantly persuaded to forgo 
command of the Mediterranean and move to the Admiralty.
16
   
  As already noted, in July 1917, the political situation and potential disquiet 
within the Navy precluded Lloyd George from removing both Carson and Jellicoe at 
the same time.  However, these circumstances all point to a conspiracy to appoint 
Wemyss as successor to Jellicoe when the opportunity arose.  Whether the suggestion 
was formally put to Wemyss then that he should take over from Jellicoe in due course 
is impossible to determine.  However, given his reluctance to move to the Admiralty 
and to assume the role as First Sea Lord when Jellicoe was dismissed, it seems 
unlikely that he was directly involved in the conspiracy to oust Jellicoe.  He must, 
nevertheless, have been aware that Jellicoe was vulnerable and accepted the role 
knowing he was the probable replacement should Jellicoe be sacked.  
Thus, at a critical point in the war, the Prime Minister was motivated to 
replace the person who was regarded, certainly from within the Navy, as the person 
best qualified to fulfil the role of First Sea Lord by an officer who not only lacked the 
requisite command and administrative experience but had doubts about his own 
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capability of fulfilling the role.  Moreover, Lloyd George’s appointment of Wemyss 
as the potential successor to Jellicoe was made on the recommendation of a relatively 
junior officer at the Admiralty who was perceived by his fellow officers to have 
unconventional views.  In these circumstances Geddes’ comment that Wemyss was 
the ‘best man for the job’ lacks credibility.  
 
 
A Strategic Retreat 
 
If Lloyd George had thought that the appointment of Wemyss would bring 
about a change in naval strategy, he was to be disappointed.  Throughout 1917, he had 
complained about the conservative nature of the Admiralty’s approach. ‘In that year’, 
Jellicoe wrote, ‘He [Lloyd George] pressed for more offensive action on the part of 
the Navy in general and the Grand Fleet in particular, pointing out the superior Naval 
strength as possessed by us as compared to the Germans.’17  Thus, it might have been 
anticipated that dismissal of the principal advocate of that policy would have brought 
about a significant change.  It brought about some change, but arguably, it was to an 
even more conservative policy.  
 Two weeks after Jellicoe’s dismissal, Beatty wrote to the Admiralty 
concluding that: 
The correct strategy of the Grand Fleet is no longer to endeavour to bring the 
enemy to action at any cost, but rather to contain him in his bases until the 
general situation becomes more favourable to us. This does not mean that 
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action should be avoided if conditions favour us, or that our role should be 
passive and purely defensive.
18
  
Beatty based this conclusion essentially on five grounds; depletion of the Grand Fleet 
through the need for ships to cover the Scandinavian convoys; the effect of  
superiority in numbers of battleships being diminished as a consequence of ‘the 
enemy having the power of selecting the moment for inviting a Fleet action’; concern 
over the frailty of the British battle cruisers, despite a numerical superiority of nine to 
six over those of the High Seas Fleet; the inefficiency of the shell which the Grand 
Fleet was using; and the loss of its nominal compliment of destroyers for anti- 
submarine and convoy escort duties.
19
  There is not space here to analyse the validity 
of each of these reasons, but it is sufficient for the purposes of the present argument to 
say that Beatty’s conclusions were accepted by Geddes and the Admiralty Board.  
More significantly, this strategy was accepted by the War Cabinet when the matter 
came before them on 18 January 1918, albeit, according to Madden, with the 
members looking ‘very glum’ throughout the discussion.20  John Terraine perceived 
this to be ‘a moment in history: a moment of farewell to the supremacy of British sea-
power that had been taken for granted since Trafalgar’.21  Marder, on the other hand, 
argued that with available resources having been directed primarily at developing the 
convoy system through the best part of 1917, the ‘new’ strategy as regards the role of 
the Grand Fleet had in practice been in effect throughout that year.  Therefore this 
strategy was not truly radical.
22
  Nevertheless, whether the policy accepted by the War 
Cabinet represented a real change or not, it is not surprising that Jellicoe found ‘it 
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difficult to reconcile the decision thus arrived at with the views expressed by Lloyd 
George in 1917’.23   
  Two other factors are of relevance in considering whether the change of First 
Sea Lord resulted in a change of strategy.  The first relates to Beatty’s motivation for 
producing the strategy document referred to above so soon after Jellicoe’s dismissal.  
It may have been the natural outcome of Beatty’s discussions with Geddes and 
Wemyss early in January 1918, and it was merely intended as clarification or 
restatement of the role of the Grand Fleet.  However, one of the principal areas of 
tension between the Admiralty and the Grand Fleet was the redeployment of Grand 
Fleet destroyers for convoy protection.  By mid December 1917 Jellicoe was 
contemplating a reduction in size and readiness of the Grand Fleet so as to reallocate 
some of its resources to trade protection.
24
  That being the case, the question arises as 
to whether Beatty’s memorandum was an attempt to deflect further reductions in the 
size and capability of the fleet under his command, or to cover himself against the 
eventuality of being drawn into a fleet action in unfavourable circumstances.   
Certainly, it was perceived by Geddes that the new policy was ‘rendered necessary 
only by the exigencies of the present situation and should be regarded as purely a 
temporary measure because of the deficiency of destroyers’, which might point to an 
ulterior motive on the part of Beatty.
25
  However, the policy was not reversed during 
the remainder of the war.  
Furthermore, there is some irony in this situation in that Jellicoe later wrote 
that ‘I should never have accepted this view had I been at the Admiralty.’26  This view 
differed from that which he held in the early part of 1917 when contemplating the 
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introduction of the convoy system.  However, his reasoning for the change was that 
by the latter part of 1917 the Grand Fleet was considerably stronger than it had been 
at the Battle of Jutland, both numerically and in terms of material improvements 
made, particularly in reducing the battle cruisers’ vulnerability.  That he would have 
been prepared to reduce the capability of the Grand Fleet by diverting more of its 
resources to counter the U-boat threat and, at the same time, countenance a fleet 
action ‘if the opportunity should arise’ without the constraints imposed by Beatty, 
suggests he was less risk averse than either Beatty or Wemyss and Geddes.
27
  In other 
words, for all Lloyd George’s complaints about Jellicoe’s conservative strategy as to 
the role of the Grand Fleet, he appears to have replaced him with an Admiral who 
adopted an even more conservative strategy. 
The second point to consider in the context of whether Wemyss was 
committed to a different strategy than Jellicoe stems from arguments put forward by 
Nicholas Black in The British Naval Staff in the First World War.  Although the 
introduction of the convoy system had significantly reduced British merchant 
shipping losses from U-boat attack, the losses for the last quarter of 1917 still 
amounted to 783,000 tons, whilst new merchant ships coming on to the shipping 
register during the same period only amounted to 389,000 tons.
28
  Thus, 
understandably, the Admiralty’s focus was still primarily directed towards defeating 
the U-boat, to the extent that on 14 December 1917 Jellicoe wrote, ‘The shipping 
situation is now most serious and the greatest danger that we face is unquestionably 
the shortage of shipping, and for this reason some of the destroyers relieved from the 
Grand Fleet must be directed to trade protection.’29  Admirals Duff and Oliver 
concurred with this view, Duff believing that ‘so long as the submarine campaign 
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gives reasonable prospects of bringing the war to an end, and it certainly does at the 
present, it is almost inconceivable that the High Seas Fleet will come out committed 
to a decisive action.’30  Thus, Jellicoe and two of his most experienced senior 
subordinates thought it highly unlikely that the High Seas Fleet would commit to a 
fleet action.  Moreover, as argued above, it appears that Jellicoe would have been 
prepared for the Grand Fleet to fight the High Seas Fleet even with its superiority 
reduced.  
 Wemyss did not share this view.  He thought that if the German naval 
command believed that the submarine campaign was not going to be decisive, they 
would reverse their strategy, bring the High Seas Fleet out and force a fleet action.  
Further, he believed that the chance of that happening was greater than it had been at 
any time during the preceding 18 months.
31
  He then concluded that ‘so long as there 
is a chance of a general naval action being brought about, the risk of denuding the 
Grand Fleet of destroyers is one which should not be taken.’32  
  Further, Wemyss persisted with this view throughout 1918, despite the 
contrary position of the Plans Division of the Admiralty.  This division had been 
established in September 1917 as part of the reorganisation undertaken by Geddes 
shortly after his appointment as First Lord.  The intention was that the division should 
be separate and be concerned with strategic plans as distinct from day to day 
operations.  However, on at least three occasions through the first half of 1918, it 
produced memoranda questioning the strategic role of the Grand Fleet.  In February 
1918, it recommended that ‘the primary function of the Grand Fleet should be defined 
as the support of the barrage and the prevention of submarines passing out of the 
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Northern exit.’33  In March 1918, the Plans Division’s recommendations went even 
further by concluding that ‘the idea of inveigling the High Seas Fleet into a fleet 
action should be abandoned in favour of an anti-submarine blockade of the Northern 
exit.’34  Again in June 1918, the need for the Grand Fleet to have so many destroyers 
was questioned.
35
  However, based on Wemyss’ belief that the High Seas Fleet would 
come out and fight as Germany collapsed and Beatty’s strong opposition to reducing 
the capability and readiness of the Grand Fleet, none of the recommendations of the 
Plans Division in this regard were implemented, with Wemyss putting an end to the 
matter by endorsing the relevant docket with the words, ‘An interesting paper 
containing many truths, the policies proposed however cannot be implemented now.  
No further action required.’36  This adds to the irony in that these anti-submarine 
recommendations, which were rejected by Jellicoe’s successor, were advanced by the 
Plans Division, whose very creation Jellicoe only agreed to most reluctantly in the 
first place.  
 One further point can be made in the context of this discussion.  In the 
introduction to this chapter, reference was made to the fact that the received view is 
that relations between the Admiralty and Grand Fleet were better under Wemyss than 
they had been under Jellicoe.  Certainly, those with a vested interest in justifying the 
change said as much.
37
  It may have been that Wemyss’ more relaxed style in dealing 
with Beatty contributed to this view.  However, given that Wemyss, in contrast to 
                                                 
33
 Plans Division Memorandum, 11 February 1918, NA, ADM 137/2707.  As is discussed later, one of 
the principal offensive measures taken against German submarines was to lay a mine barrage from 
Orkney to the coast of Norway.  However, to be fully effective it was recognised that it should be 
patrolled by surface vessels to force the submarines to dive into the minefields, and hence the 
recommendation that Grand Fleet resources should be diverted for this purpose.  
34
 Plans Division Memorandum, Anti-Submarine Policy in the Immediate Future, 28 March 1918, NA, 
ADM 137/2708. 
35
 Joint Memorandum by the British and American Planning Sections, 13 June 1918, NA, ADM 137/ 
2709.  
36
 Wemyss Minute, 21 June 1918, NA, ADM, 137/2709; Black, British Naval Staff, 219.  
37
 Roskill, Earl Beatty, 249; Marder, FDSF, 5, 9. 
 219 
Jellicoe, accepted that the capability of the Grand Fleet should not be compromised in 
favour of anti-submarine measures, the reason for much of the tensions between the 
Admiralty and Grand Fleet disappeared, and that too must have contributed to the 
better relationship.  In other words, when Beatty had his way in retaining his 
destroyers, the relationship between the Grand Fleet and the Admiralty improved.
38
   
Whether or not the strategy that Wemyss adopted was the correct one and the 
extent to which Jellicoe would have reduced the Grand Fleet’s capability must be 
open to question.
39
  However, the mere fact that in December 1917 he was prepared to 
do so to a degree that his successor was not counters the argument that Jellicoe was 
over cautious and British Naval strategy was too defensive whilst he was First Sea 
Lord. 
 
 
Submarine Problems Continue 
 
Although losses to merchant shipping had dropped considerably through the 
latter part of 1917, they continued at an unacceptably high level during the first 
quarter of 1918.  The tonnage of British merchant shipping sunk during that period 
averaged approximately 200,000 per month, but as stated previously, on the other side 
of the equation, the output of new merchant shipping still lagged well behind the 
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losses sustained.
40
  Jellicoe, in his minute of 14 December 1917, had recognised that 
this remained the most significant threat to Britain.  Newbolt summed up the position 
eloquently in commenting that ‘the excess of losses over replacements must, in the 
end, swallow up the tonnage saved … and then the breathing space would end in 
national asphyxiation.’41  However, there was no immediate relaxation of the 
stranglehold.  It would be five months after Wemyss’ appointment before the 
replacements exceeded the losses and this fact in itself gives weight to the argument 
that, at least in terms of results alone, Wemyss proved no more effective a First Sea 
Lord than his immediate predecessor.  This may seem a harsh conclusion given that 
Wemyss was only appointed on 25 December 1917.  Nevertheless, as the following 
discussion will show, eventual success was not achieved as the result of any inspired 
strategy on the part of Wemyss or his team.  Rather, it came about as a consequence 
of the building blocks put in place by Jellicoe in the previous year.  
 As has been discussed in Chapter III, the substantial reduction in shipping 
losses from their peak in April 1917 largely resulted from the introduction of the 
convoy system.  By the end of that year, only just over half Britain’s overseas trade 
was undertaken in convoy.
42
  However, apart from the convoy system, Jellicoe left 
another legacy.  Through the course of 1917, he had ‘promoted an aggressive mining 
strategy’, initially directed at the Channel and the Heligoland Bight.43  This strategy 
had been seriously hampered at the beginning of 1917 by a shortage of effective 
mines.  However, through the initiatives of the Anti-Submarine Division, by the latter 
part of 1917 increasing numbers of an improved mine, based on a German model, 
began to be delivered.  Thus, by the end of 1917, over 20,000 mines had been laid in 
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the Dover Straits and the Heligoland Bight alone, compared to a total of just over 
6,000 mines in all minefields in home waters during the preceding two and a half 
years.
44
  Moreover, the strategy had started to prove successful, both in hampering 
German surface fleet and U-boat movements.  During the course of 1917, six U-boats 
were destroyed in the Bight minefields, and perhaps just as significantly, through that 
year and 1918,  Germany lost 28 destroyers and 70 minesweepers and patrol craft in 
that area in their attempts to keep channels clear.
45
    
However, despite these losses, the fact that the Bight minefield was close to 
German occupied ports allowed German minesweepers frequently to clear and mark 
channels through the fields.  As a consequence, at the Allied Naval Conference in 
September 1917, Jellicoe resurrected the idea, advocated in 1916 by Admiral Bacon, 
of sealing off the northern exits from the North Sea by laying a minefield from the 
Orkney Isles to the Norwegian coast.  The thought behind this proposal was that, if 
implemented and effective, in combination with the Dover Barrage, German 
submarines would be confined within the North Sea.  The scheme had originally been 
rejected because of the difficulties of laying mines in the deep waters of the North Sea 
and the scale of production that would have been necessary to supply the 100,000 
mines required.  However, the combination of the development of an ‘antenna’ mine 
in the US, the availability of production facilities there and a particular liking for the 
scheme by the US Navy had shifted the feasibility of the project.  Thus, by early 
November 1917 both the British and US Governments had agreed to proceed with the 
scheme, despite its scale and its potential cost. 
 Nevertheless, the effectiveness of the Northern Barrage has been questioned.  
The mine laying was hampered by technical difficulties. The barrage was never fully 
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completed and it probably only accounted for the destruction of 6 U-boats during the 
course of 1918.
46
  Moreover, Beatty particularly was against the minefield.  It irritated 
him as it constricted the Grand Fleet’s freedom of manoeuvre, and as stated, the need 
to provide destroyers to patrol the barrage, in his view, weakened the Grand Fleet.
47
  
On the other hand, there seems little doubt from a German perspective, that the 
barrage did create difficulties for the U-boat commanders.  In the words of the 
German Official Historian of North Sea operations, ‘The Northern Barrage made its 
presence felt.  The main reason for this is that it lay too far from the German bases, 
ruling out all minesweeping possibilities and also the provision of escorts for U-
boats.’48  
There is also no doubt that the improvements to the Dover Barrage discussed 
in Chapter IV had the desired effect of sealing the North Sea exit through the 
Channel.  Again to quote a German source, ‘towards the end of the war the U-boats 
experienced considerable difficulty in breaking through the North Sea to and from 
their operation areas west of England.  The closure of the Dover Strait had become 
more or less effective.’49  Thus, despite there being some doubt as to the effectiveness 
of the Northern Barrage, on that basis it can be said that when Wemyss assumed the 
role of First Sea Lord, he inherited from Jellicoe a comprehensive offensive plan for 
attacking the U-boat.  It was under Wemyss’ auspices that the mining strategy was 
fully implemented, but much of the work in devising the plan, organising the 
production of the required mines and mine-laying vessels and organising the logistics 
of laying the mines, was down to Jellicoe and his team.   
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Perversely, however, the effectiveness of the mining strategy helped to 
prolong the high level of merchant shipping losses.  The extensive mining undertaken 
in 1918 did not significantly increase the number of U-boats destroyed by mines (20 
in 1917 as against 22 in 1918).
50
  What it did do was force the German naval 
hierarchy to divert the principal area of attack from the Atlantic approaches and the 
south west coast of Britain to the east coast, where apart from the Scandinavian trade 
and French coal trade, merchant ships generally did not sail in convoy.
51
  It was not 
until May 1918 that the Admiralty started to implement a general convoy system on 
the east coast on a large scale.  From June onwards the number of ships convoyed 
increased substantially, so that by the end of the war virtually all shipping from the 
Humber north was undertaken in convoy.
52
  The effect was marked.  In August 1918, 
the total tonnage of  British merchant shipping sunk by submarine reduced to 
approximately 145,000 tons, and by October 1918 that figure had fallen to 
approximately 55,000 tons.
53
    
Why the Admiralty under Wemyss was so slow to implement the convoy 
system on the east coast is not evident from the sources considered.  However, it 
probably resulted from the continuing shortage of escort vessels compounded by the 
reluctance of Wemyss and Beatty to divert destroyers from the Grand Fleet.  Again, it 
is conjecture as to whether the Admiralty under Jellicoe would have reacted any 
quicker, but the sense taken from his 14 December minute, and the priority he gave to 
the U-boat problem in ordering Bacon to illuminate the Dover Barrage at the risk of 
provoking a surface attack, suggests that Jellicoe may well have done. 
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There is one other factor that may have contributed to the length of time taken 
finally to defeat the U-boat.  Although the convoy system proved successful, there 
remained within the Admiralty a perception that the convoy was purely a defensive 
measure and that alone would not defeat the U-boat.  The Plans Division paper of 11 
February 1918 had concluded that ‘attempts to defeat the submarine campaign mainly 
on a basis of local trade protection have been a failure, in the sense that if the sinkings 
are not permanently reduced during 1918, the war will probably have an 
unsatisfactory ending.’54  Wemyss was certainly of this view, remarking that ‘to 
counter the submarine menace Defence only had been used.  To me it appeared 
absolutely necessary that the tables must be turned and we must hunt the enemy 
submarines instead of them hunting us.’55  These may have been Wemyss’ thoughts at 
the time, but the plans to form concentrated hunting groups of destroyers to 
implement this strategy were never executed, because, as Nicholas Black argues, ‘in 
the end, the senior members of the Staff chose not to reduce the readiness of the 
Grand Fleet in the face of opposition from Beatty, particularly as their decision 
coincided with the launch of the German Spring Offensive.’56  Thus, on the one hand, 
Plans Division, in theory supported by Wemyss, was advocating one strategy, and the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet dictating another, in practice supported by 
Wemyss.  Further, it is open to argument that this confusion obscured the fact that it 
was the convoy system that remained the principal means of reducing merchant 
shipping losses, despite Wemyss’ earlier acknowledgement that ‘the convoy has 
proved so eminently successful.’57  Again, it is impossible to be categorical as to 
whether this confusion in strategy would have been perpetuated under Jellicoe.  What 
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it does show however, is a lack of clarity of thought on Wemyss’ part.  It also shows 
that, at least in certain parts of the Admiralty, there remained a legacy of ambivalence 
to the convoy system after Jellicoe’s dismissal that Wemyss did nothing to dispel.     
 
 
Blunders and Missed Opportunities 
 
 The Admiralty was not only criticised for its cautious strategy during the 
Jellicoe era.  It was also criticised for what may be described as operational blunders 
and missed opportunities.  Again therefore, it can be argued that if some reduction in 
such incidents resulted from the change of First Sea Lord, there would have been 
some justification for dismissing Jellicoe, whether or not the Admiralty was directly 
responsible.  However, as will be seen from the following discussion of three 
incidents, blunders continued and opportunities continued to be missed.  
The first of these was the attack on 14 February 1918 by a flotilla of German 
destroyers on the vessels patrolling the Dover Barrage.  Reference has already been 
made to this in Chapter IV.  Briefly the narrative is that, in response to the increasing 
difficulty U-boats had encountered in using the English Channel as the route to the 
Western approaches, seven German destroyers sailed into the Channel unnoticed and 
attacked the barrage patrol boats. As noted, eight boats were sunk and a further seven 
badly damaged. Eighty-nine officers and men were killed or posted as missing.
58
  The 
raid lasted over two hours.  Through a combination of poor signalling, doubt as to the 
cause of gunfire, the German destroyers not being recognised as such despite not 
answering recognition signals correctly and general confusion, the destroyers escaped 
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unscathed.  In the words of Marder, ‘The denouement is almost incredible, even when 
one allows for the fact that a patrol maintained for months on end without an 
encounter tends to be less alert than it should be.’59  Admiral Keyes, then in command 
of the Dover Patrol, was ‘consumed with cold fury against those whose failure had let 
the patrol down so badly’.60  However, it must be open to question as to who was to 
blame for this.  Keyes subsequently ordered a Court of Enquiry, the outcome being 
that three officers commanding British patrolling destroyers and a monitor were 
relieved of their command.   
This conclusion was harsh.  In the first place, Keyes himself admitted that the 
trawlers that burned the illumination flares were vulnerable and stated that ‘it is most 
doubtful whether any system of reporting, or any distribution of forces could have 
prevented the Germans from entering or leaving the Straits if they were determined to 
do so.’61  Secondly, the Court of Enquiry criticised the inadequacy of the signalling 
arrangements in place to alert to the fact that an enemy raid was underway.  Keyes 
sought to abrogate responsibility by claiming that these arrangements had been in 
place when he assumed command of the Dover Patrol and he had not altered them.  
However, as it was Keyes who was responsible for implementing the new 
illumination and patrol arrangements after he assumed command, it must be open to 
argument that he ought also to have reviewed the communication and signalling 
arrangements, particularly as he claimed to have anticipated that the increased enemy 
submarine losses sustained as a result of the improved barrage ‘would provoke 
reprisals before too long’.62  Thus, Keyes should have shouldered at least part of the 
responsibility for the debacle. 
                                                 
59
 Marder, FDSF, 5, 43. 
60
 Keyes, Naval Memoirs, II, 175. 
61
 Newbolt, Official History, V, 218. 
62
 Keyes, Naval Memoirs, II, 174. 
 227 
Would the German raid have been so successful had Bacon remained in 
command?  Jellicoe thought not.  As stated previously, he believed that the heavy 
losses sustained ‘were due to the system of patrols adopted by Keyes against the 
advice of Bacon’.63  Nonetheless, that judgement would also seem harsh given that 
Jellicoe had overridden Bacon’s arguments and ordered that Keyes’ proposals be 
implemented in the interests of giving priority to stopping U-boats using the Channel.    
Irrespective of this, however, what the enemy raid and its aftermath 
established was that Wemyss’ dismissal of Bacon and the appointment of Keyes was 
not the panacea for any operational problems that existed within the Dover Patrol that 
some expected.  To Wemyss the raid was just ‘one of the inevitable incidents of 
war’.64  
The second example of an operational blunder that occurred after Jellicoe’s 
dismissal concerns two German ships, the battle cruiser, Goeben and the cruiser 
Breslau, which were the Admiralty’s greatest nemesis of the War.  On 22 January 
1918 an article appeared in The Times which claimed:  
In spite of the ignominious nature of their career, no two warships have had 
such an important effect upon the war … The story of their escape from 
Messina represents one of the greatest of our war blunders … a blunder, a pail 
of whitewash and rigid secrecy – these are the three main factors in the 
Goeben case, and the example thus unfortunately set has been copied far too 
often.  The mistake made outside the Straits of Messina led straight to the 
splendid failure at Gallipoli and to the siege of Kut.  Very rarely in war has a 
single error had more far reaching consequences. 
65
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 It is doubtful if this article correctly assessed the impact of the escape of the two 
ships to the Dardanelles as Turkey had signed an alliance with Germany on the 3 
August 1914, i.e., the day before Britain declared war on Germany and a week before 
the Goeben and Breslau reached the Dardanelles.  Nevertheless, even if the escape of 
the two ships was not the direct cause of Turkey’s alliance with Germany, it certainly 
facilitated Germany’s objective in this respect.  What is not open to doubt is that the 
two ships escaped the clutches of the Navy through the ‘listless fumbling of two 
British admirals’ combined with ineptness on the part of both the Admiralty and the 
Foreign Office.
66
  Three and a half years later, in the third week of Wemyss’ tenure as 
First Sea Lord, the blunder was repeated. 
  Briefly, the circumstances were as follows.  Throughout the war both the 
Goeben and the Breslau had sailed under the Turkish flag and their operations had 
been limited to the Black Sea in opposition to the Russian Black Sea fleet.  However, 
with hostilities there ending on 15 December 1917 following the armistice between 
Germany and Russia, the German Admiral, then commanding the Turkish squadron, 
planned a sortie into the Dardanelles to destroy allied patrol craft.  Admiral 
Fremantle, in command of the Aegean Squadron, had anticipated that the Goeben and 
the Breslau might attempt a break out with a view either to joining with the Austrian 
fleet in the Adriatic, raiding allied trade routes in the Mediterranean, or attacking the 
allied bases in Egypt.
67
  Despite the third of these options being considered to be ‘a 
desperate venture which could only end in the destruction of the enemy’, it was the 
last option that the German commander, Admiral von Rebeur-Paschitz, selected and, 
on 19 January 1918, the Goeben, in company with the Breslau, set sail with that 
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objective in mind.
68
  However, in the interests of achieving surprise he failed to 
reconnoitre the Allied minefields and the following day, having bombarded one 
Allied shore station and sunk two British monitors, both the Goeben and the Breslau 
hit mines.  As a consequence, the Breslau sank.  The Goeben was severely damaged 
and forced to abandon her sortie and turn for home.  However, sailing through the 
Dardanelles, she ran aground and remained stuck fast on a sandbank for six days.  
Frequent bombing attacks from British aircraft proved ineffective and ultimately she 
was towed off the sand bank and returned to port.  
Wemyss was not pleased, remarking that, ‘The Goeben getting away is 
perfectly damnable and has considerably upset me, since we at the Admiralty were 
under the happy delusion that there were sufficient brains and sufficient means out 
there to prevent it: of the latter there were; of the former apparently not.’69  Whether 
there were ‘sufficient means’ is debatable, as the Aegean squadron was well 
dispersed.  Moreover, the most powerful ships that the Navy had in the vicinity were 
two pre-dreadnought battleships, which, even if they had been ordered to sail together 
as soon the first report of Goeben’s sortie had been received, would not have matched 
her speed or firepower.  
However, Wemyss’ comment to the effect that there were insufficient brains 
‘out there’ to deal with the situation seems fully justified.  Firstly, Admiral Hayes-
Sadler, who had replaced Fremantle on 12 January 1918, had used one of the two 
battleships to sail to Salonika, contrary to a predetermined understanding that they 
should be kept together; one pre-dreadnought battleship would have been no match at 
all for the Goeben.  More importantly, after the Goeben had run aground, Hayes-
Sadler procrastinated about sending either of two available submarines to attack the 
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Goeben whilst aground, despite the entreaties of the submarine commanders.  It was 
not until the Admiral in command of the Mediterranean arrived on the scene that the 
decision was taken to make a submarine attack, by which time the Goeben had been 
re-floated and returned to harbour. 
It may be said that this was purely an operational faux pas and not the fault of 
the Admiralty.  Also, the consequences of the Goeben’s escape on the second 
occasion was far less damaging to the war effort than on the first, as it transpired that 
the damage caused to the Goeben had put it out of action for the remainder of the war.  
Furthermore, on the second occasion the Breslau had been sunk.  On the other hand, it 
can be argued that, given Russia’s withdrawal from the war and the fact that an 
attempted breakout by the Goeben had been anticipated by Admiral Fremantle, 
Wemyss was at fault for recalling the highly regarded Fremantle to the Admiralty on 
12 January 1918 and leaving the Aegean Squadron in command of Hayes-Sadler, 
reputed to be no more than ‘a good average officer of no outstanding qualities’ in 
command.
70
  The fact that the unfortunate Hayes-Sadler was relieved of his command 
immediately following the incident is indicative of the fact that he should not have 
been left in command in the first place.  
The third incident that falls for discussion in the context of whether matters 
improved after Wemyss’ appointment may be described as more of a missed 
opportunity than a blunder.   Since October 1916, the German High Seas Fleet had not 
made one major sortie beyond the Heligoland Bight.  Despite this, Beatty in particular 
feared another sortie, being convinced that ‘the Scandinavian supporting system was 
wrong … and the importance of it was not sufficient to justify the possibility of strong 
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enemy forces effecting a surprise and inflicting a defeat on the supporting force.’71  In 
this expectation, he was proved right.  Admiral Scheer, commanding the High Seas 
Fleet, had gleaned from intelligence reports that as a consequence of the German 
spring land offensive, the Navy had strengthened its resources in the Channel in 
support of the increased demands on troop and material transportation.  Scheer had 
also gleaned from U-boat intelligence that, following the successful attacks on the 
Scandinavian convoys in October and December 1917, the level of protection for 
these convoys had been improved to the extent that larger convoys protected by 
battleships, cruisers and destroyers had become the norm.  Consequently, Scheer 
concluded,  ‘A successful attack on such a convoy would not only result in the sinking 
of much tonnage, but would be a great military success, and would bring welcome 
relief to the U-boats operating in the Channel and round England, for it would force 
the English to send more warships to northern waters.’72  Thus, on 23 April 1918, 
Scheer, with all available units of the High Seas Fleet under his command, sailed for 
the Norwegian coast with Admiral Hipper and his scouting groups of battle cruisers 
and cruisers leading the search.   
However, the sortie achieved nothing.  Firstly, Scheer’s intelligence was 
wrong.  The convoy in question had sailed two days before the date anticipated by 
Scheer’s sources, and by the time Hipper and his scouting group arrived at the 
planned intercept point, the convoy had long since passed.  Further, Scheer’s 
intelligence sources had made another error that could have proved disastrous.  They 
had failed to report that on 12 April 1918, the Grand Fleet had moved its base south 
from Scapa Flow to Rosyth in the Firth of Forth.  Rosyth was no nearer the planned 
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point of intercept of the High Seas Fleet and the convoy, but sailing from Rosyth 
made it easier for the Grand Fleet to intercept the High Seas Fleet returning to base.  
 In the event, Scheer was lucky.  By the time the Admiralty had realised that 
the High Seas Fleet was at sea and ordered Beatty to sail, it was too late.  It appears 
that returning to base on 24 April, Scheer had crossed ahead of Beatty’s course with 
Beatty some 150 miles away.  
 Again, the issue in the context of the current argument is whether the 
Admiralty was at fault in not ordering the Grand Fleet to sail earlier.  The German 
Fleet’s signal security had been improved.  All orders to the Fleet were given in 
writing rather than over the wireless and, in this particular instance, strict radio silence 
had been imposed.  Thus, it was not until the battle cruiser Moltke suffered 
mechanical problems, necessitating wireless exchanges between Hipper and Scheer 
early in the morning of 24 April 1918, that British Naval Intelligence had a definite 
indication that the High Seas Fleet was at sea.  Further, the High Seas Fleet had made 
changes to its wireless coding sequences which meant that the cryptanalysts in the 
Naval Intelligence Division were taking longer to decipher messages.  Consequently, 
they had not realised that the operation had been planned and in these circumstance it 
is arguable that no blame should attach to the Admiralty.   
On the other hand, from the enquiry that followed, it was established that 
although it was not possible to decode the intercepted signals, there was sufficient 
signal traffic to suggest that an important operation was in progress.  Further, around 
midnight on 23 April, messages ordering Zeppelin airship reconnaissance had been 
intercepted.  This should have indicated that an attack was being contemplated, and 
indeed on the basis of that information the Harwich force, but not the Grand Fleet, 
was ordered to raise steam.  As Patrick Beesly wrote, even if ‘there were no firm 
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indications that the Hochseeflotte was on the move, or if it was, in what direction … 
surely the Grand Fleet should have been brought to the same state of readiness as the 
Harwich Force’.73  In the event, the Grand Fleet was not ordered to sea until 10.47 am 
on 24 April 1918. 
  However, it was not just the Admiralty that was at fault.  Recognising the 
difficulty in anticipating German naval operations in the North Sea, the Admiralty had 
stationed four submarines around the western perimeter of the Heligoland Bight to 
report on and attack any German shipping.  One of them, J 6, actually sighted the 
leading destroyers and cruisers of the High Seas Fleet at approximately 8 pm on       
23 April.  Mistaking these ships for British ships, the commander failed to report this 
sighting and even, ‘the sighting of five battle cruisers escorted by destroyers about 
half an hour later, followed soon after by battleships, the van of the battle fleet, 
headed in a northerly direction, told J 6  nothing.’74  Beatty was damning, writing that 
‘it was incredibly stupid and indeed heartbreaking’ and certainly, on the face of it, 
there would seem to be merit in the historian Beesly’s argument that there ‘can really 
be no charitable excuse for this failure’.75  Nevertheless, three points can be made in 
mitigation of the maligned submarine commander.  Firstly, visibility was apparently 
poor at the time.  Secondly, it appears that the submarine commander had been 
advised that British heavy ships would be operating in his patrol area and he had 
mistaken the German ships for British ships.
76
  Thirdly, there must be some question 
over the efficacy of the briefing by senior officers.  As one naval commentator 
remarked: 
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It is easy to see now what a grave neglect of duty this was; but it is not so easy 
to judge to what extent it was the personal fault of the Captain of J 6, and how 
much may be attributed to the Higher Command failing to make it quite clear 
to subordinates – junior flag officers and captains of detached ships – what 
was required of them.
77
  
Ultimately, it is doubtful if J 6’s failure to report would have made a difference.  One 
analysis suggests that for Beatty to have intercepted Scheer in daylight hours on 24 
April 1918, the Grand fleet would have had to have left Rosyth no later than midnight 
of 23 April, at which time there was thick fog in the Firth of Forth.  Thus, even if the 
commander of J 6 had reported his sighting of the heavy ships and the Admiralty had 
reacted immediately, it is unlikely that Beatty would have been in time to make the 
intercept.   
Nevertheless, Beatty was bitter, remarking that ‘we have just returned once 
again disappointed.  It promised well but as on many other occasions was doomed to 
disappointment.’78  His attitude is not surprising.  Prior to this incident, the High Seas 
Fleet had ventured out four times in the course of over three and a half years of war in 
circumstances where the Grand Fleet had an opportunity to inflict major damage on it.  
On only two occasions was contact made between the main forces, and in terms of 
damage caused, neither of these two engagements resulted in a satisfactory outcome 
for the Navy.
79
  On each occasion the failure was caused in part by 
miscommunication between the Admiralty and the Grand Fleet, miscommunication 
amongst those in command afloat, or a combination of both.  The same conclusion 
can be drawn in respect of the missed opportunity described above.  The Admiralty 
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failed to pick up that the High Seas Fleet was at sea, its sailing orders to Beatty were 
too late, and a commander afloat, whether through his own stupidity or poor briefing, 
failed to communicate with the Admiralty as he should have done.  Thus, it can be 
argued that opportunities to bring the High Seas Fleet to battle were as likely to be 
missed and miscommunication between the Admiralty and the Grand Fleet was just as 
likely to happen under Wemyss as under any of his predecessors at the Admiralty.   
 
 
Zeebrugge and Ostend 
 
Whilst Scheer was patrolling the North Sea in search of a Scandinavian 
convoy, a specially constituted naval force ‘hurled itself at the defences of the Belgian 
coast in a desperate endeavour to block the submarine bases at Ostend and 
Zeebrugge’.80  In stark contrast to the negative comments that the Admiralty attracted 
whilst Jellicoe held the post of First Sea Lord, the press comment following the raid 
was little short of rapturous.  The Observer thought that the raid ‘was magnificent and 
the soul of war’.81  The Times concluded that ‘no meed of praise can be too high for 
those who skilfully initiated and developed the plan or those who with dauntless 
courage carried it to execution.’82  Jellicoe’s nemesis, the Daily Mail, proclaimed that 
‘our High Command to-day believes in using our sea-power to strike and not merely 
to fend off blows’, this last remark no doubt being an obtuse reference to the 
perceived negative strategy of the previous incumbents at the Admiralty.
83
   
Politicians, too, were impressed.  Churchill thought that the raid had given the Navy 
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back ‘the panache it lost at Jutland’ and Lloyd George congratulated the Admiralty 
‘most heartily’ upon an achievement that ‘was worthy of the greatest traditions of the 
British Navy, both in conception and execution’.84  Moreover, Admiral Keyes, who 
commanded the raid, was knighted for his part in it.  Prima facie, then, it appeared 
that the Navy under Wemyss had scored the magnificent success it had failed achieve 
under Jellicoe. 
However, two significant issues arise in the context of determining if this 
accolade was warranted.  Firstly, the raid was not as successful as claimed by the 
press, the politicians or the Navy itself.  In fact, in many respects it was a fiasco.  The 
primary objective of the raid had been to block the harbours at Zeebrugge and Ostend 
and prevent Bruges, with its linking canals, from being used by the German navy as 
an advanced submarine and destroyer base.  Bruges had the advantage of being some 
300 miles closer to Dover than the German North Sea ports.  If the two harbours 
could be blocked the German submarine campaign would be seriously disrupted.
85
  
The plan was to sink three old cruisers in the mouth of the Zeebrugge canal and two 
in the mouth of the Ostend canal.  At the same time a diversionary attack was to be 
made by Royal Marines and seamen from the Naval Brigade against the Zeebrugge 
harbour mole, with the intent of diverting German defensive fire from the block ships 
entering the harbours.   
So, on 22 April 1918, 165 vessels of various sizes and types, accompanied by 
82 officers and 1698 seamen and marines, set sail for the two ports.
86
  In a number of 
respects, the raid went wrong.  The ship carrying the majority of the seamen and 
marines for the diversionary attack on the Zeebrugge harbour mole docked in the 
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wrong position, leaving the shore parties badly exposed to enemy fire.  Of the three 
block ships destined for the Zeebrugge harbour, two were sunk, more or less in the 
correct position, but due to a marker buoy having been moved, the two block ships 
destined for Ostend missed the harbour completely, ran aground on the beach and 
were blown up there.
87
  In terms of men and materials, the cost was high; 170 men 
were killed, 400 were wounded and 45 posted as missing; an attrition rate of over 30 
percent. 
88
  Moreover despite the accolade, the objectives were not met.  Ostend was 
never blocked; Zeebrugge only partially.  Aerial photographs taken after the raid 
seemed to confirm that large destroyers were bottled up in Bruges for some weeks 
after the raid and until June 1918, submarines could be seen outside their shelters, 
suggesting that the shelters were full.  It was perhaps this that led Keyes to believe 
that the raid had been successful.  The Germans claimed the contrary.  Scheer wrote, 
‘It was found possible for the U-boats to get round the obstruction, so that connection 
between the harbour at Zeebrugge and the shipyard at Bruges was never interrupted 
even for a day.’89  The Admiralty also knew that the raid had failed.  Admiral Sir 
William James, at the time director of ‘Room 40’ of the Naval Intelligence Division, 
later wrote, ‘At the Admiralty we knew five hours after the attempt from an 
intercepted signal that the canal had not been blocked, but no good purpose would be 
served by publishing this.’90  Hence, the public spin was maintained.   
 The second point to make in the context of this argument is that despite the 
accolades going to Wemyss and Keyes, the raid had been initiated and approved by 
Jellicoe prior to his dismissal.  The possibility of carrying out a blocking operation 
against the enemy occupied channel ports had been contemplated as early as the 
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autumn of 1914, and the idea resurrected but rejected from time to time throughout 
the war.  Specifically, in May 1917, Commodore Tyrwhitt, in command of the 
Harwich Force, had proposed a highly ambitious amphibious operation that entailed 
attacking the harbour mole at Zeebrugge, then occupying the town so that it could be 
used for a forward base for a possible army advance on Antwerp.  This plan was 
opposed, principally by Admiral Bacon, firstly on the grounds that it had little 
prospect of success, and secondly, on the basis that it was essential to keep the 
Belgian ports clear to accommodate the large scale amphibious landing then being 
planned in conjunction with the imminent land offensive at Ypres.  However, when it 
became apparent that the land offensive had stalled in the mud of Passchendaele and 
the objective of reaching the channel ports would not be met, in September 1917 
Jellicoe resurrected the idea of carrying out a naval operation to block the Zeebrugge 
and Ostend harbours and directed Keyes, then Director of the Admiralty Plans 
Division, to examine the feasibility of such an operation.  Bacon, who had been 
closely involved with General Haig and his staff in planning the original amphibious 
operation, had always been against a mere blocking scheme.  He believed that ‘a 
blocking operation was a farce, so far as sealing the port against the egress of 
destroyers and submarines was concerned’ on the grounds that ‘any blocking 
operation must be ineffective unless the rise of the tide above low water is appreciably 
less than the draught of water of the vessels which it is intended to block in or out.’91  
According to Jellicoe, the rise and fall of the tide at Zeebrugge was about 13 feet and 
at Ostend 14 feet for about half the days in any month.
92
  It would therefore have been 
relatively easy for the Germans to cut a passage through the block ships by cutting off 
a portion their superstructure sufficient for both destroyers and submarines to pass 
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through for a few hours either side of high water.  Bacon therefore proposed an 
alternative plan of attacking the Zeebrugge harbour mole and bombarding the lock 
gates.  Jellicoe compromised.  On 4 December 1917, he approved a plan that 
combined Bacon’s idea of an attack on the harbour mole with Keyes’ idea of 
attempting to block the harbours.  It was, however, a plan he approved in the 
knowledge that blocking the harbours, even if successful in the first instance, ‘would 
only be temporary, but that it would undoubtedly be a source of considerable 
inconvenience’.  At the same time, he acknowledged that ‘the moral effect alone of 
such an operation would be of great value.’ 93  From that and the length of time that 
elapsed between initiating preparation of the plan and its eventual approval, it would 
seem that this approval was given with some degree of reluctance.  Nevertheless, it 
was this plan that was, in essence, subsequently adopted by Wemyss and executed by 
Keyes as Bacon’s successor, albeit with modifications in detail, particularly as to the 
method of disembarkation of the troops attacking the harbour mole.   
Bacon, in The Concise Story of the Dover Patrol, was critical of the detail of 
the plan finally adopted by Keyes, particularly as to the type of ship used for the 
attack on the mole, the method of docking and disembarkation and the size of ships 
used to attack the mole gun batteries.
94
  The points he made have merit, although 
given the lack of experience within the Navy of undertaking an operation of this 
nature with the conditions, types of vessels and defensive armoury then prevailing, 
whether the raid would have fared better if his plan had been adopted in full or if 
Bacon had been in command, must be open to speculation.
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Keyes, on the other hand, never acknowledged that the raid was unsuccessful.     
The Official History, not published until 1931, contained the first public admission as 
to the true effect of the raid:  
 Previous to the operation about two submarines were entering or leaving the 
Flanders bases every day; during the week after the operation, this figure was 
maintained … In May there were fifty-six entries and exits, so that the average 
passage of nearly two passages a day was maintained during the five weeks 
immediately subsequent to the operation.
95
 
Yet in his autobiography published four years later, Keyes still maintained that:  
Week after week our aerial photographs of Bruges clearly showed large 
destroyers lying in Bruges basin and in the canal system … Until the middle of 
June large submarines could also be distinguished in the open, so we were 
justified in supposing that the huge submarine shelters were occupied by as 
many submarines as they could hold.
96
  
Moreover, in Keyes’s authorised biography, its author claimed, ‘The Zeebrugge Canal 
was to be useless to the enemy for many critical weeks, and for the most of that period 
forty German destroyers and submarines … could not take part in the war.’97  Marder 
suggests on evidence from Admiral James that the biographer had been subject to 
‘pressure’ from the ‘redoubtable Lady Keyes who never ceased extolling and 
magnifying her husband’s achievements’.98  This may be understandable but, if 
correct, would suggest that Lady Keyes was as blind to the facts as her husband. 
            Why Keyes was so adamant is more difficult to understand.  It is unlikely that 
he was concerned to justify the horrendous losses in that he appears to have accepted 
                                                 
95
 Newbolt, Official History, V, 274.  
96
 Keyes, Naval Memoirs, II, 319. 
97
 Quoted, Marder, FDSF, 5, 63. 
98
 Ibid, 64. 
 241 
this possibility at the outset, writing, ‘I feel very strongly that we shall not be asking 
the personnel engaged to take any greater risks than the infantry and tank personnel 
are subjected to, on every occasion on which an attack is delivered on shore’, an 
approach that does not necessarily warrant commendation given the inordinate 
casualties suffered by the land armies.
99
  It may just have been pride that prevented 
him acknowledging the veracity of Bacon’s comments.    
 When reading detailed accounts of the operation, what cannot be doubted is 
the courage of those involved, witness the fact that eleven Victoria Crosses were 
awarded for bravery.  Most historical commentators believed that despite the actual 
outcome, the raid had been justified.  Marder was of the view that ‘the psychological 
effect was considerable.’100  More recently, David Ramsay argued that:  
The Zeebrugge operation was a massive boost for morale both in the Navy, 
where the inactivity in the Grand Fleet enforced by the HSF’s [High Seas 
Fleet’s] consistent avoidance of offensive action had inevitably engendered a 
sense of frustration, and in the Army, who had experienced the costly 
stalemate at Passchendaele, and the hammer blow of the March offensive.  
The press was ecstatic, hailing the operation … as a rebirth of the offensive 
spirit of Nelson and Drake.
101
  
Jellicoe’s view was clearly in accord with that of Ramsay in that he recognised the 
need for demonstrating the Navy’s offensive spirit.  In approving the raid, he believed 
that strategically no long term advantage would stem from it, and in this he was also 
proved to be correct.  All the accolades following the operation went to Wemyss and 
Keyes and there can be no doubting Keyes’ tenacity in executing the raid.  However, 
in the accolade, what was forgotten was that the operation had been initiated and 
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approved by Jellicoe and much of the initial planning undertaken by Bacon.  If the 
operation had been initiated by Wemyss, then it could have been argued that this 
exemplified a more ‘offensive spirit’ on the part of the Admiralty after Jellicoe’s 
dismissal.  However, that was not the case.    
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The view that the Admiralty under Admiral Wemyss was more effective and 
less prone to making operational blunders than under Admiral Jellicoe appears to be 
based on the opinions of those with a vested interest in claiming that such was the 
case, notably, Lloyd George and Geddes, who had to defend their position publicly 
before Parliament in the Naval Estimates debate of March 1918.  This position has 
been perpetuated as a consequence of their being unable to provide a justifiable 
reason for dismissing Jellicoe.  Moreover, this position appears to have been accepted 
by a number of naval historians at face value from the biographies of Lloyd George 
and Geddes, without comparing specific aspects of the work of the Admiralty under 
the respective regimes of Jellicoe and Wemyss.  Making that comparison places a 
different perspective on the claims of Lloyd George and Geddes.  
 The relationship between the Admiralty and Beatty may well have improved 
under Wemyss, partly as consequence of Wemyss’ more relaxed style of command.  
However, it is evident that Wemyss was less prepared than Jellicoe to divert resources 
from the Grand Fleet to strengthen anti-submarine and trade protection measures.  
That also would have reduced any friction between the Admiralty and the Grand 
Fleet.  Further, there is no evidence to suggest that the relationship between the 
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Admiralty and the Grand Fleet was unworkable during Jellicoe’s tenure.  Indeed, the 
difference of opinion between Geddes and Jellicoe regarding the inquiry into the 
destruction of the Scandinavian convoy in December 1917 is an example of Jellicoe’s 
support for Beatty and his commanders.  
  In terms of the Grand Fleet strategy, Lloyd George persistently complained 
that Jellicoe’s approach was too conservative.  Two reputable naval historians have 
opposing views on the naval strategy that Geddes and Beatty proposed and was 
accepted by the War Cabinet shortly after Jellicoe’s dismissal.  John Terraine 
concluded that this strategy was ‘radical’ and denoted the end of British sea power.  
Arthur Marder, on the other hand, thought that there had been no change to the 
strategy that had, perforce, because of the U-boat threat, been followed by the 
Admiralty under Jellicoe.  In a sense, this difference of opinion is immaterial in the 
context of the current argument as at best, the old strategy was maintained.  Jellicoe’s 
dismissal did not bring about the more offensive strategy that Lloyd George craved.  
 The policy of maintaining the Grand Fleet at maximum strength also had an 
impact on the efforts to contain the U-boat threat.  It was at least part of the cause of 
the delay in introducing the convoy system to east coast merchant shipping and 
although Wemyss appeared to agree with the Admiralty Plans division to set up 
submarine ‘hunting groups’, these groups were never established.  As mentioned, it 
may be speculative to suggest that merchant shipping losses would have reduced more 
quickly had Jellicoe remained in office.  Nevertheless, from the remarks that Jellicoe 
made about being prepared to divert resources from the Grand Fleet to add to the 
resources available to counter the U-boat campaign, it was certainly a strong 
possibility that they would have done.    
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 It has also been established that blunders continued to be made and 
opportunities continued to be missed.  It can be argued that incidents of this nature 
were inevitable in the course of war.  On the other hand, the Admiralty certainly were 
partly at fault in the escape of the Goeben and in the missed opportunity to attack the 
High Seas Fleet on 24 April 1918.  The weakness of local command was the principal 
issue in the former case.  It was the Admiralty’s responsibility to ensure there was a 
capable officer in command.  In the latter case, the opportunity was missed due to a 
combination of misread intelligence and the late issue of sailing instructions to Beatty.   
As to the attack on the Channel barrage patrol boats, part of the confusion 
resulted from the lack of proper signalling and communication arrangements and, 
therefore, the fault lay at a local operational level.  However, it can be argued that 
Keyes, whom Wemyss had appointed in place of Bacon in command of the Dover 
Patrol, ought to have ensured appropriate signalling and recognition procedures were 
in place.  Bacon had predicted the destroyer attack and had resisted Keyes’ proposal 
for illumination of the barrage by the patrol vessels on the grounds that it made them 
more vulnerable to attack.  That is not to say that the attack of 14 February would 
have been any less successful had Bacon remained in command.  However, what it 
does say, in the context of the current discussion, is that Jellicoe’s support for Bacon 
during the controversy over the Dover barrage was not misplaced and Wemyss’ 
choice of replacement commander was far from infallible. 
 Ostensibly, the attack on Zeebrugge and Ostend in April 1918 rekindled the 
‘Nelson spirit’ and resulted in much kudos for both the Admiralty and Keyes, who 
commanded the attack.  Much of this accolade stemmed from the fact that it took 
place at the same time as the German spring land offensive.  In the words of Newbolt, 
‘The blocking operations were executed during weeks of great national anxiety, for it 
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was during those weeks that the British armies … were yielding before an onslaught 
that seemed irresistible.’102  In other words, when the armies were in retreat on the 
Western Front, the attack on Zeebrugge and Ostend displayed an offensive approach 
which the Admiralty had often been accused of lacking.  However, the raid was not 
successful in achieving the strategic objective of restricting the passage of German 
submarines and destroyers from the harbour at Bruges.  The Admiralty were aware of 
this within hours, yet failed to acknowledge this publicly - understandably, perhaps, 
given the persistent press criticism that it had sustained in the past, the ‘great national 
anxiety’ prevalent at the time and the particularly high casualty count.  However, it 
was Bacon, not Keyes, who prepared the initial plans for the raid, and it was Jellicoe, 
not Wemyss, who resurrected and approved the plan following the failure of the 
Flanders military offensive in the autumn of 1917.  Thus, at least part of accolade 
should have been attributed to Bacon and Jellicoe.  Moreover, the fact that Jellicoe 
was prepared to approve the raid, recognising that the strategic gain would, at best, be 
only temporary and, in reality, would only benefit morale, dispels the perception that 
Jellicoe’s mindset was wholly defensive.   
 Thus, if the foregoing is taken in combination, there is no substance in the 
claim that the Admiralty proved to be a more effective organisation under Wemyss 
than it was under Jellicoe.  To an extent, this been recognised by Nicholas Black, who 
remarked, ‘There was a clear progression from the work that the Naval Staff was 
doing under Jellicoe and that which was done under Wemyss.  To that extent, the 
events of Christmas Eve 1917, when Jellicoe was summarily sacked, made little real 
difference.’103   
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The legacy left by Jellicoe on the work that had been undertaken on the 
northern mine barrage is an example of this ‘progression’.  However, Black’s 
argument can be taken a stage further.  Taking into consideration the delay in 
introducing the east coast convoys, the restated Grand Fleet strategy, and indeed the 
confusion caused by the contradictory strategies of the Plans Division and the 
Operations Division, there is a powerful argument to the effect that under Wemyss, 
the Admiralty took a backward step.  That being the case, the contention of Lloyd 
George, Geddes and Wemyss himself that the Admiralty was greatly improved after 
Wemyss’ appointment is misleading and as such cannot be taken as a reason for 
justifying Jellicoe’s dismissal.    
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Chapter VIII 
 
  
 Conclusions 
  
 
This chapter is primarily directed at consolidating the conclusions made in the 
previous chapters.  What can be said at the outset is that despite the number of 
hypotheses put forward for Jellicoe’s dismissal by several historians, and indeed the 
research undertaken for this dissertation, no rational explanation has come to light.  
This would suggest that it was simply an expression of Lloyd George’s mercurial and 
vindictive character.  
 However, before moving to the conclusions, there are two other issues that 
warrant brief discussion, namely the question of whether the stress of command 
during three years of war had impaired Jellicoe’s ability to continue as First Sea Lord, 
and, perhaps perversely, the commands offered to him after his dismissal.       
 
 
The Stress Factor 
 
As mentioned, Newbolt, in the Official History, concluded that the stress of 
command had been too much for Jellicoe and it was in his own and the Navy’s 
interest that he left.  Whether or not this was just an example of Newbolt’s ‘restraint’, 
it was a view that was perpetuated by two of Jellicoe’s biographers, Patterson and 
Winton.  The former concluded that by the end of 1917, ‘Jellicoe was no longer fit to 
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continue as First Sea Lord.’1  Winton was of the view that ‘the strain showed on him 
physically’ and, in support of this view, relied on an incident in August 1917 whereby 
‘one of his papers was so lacking in direction and prosily diffuse and so confusedly 
set out, that Geddes wrote on it “Better not use this argument.”’2  Marder was also of 
the view that at the end of 1917 Jellicoe was ‘overtired’ and that ‘[his] ability to 
grapple with his problems of First Sea Lord was sapped by the cumulative mental and 
physical pressures of three years.’3   
However, this view is inconsistent with much of the evidence, including 
evidence quoted by Marder himself.  Firstly, Marder appears to have had direct 
correspondence with Jellicoe’s family over the issue in which a niece of Lady Jellicoe 
observed that through 1917 ‘Lady Jellicoe never showed any anxiety about the 
Admiral’s health and that he [Jellicoe] seemed always his usual shrewd, quietly 
observant self.’4  Lord McKenna, First Lord of the Admiralty from 1908 to 1911, also 
wrote that ‘the suggestion that Jellicoe was suffering from strain is new to me and 
quite ridiculous. I saw him constantly at the time and he certainly showed no 
indication of unusual fatigue.’5  The Sea Lords, in their correspondence with Geddes 
after the dismissal, wrote that ‘we have full confidence in Sir John Jellicoe’s ability 
and fitness to perform his responsible duties’, a collective remark they would have 
been unlikely to make if they had any doubts as to Jellicoe’s physical or mental 
capacity.
6
  Moreover, there is a counter to Winton’s argument that the ‘confused 
document’ supported the view that Jellicoe was ‘over tired’.  In Chapter IV, reference 
was made to orders that Jellicoe issued to Bacon in December 1917 regarding 
                                                 
1
 Patterson, Jellicoe, 205.  
2
 Winton, Jellicoe, 252.   
3
 Marder, FDSF, 4, 330. 
4
 Ibid, 329. 
5
 Letter, McKenna to Bacon, 21 August 1936, quoted, Bacon, Jellicoe, 386. 
6
 Letter, Sea Lords to Geddes, 2 January 1918, NA, ADM 116/1807. 
 249 
measures to be taken in connection with the patrolling and illumination of the mine 
barrage across the English Channel.  As noted there, those orders were measured, 
balanced, decisive and showed a clear appreciation of the relative risks involved.  In 
contrast to the example quoted by Winton, they do not appear to have been issued by 
someone whose judgement had been impaired through stress or ill health. 
The final point on this issue is one that has been expressed by Bacon.  He 
claimed that ‘had mental or physical failing been the real cause, both Sir Eric Geddes 
and Mr. Lloyd George would have stated the fact openly, but to have done so would 
have been to court ridicule and contradiction’.7  Irrespective of any concern about 
Bacon’s bias, the point is well made.  If Jellicoe’s health was an issue, he need not 
have been dismissed, or certainly not in the manner that he was.  He could have been 
rested for a short period, or at worst asked to resign on health grounds.  There is no 
suggestion in any of the source material consulted that either Lloyd George or Geddes 
regarded Jellicoe’s health as an issue.  Thus, it was not a justifiable reason for his 
dismissal.  
 
 
Aftermath 
 
The argument that Jellicoe’s health was not a factor in his dismissal is 
supported by the fact that not long after he was offered two further command posts.  
Firstly, he was offered the command of the naval base at Devonport in place of 
Admiral Bethell, but declined this on the grounds that he was not prepared ‘even in 
wartime - to take a command which involves depriving a brother flag officer of his 
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appointment before its proper termination, when that officer, so far as I am aware, has 
filled it with merit’.8  Geddes had made this offer on 3 April 1918, i.e., when he still 
appeared to have concerns about being questioned in the House of Commons over 
Jellicoe’s dismissal.  Consequently, his motivation for offering Jellicoe the command 
of Devonport in these circumstances may well have been to deflect potential criticism 
over the matter.  Bethell certainly was of that view, claiming that the offer to Jellicoe 
was made ‘to quiet the agitation which has been caused by your relief as First Sea 
Lord’.9 
The second offer was of a much more significant value than that of 
commanding Devonport.  For some time the Allied War Council had been concerned 
about the lack of cohesion in the command of the British, French, Italian and Japanese 
naval forces operating in the Mediterranean.  Their proposed solution to this problem 
was to appoint an ‘Admiralissimo’ in overall command of these forces.  Early in May 
1918, Jellicoe, with the approval of the War Cabinet, was offered and indicated that 
he would be prepared to accept the role.  In the event however, the appointment did 
not materialise as, after lengthy debate within the Allied War Council, the proposal 
fell through, in essence because the Italian Chief of Naval Staff did not like the 
prospect of Jellicoe being able to order the Italian ships to sea.
10
                      
 Clearly, if the proposal to appoint Jellicoe as ‘Admiralissimo’ had 
materialised, the role would have been an important and challenging one which would 
have demanded considerable leadership, administrative, and not least of all, 
diplomatic skills.  Thus, in the context of this dissertation, perhaps the most striking 
factor about the nomination was the fact that it had been approved by Lloyd George 
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and Geddes just four months after Jellicoe’s dismissal.  Moreover, Jellicoe’s 
nomination for this post was, as discussed in Chapter VI, made at about the same time 
as Lloyd George was preparing to make a statement to the House of Commons to the 
effect that he had been ‘dissatisfied’ with Jellicoe; a confusing situation to say the 
least and again one which gives rise to the question of motivation.  It may have been 
that Lloyd George believed from the outset that the proposal to appoint the 
‘Admiralissimo’ would not have been accepted by all of the Allies, and this again 
leads to the suspicion that the motivation for nominating Jellicoe was simply ‘to quiet 
the agitation’.  Irrespective of the motive, in the event, Jellicoe’s contribution to the 
war effort ended on 24 December 1917. 
However, despite the offers of other commands, Jellicoe’s ignominy did not 
end with his dismissal.  On 21 November 1918, 370 British ships, with 90,000 men on 
board, sailed from various ports around Britain to rendezvous about 40 miles west of 
the Firth of Forth to accept the surrender of the High Seas Fleet.
11
  Jellicoe, despite his 
contribution to the war effort, was not invited to the surrender.  Admiral Beatty 
received all the accolades of the day.  Further, when the post war honours were 
awarded for war services, Beatty received an earldom and the sum of £100,000.  
Jellicoe received the sum of £50,000.
12
  Jellicoe’s ignominy was thus complete.  
 
 
Final Perspectives  
 
  After the war Jellicoe, at the behest of the Admiralty, embarked on an 
‘Empire Tour’ to examine the post war naval needs of the principal Dominion 
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countries and then, from 1920 to 1924, served successfully as Governor General of 
New Zealand.  For the latter services he received the earldom which ought to have 
been awarded at the end of the war.  However, despite the success of his post war 
career, Jellicoe’s reputation remained sullied.  This was partially as a result of the 
outcome of the Battle of Jutland relative to the level of public expectation of ‘a 
Nelsonian’ victory and partially as a consequence of his perceived lacklustre 
performance as First Sea Lord.  Andrew Gordon has written that ‘Jellicoe had gone to 
the Admiralty partly to get to grips with the submarine menace.  He failed.’13   As the 
foregoing demonstrates, this was manifestly not the case.  Jellicoe inherited a difficult 
legacy.  Before he was appointed First Sea Lord, the Admiralty had done little 
towards combating the U-boat.  Within a month of his arrival at the Admiralty, 
Germany decided to risk the wrath of the US and other neutral countries and altered 
its naval strategy by embarking on a wholly unrestricted campaign against merchant 
shipping, thereby rendering the British strategy of arming merchant ships virtually 
obsolete.  Lloyd George could not fault this strategy as it had been endorsed by him.  
As he later wrote, ‘the conclusion we [the War Cabinet] arrived at on this point was 
that it was a question of the first importance to increase the production of these 
[merchant ship guns].’14  Given the changes made at the Admiralty, the initiatives 
taken in the development, supply and equipping anti-submarine craft with depth 
charges and hydrophones and in the development and supply of effective mines, the 
perception that Jellicoe failed in tackling the U-boat threat is not credible.  Indeed, on 
the basis of the statistics referred to in Chapter II, it could be argued that the progress 
made by the end of 1917 was little short of remarkable.  Moreover, in this context 
Marder’s argument that it was ‘immaterial whether or not the submarine gets sunk in 
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the [convoy] process’ is fallacious.  That argument implies that the work undertaken 
in finding and introducing effective means of sinking the U-boat was unnecessary.  
Apart from the argument made in Chapter III that the greater the number of 
submarines that are operating, the greater their chance of success, escort vessels were 
of little use if they did not have weapons to deter U-boat attacks.  Thus, embarking on 
a programme of developing weapons capable of detecting and sinking submarines 
was essential. 
         Where the Admiralty under Jellicoe has been universally criticised is in the 
perceived delay in introducing a general convoy system.  There is no doubt that the 
Admiralty staff paper issued in January 1917, recommending that ‘vessels should sail 
singly’, is evidence that the prevalent view within the Admiralty was that merchant 
ships sailing in convoy was not the answer.  However Lloyd George’s vitriolic 
criticism that the Admiralty was totally opposed to the introduction of the convoy is 
not sustainable.  The source documentation referred to in Chapter III provides 
evidence that Jellicoe had the issue under review, and indeed gave early approval to 
the introduction of escorted convoys for the coal trade with France and for trade with 
Scandinavia.  Furthermore, the Admiralty had grounds for being somewhat cautious.  
It was not as if the rationale for this caution was spurious.  As Hankey acknowledged 
in his Memorandum of 11 February 1917, advocating the introduction of the convoy, 
the potential problems perceived by the Admiralty of slow speed, difficulty in station 
keeping, providing a larger target for submarines to attack and potential port 
congestion, were ‘formidable’ objections.15  Also, there is no doubt that unless the 
Grand Fleet was to be deprived of its screening destroyers, there was a chronic 
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shortage of vessels for escort purposes and the timing of the entry of the US into the 
war was critical in this respect. 
                            Nevertheless, despite their reservations, the Admiralty did initiate the use of a 
general convoy system at the end of April 1917.  Lloyd George claimed that it was his 
threatened visit to the Admiralty on 30 April 1917 that provoked the change of mind.  
Again, the evidence adduced in Chapter III counters this claim.  A combination of the 
timing of Admiral Duff’s memorandum of 27 April 1917, the dramatic increase in the 
shipping losses over the last two weeks of April, the prospect of additional escort 
vessels being supplied by the US Navy and Duff’s later outright denial that he was 
responding to political influence, all point to the fact that Lloyd George grossly 
exaggerated his involvement.   
         Jellicoe believed that the perceived delay in introducing the convoy system was a 
contributory factor in Lloyd George’s decision to replace him.  However, considering 
the time that elapsed between Germany embarking on an unrestricted campaign and 
first introducing a general convoy system, given the enormity of the logistical issues 
and, as Bacon pointed out, the fact that until April 1917 the Admiralty had no power 
to direct merchant ship owners, there is a powerful argument to the effect that any 
delay was more perceived than real.   
         This raises the question as to why Jellicoe appears to have been universally 
condemned on this issue by historical commentators.  In part the answer lies in the 
proposition that if the Admiralty had taken ‘a cold, hard look’ back at history they 
would have come to the convoy solution sooner than they did.
16
  However, apart from 
changes brought about by the advent of steam, the critical element of Britain’s sea 
trade during the Napoleonic wars was carried out by some hundreds of small wooden 
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ships, whereas by June 1914, British Empire shipping alone totalled in excess of 20 
million tons, carried in much larger ships of immeasurable numbers.
17
  Consequently, 
as Terraine points out, ‘It is not entirely to be wondered at if the Admiralty baulked at 
the sheer size of the task if it attempted constant trade protection on the lines of the 
old convoy system.’18  
         The other part of the answer lies in the proposition that historians have been 
swayed by the criticism of Lloyd George, and to a lesser extent Winston Churchill, 
and these historians have not considered the circumstances in the context either of the 
legacy Jellicoe inherited or the novel and unique problems raised by an undetectable 
enemy attacking unseen.  Even if the argument that the Admiralty under Jellicoe was 
slow to realise the benefits of the convoy system is accepted, any delay was short 
lived and indeed the fact that Jellicoe was prepared to overturn the prevailing view 
and grasp the logistical difficulties involved counters the perception that he was too 
rigid and inflexible in his approach.  
         Thus, as stated in the conclusion to Chapter III, the extensive and severe 
criticism the Admiralty under Jellicoe has been subjected to over this matter has not 
been warranted.  It therefore follows that Lloyd George would not have been justified 
in dismissing Jellicoe for reasons related to the introduction of a general system of 
convoys for merchant shipping.   
         The fact that six months passed between the time when Lloyd George stated that 
he had finally decided to replace Jellicoe and actually doing so, also gives rise to the 
question as to whether further grounds for dismissal may have arisen during the 
intervening period.  Although there were differences of opinion between Geddes and 
Jellicoe during that period, an analysis of the circumstances leading to these 
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differences leads to the conclusion that they did not constitute grounds for dismissal.  
The issue over honours for Admiral Duff appeared relatively trivial in the context of 
the war effort.  Moreover, when Duff tendered his resignation after Jellicoe’s 
dismissal, Geddes was at pains to persuade Duff to remain at the Admiralty, clearly 
recognising the significance of Duff’s contribution to countering the U-boat threat.  
The destruction of the two Scandinavian convoys in October and December 1917 
showed deficiencies in operational procedures, but these incidents themselves were 
not the source of the argument between Jellicoe and Geddes.  Rather it was the way 
Geddes handled the enquiry by undermining Beatty’s authority.  Again Jellicoe’s 
concerns over this were vindicated by Geddes’ later apology to Beatty.   
         As to the dispute between Admirals Bacon and Keyes over the Dover barrage, 
they both had valid grounds for adopting the position they did.  Jellicoe’s intervention 
in the matter was considered and balanced.  Given the respective rights and wrongs of 
the positions taken by the feuding Admirals and the success of the Dover Patrol under 
Bacon in protecting the Channel, Jellicoe’s loyalty to Bacon in refusing to relieve him 
of command was not misplaced.  There is no evidence of any difference of opinion on 
strategy or on operational matters between Geddes and Jellicoe.  The differences that 
did exist related more to ‘style’ of management than to any substantive issues. 
         Furthermore, for two reasons Lloyd George had less cause to replace Jellicoe at 
the end of December 1917 than at the end June.  Firstly, friction that may have existed 
between Lloyd George and Jellicoe through June and July 1917 over Jellicoe’s 
support for the military’s war strategy had disappeared in as much as the War Cabinet 
had, with reservations, accepted the strategy advocated by Generals Haig and 
Robertson and had authorised the Flanders offensive.  Secondly, Jellicoe had largely 
succeeded in his primary mission at the Admiralty, namely containing the German U-
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boat threat.  Finally in this context, the fact that different historical commentators 
have attributed different hypotheses as to the circumstances that may have triggered 
the dismissal, does in itself suggest that there was no rational explanation for it.  
        Turning to the circumstances of the dismissal discussed in Chapter VI, three 
points can be drawn in conclusion.  Firstly, there is no doubt that the inappropriate 
manner of the dismissal was bound to induce resentment from within the Navy and 
from Jellicoe.  It would certainly appear that in acting with such haste, Lloyd George 
and Geddes took advantage of the fact that Parliament was in recess and that 
newspapers were not published over the Christmas period.  Further, by just leaving 
the dismissal letter on Jellicoe’s desk, Geddes avoided a personal confrontation with 
him, which would have resulted in being asked for an explanation as to the reasons; 
an explanation that Geddes did not have.  Secondly, the aftermath of the dismissal 
was mishandled by Geddes.  The Sea Lords initially decided not to resign; a decision 
they made on the basis that Geddes’ two predecessors, Arthur Balfour and Sir Edward 
Carson, supported the decision to remove Jellicoe.  It was when they were told 
otherwise by Carson that they threatened resignation.  If there had been a rational 
explanation for dismissing Jellicoe, Geddes would not have had to rely on the 
misleading claim that he had the support of his predecessors.  Thirdly, the dismissal 
was effected without the knowledge or concurrence of the War Cabinet.  Lloyd 
George was no doubt aware that there were members of the Cabinet who would resist 
Jellicoe’s removal and the fact that the Cabinet were presented with a fait accompli, 
once again points to the fact that he would have had difficulty in providing his 
Cabinet colleagues with justifiable reasons. 
         Subterfuge on the part of Lloyd George is also evident in the way General Haig 
was brought into the matter.  The circumstances surrounding Geddes’ appointment as 
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Controller and the timing of his complaints to Haig about the state of affairs at the 
Admiralty point to the conclusion that Haig’s involvement was engineered by Lloyd 
George.  Certainly Haig’s support would have helped ease the  path to obtaining the 
King’s consent to replacing Jellicoe and the approval of the War Cabinet had the 
matter been brought to it at that time.  Why Haig should have become involved is not 
clear.  He may have wished to deflect attention from himself as Lord Beaverbrook 
maintained.  Alternatively, Haig may just have felt that he had no option but to 
become involved after Geddes had raised the issue with him.         
         Haig’s involvement came to nothing.  Political expediency dictated that Lloyd 
George could not dismiss Jellicoe at that time.  By appointing Geddes as First Lord in 
place of Carson, he had his ‘satellite’ in place, but with Geddes lacking the requisite 
experience, he was obliged to retain Jellicoe for the time being.  However, it is 
evident that Lloyd George prepared the ground for removing Jellicoe in two ways.  
Firstly, he appointed Admiral Wemyss as Deputy First Sea Lord.  As explained in 
Chapter VII, given Wemyss’ background and limited experience, this was a peculiar 
choice.  It was based on a discussion that Lloyd George had with a junior captain then 
serving at the Admiralty.  Marder states that there was a suspicion amongst Jellicoe 
supporters that Wemyss’ appointment was part of a conspiracy to remove Jellicoe 
from office and that would seem to be confirmed by the remarks made by Lady 
Wemyss at the time of her husband’s appointment.  Thus, there is little doubt that the 
motivation behind his appointment was to have an available successor who was 
considerably more malleable than Jellicoe. 
         The second way Lloyd George prepared the ground for Jellicoe’s dismissal was 
by conspiring with Lord Northcliffe to embark on a press campaign to discredit the 
Admiralty.  Despite Lloyd George’s persistent claims to the contrary, the nature of the 
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relationship between Lloyd George and Northcliffe, the timing and content of the 
press attacks and, latterly, their virulent and personal nature, all give credence to 
Hamilton Fyffe’s allegation that Lloyd George told Northcliffe, ‘You kill him, I’ll 
bury him.’19  Certainly, there is little doubt that, given Northcliffe’s quasi- 
governmental role at the time, Lloyd George could have brought an end to the press 
campaign by following the Attorney General’s advice and asking Northcliffe to desist.  
There is no evidence to suggest that Lloyd George acted on that advice.   
         Beaverbrook was of the view that Haig’s involvement in the matter was part of a 
well constructed plot to remove Jellicoe.  At times, Beaverbrook was prone to 
exaggeration.  However, if the circumstances surrounding, firstly, Geddes’ 
appointment as Controller, secondly, the involvement of Haig, thirdly the 
appointment of Wemyss as Deputy First Sea Lord and fourthly, Northcliffe’s press 
campaign against the Admiralty are taken together, on this occasion Beaverbrook’s 
view undoubtedly has merit.  It did perhaps take longer for the plan to come to 
fruition than Lloyd George may have originally contemplated.                
         This leaves the issue as to whether the Admiralty performed better under 
Wemyss than it did under Jellicoe.  Again, despite the assertions of Marder and other 
historical commentators, the answer is that it did not.  If anything, the Grand Fleet 
strategy became more defensive.  Operational mistakes continued to be made and 
opportunities continued to be missed.  In the conflict that emerged between the 
Operations Division and the Plans Division, the Admiralty’s strategy became 
confused.  Moreover, despite the public and press accolades, the raid on Zeebrugge 
and Ostend was a failure; a very costly one in terms of casualties. 
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        Nicholas Black has suggested that ‘the events of Christmas Eve 1917, when 
Jellicoe was summarily sacked, made little real difference.’20  To the extent that the 
German submarine was ultimately defeated as a result of the building blocks Jellicoe 
put in place during his tenure as First Sea Lord, Black is correct.  However, at the end 
of 1917 Jellicoe contemplated reducing the capability of the Grand Fleet by diverting 
yet more escort vessels to strengthen trade protection measures.  If that had been 
done, merchant shipping losses could well have reduced more quickly.  Consequently, 
on that basis it can be argued that the ‘difference’ under Wemyss was an adverse one.  
         Thus, reverting to the central theme of this dissertation, based on the conclusions 
drawn from the six premises referred to in Chapter I, there was no rational 
explanation for Jellicoe’s dismissal.  On an analysis of the work undertaken by the 
Admiralty through 1917 coupled with the resulting success in combating the U-boat, 
the view of those historical commentators who have concluded that Jellicoe was not 
an effective Sea Lord is misconceived.  Moreover, the criticism made regarding the 
introduction of the convoy system does not stand up to critical appraisal.  Jellicoe’s 
predecessors at the Admiralty may be accused of dilatoriness in this respect, but not 
Jellicoe.
21
  The shipping losses through the latter part of April 1917 had risen to such 
an extent that the balance of risk had changed and, courtesy of the US, additional 
escorts had become available.  His dilemma was real and given the catastrophe that 
would have resulted if command of the surface of the seas had been lost as a 
consequence of leaving the Grand Fleet without sufficient escort vessels, his caution 
in this respect was warranted. 
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         This leaves the question as to why, in all these circumstances, Lloyd George, 
through Geddes, dismissed Jellicoe.  He took a huge risk.  His action almost brought 
about the resignation of all the Sea Lords, which probably would have resulted in the 
collapse of the Government with the Conservative members withdrawing their 
support for him.  There is no doubt that by the end of 1917 Lloyd George was 
frustrated by events of that year, particularly with the failure of the Passchendaele 
offensive, and in needing to effect some change he sacked the one senior commander 
he felt he could without major repercussions.  He was no doubt also frustrated by 
Jellicoe’s pessimism, particularly when it was coupled with forceful argument from 
Jellicoe that supported the strategic views of Haig and Robertson.  It must have been 
galling for Lloyd George to have his ideas on military strategy resisted by a 
triumvirate of advisers who were appointed by his political predecessors.  On the 
other hand by the end of 1917, the dispute over military strategy that had persisted 
through June and July 1917 had passed and, according to Geddes, ‘There was no 
urgent issue at the Admiralty.’  This leaves the perception that Lloyd George 
dismissed Jellicoe on a whim.  There was no logic to it or to the choice of Jellicoe’s 
successor.  The only feasible explanation is that he resented that Jellicoe had 
frequently thwarted his ambitions, not least in the compilation of the 1909 – 1910 
Naval Estimates, whereby he curtailed Lloyd George’s plans for social reform.  In 
other words, the dismissal was simply an expression of Lloyd George’s vindictive 
nature.  King George V certainly was of that view, claiming that ‘the Prime Minister 
had his knife into him [Jellicoe] for some time.’22    
          The military theorist, Carl von Clausewitz, wrote, ‘The subordination of the 
political to the military point of view is absurd, because politics has produced the war; 
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it is the intellect and the war only the instrument and not the other way round.’23  
From this it is logical to infer that the appointment and dismissal of commanders of 
the fighting services must lie within the prerogative of their political masters.  That is 
not to say that such powers should be exercised without justification, if for no other 
reason than the unreasonable exercise of that power will undermine the loyalty of 
those lesser ranks that are required to fight.  Lloyd George was fortunate.  If the 
ensuing political furore had resulted in the downfall of the coalition government, ‘the 
political’ would have been subordinated to the ‘military’ and the ensuing ‘state of 
absurdity’ could only have impaired Britain’s war effort.  That the Admiralty Board 
did not resign was due in no small part to Carson and Jellicoe placing the country’s 
interests above their own, in spite of the machinations of Lloyd George and Geddes.  
Lloyd George was also fortunate in that the foundations Jellicoe put in place in terms 
of strategy, weapons development and the organisation necessary to operate the 
convoy system meant that by August 1918 the Navy had achieved a comprehensive 
victory over the U-boat.  
             In one respect, Jellicoe was less fortunate.  Despite the success of his post war 
career, his reputation remained tarnished.  As suggested in Chapter I, Lloyd George’s 
version of the war ‘stigmatised indelibly’ the popular memory of those in charge of 
the Admiralty during 1917.  That popular memory has been perpetuated by those 
historians who have demeaned Jellicoe’s effectiveness as First Sea Lord.  It is hoped 
that the arguments made in this dissertation will go some way towards removing the 
stigma.  Jellicoe’s career cannot be likened to an Aristotelian tragedy.  He was not 
responsible for his own downfall.            
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